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3Abstract
The first chapter is titled "Productivity As If Space Mattered: An Application to Factor Markets Across
China”. Optimal production decisions depend on local market characteristics. This chapter develops a
model to explain firm labour demand and firm density across regions. Firms vary in their technology
to combine imperfectly substitutable worker types, and locate across regions with distinct distributions
of workers and wages. Firm technologies which best match regional labour markets explain both pro-
ductivity differences and firm density. Estimating structural model parameters is simple and relies on
a two stage OLS procedure. The first stage estimates local market conditions using firm employment
and regional data, while the second incorporates regional costs into production function estimation.
The method is applied to Chinese manufacturing, population census and geographic data to estimate
local market costs and production technologies. In line with the model, we find that labour markets
which provide cost advantages explain substantial differences in firm productivity. Furthermore, re-
gions which have lower optimal hiring costs attract more firms per capita. This is a joint work with
Wenya Cheng and Dr John Morrow.
The second chapter is called “Foreign Ownership Share and Property Rights: Evidence from Thai
Manufacturing Firms”. Existing work based on property-rights theories treat ownership as binary
and the degree of integration as exogenous. This chapter proposes a property-rights model where
the degree of integration is endogenised and treated as a continuous variable. The model makes two
predictions for firm behaviour under vertical integration. Firstly, foreign ownership shares should
increase with the significance of foreign investors’ investment. Secondly, the effect of investors’
investment on ownership increases with the elasticity of substitution across product varieties. Both
predictions find considerable support in firm-level data from Thailand.
The third chapter, “Product Quality and Intra-firm Trade”, presents a partial equilibrium model
with product quality differentiation where heterogeneous firms choose whether to vertically integrate
their foreign suppliers or outsource input production. Quality is non-verifiable by third parties which
causes the well-known hold-up problem. The severity of the problem increases with product quality.
The model yields a closed form expression for the productivity threshold that assigns firms into dif-
ferent ownership structures. The impact of quality related parameters on the threshold is analysed in
detail.
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Part I
Introduction
This thesis consists of three chapters. Their common denominator is the study of how firms organise
their production, with a focus on the skill mix of employees (the first chapter) and on ownership
decisions (the second and third chapters). In the first chapter, firms choose to locate in a region
where they can obtain the optimal skill mix, given their production technology, at the lowest costs and
this maximizes their productivity. If this is true, firms’ optimal production decisions should depend
on local labour market characteristics. A multi-region, multi-industry general equilibrium model,
where industries vary in production technology is proposed to analyse the hypothesis and measure
how significant this is in comparison to existing mo dels where skill mix and and local labour market
conditions are not taken into account when estimating firm productivity. Each region is endowed with
a different distribution of skill types and wages across workers. Firms freely locate and hire a team of
workers by choosing the optimal combination of skill levels given local conditions. Since firms take
regional characteristics as given, each firm chooses an optimal labour force conditional on industry
technology and locality. It follows that the comparative suitability of regions varies by industry. Firms
thus locate in proportion to the cost advantages available in each region.
The model allows the authors to test the hypothesis empirically by estimating structural model
parameters which relies on a two stage OLS procedure. The first stage estimates local market con-
ditions using firm employment and regional data, while the second incorporates regional costs into
production function estimation. Viability of the estimator is illustrated by simulating the underlying
production model and accurately recovering the model parameters. The method is applied to Chinese
manufacturing, population census and geographic data to estimate local market costs and production
technologies. In line with the model, we find that labour markets which provide cost advantages
explain substantial differences in firm productivity. Furthermore, regions which have lower optimal
hiring costs attract more firms per capita. The results indicate that differences in local markets are
quantitatively important and support the hypothesis that modeling a firm’s local environment may
yield substantial insights into production patterns.
The first chapter focuses on firms’ optimal decisions on hiring and production location whereas the
second and third chapters analyse firms’ decisions on their ownership structure. The second chapter
14
investigates how existing results in property-rights theories change if the degree of integration (i.e.
fraction of a subsidiary owned by its parent firm) becomes a continuous choice variable. Existing
papers in property-right literature, especially papers which examine the determinants of intra-firm
trade, mostly treat the degree of integration as an exogenous and discrete variable. A property-right
model where ownership share is endogenous and continuous is proposed and it gives two testable
predictions for firm behaviour under vertical integration. Firstly, foreign ownership shares should
increase with the significance of foreign investors’ investment. Secondly, the effect of investors’
investment on ownership increases with the elasticity of substitution across product varieties. Both
predictions find considerable support in firm-level data from Thailand. This chapter provides the first
piece of evidence suggesting that switching from exogenous and discrete degree of ownership to a
continuous choice variable generates significantly different results.
The aim of the third chapter is to explain how the desired level of input quality affects firms’
decision on their ownership structure. The chapter presents a partial equilibrium model with product
quality differentiation where heterogeneous firms choose whether to vertically integrate their foreign
suppliers or outsource input production. Quality is non-verifiable by a third party which causes the
well-known hold-up problem. The severity of the problem increases with product quality. The model
yields a closed form expression for the productivity threshold that assigns firms into different own-
ership structures. The impact of quality related parameters on the threshold is analysed in detail.
This chapter provides the first framework where both product quality and firm boundaries are jointly
determined and this is a good basis for future empirical work on the issue.
Even if both chapter two and three provides insights into the theory of the firm, they focus on
different aspects and based on different strands of ownership literature. The setting in the second
chapter is based on property-rights theory while the third chapter is based on transaction cost theory.
This is because the extra complexity that comes with the property-rights theory does not provide
additional insight into analysing the effect of product quality on ownership. By opting for transactional
cost theory, much richer findings are generated and closed form solutions can be found.
This thesis generates several new insights into how firms organise their production. Those new
insights include how firms hire their heterogeneous workers and choose their locations, how existing
results about firm ownership change when the degree of ownership becomes a continuous choice
variable and how product quality affects firms’ decisions on their ownership structure.
15
Part II
Productivity As If Space Mattered: An
Application to Factor Markets Across China
1 Introduction
A number of studies document large and persistent differences in productivity across both coun-
tries and firms.1 However, these differences remain largely ‘some sort of measure of our ignorance’
(Abramovitz, 1956). This chapter enquires to what extent the supply characteristics of regional input
markets might help explain such systematic productivity dispersion across firms. It would be surpris-
ing if disparate factor markets result in similar outcomes, when clearly the prices and quality of inputs
available vary considerably over space. Modeling firm adaptation to different factor markets provides
deeper insights and testable predictions about how firms produce and where they choose to locate.
Differences between factor markets, especially for labour, are likely to be especially stark in de-
veloping economies undergoing urbanisation (Lewis, 1954), or when government policies increase
relocation costs beyond those normally present. Institutional mobility constraints, such as the hukou
system in China, further exacerbate differences in the composition of labour markets. Even the US
labour market, which is considered relatively fluid, exhibits high migration costs as measured by the
wage differential required to drive relocation (Kennan and Walker, 2011). Thus, free movement of fac-
tors does not mean frictionless movement, and recent work has indicated imperfect factor mobility has
sizable economic effects (Topalova, 2010). Rather than considering the forces which cause workers
to locate across space, this chapter instead takes a different turn to enquire what existing differences
in regional input markets imply for firm input use, location and productivity.
To better understand these issues, we propose a multi-region, multi-industry general equilibrium
model. Industries vary in team technology, i.e. their ability to substitute between different types
of labour (e.g. Bowles, 1970). Each region is endowed with a different distribution of skill types
and wages across workers. Firms freely locate and hire a team of workers by choosing the optimal
combination of skill levels given local conditions. Since firms take regional characteristics as given,
1See Syverson (2011) for a review.
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each firm chooses an optimal labour force conditional on industry technology and locality. It follows
that the comparative suitability of regions varies by industry. Firms thus locate in proportion to the
cost advantages available in each region.
In the model, firm hiring depends on the local distribution of worker types and wages. Since
labour demand depends on model parameters and regional labour market conditions, this implies real
labour costs vary by region and industry. These labour costs help explain differences in productivity.2
However, it is not immediately clear that such productivity differences are of an economically large
magnitude. To quantify real world supply conditions, we develop an estimation strategy for the key
structural parameters. A simple relationship obtains between the firm-level shares of worker types
hired and regional observables, which can be estimated by OLS as a first stage. The first stage iden-
tifies the labour technology parameters and allows computation of regional labour costs by industry,
linking regional markets to productivity. Furthermore, the model relaxes the often imposed restric-
tion that production be supermodular, a restriction that would otherwise often bind in our sample.
The second stage incorporates regional costs into production function estimation, either by OLS or
other commonly used methods. This strategy is straightforward to implement, and simulation of the
underlying production model shows little accuracy is lost in comparison to full structural estimation.
The procedure just outlined is applied to manufacturing and population census data spread over
three hundred prefectures in China. The manufacturing survey reports the distribution of workers
across skills for each firm, while the population census provides regional distributions of wages and
worker skill types. By revealing how firm demand for skills varies with local conditions, this infor-
mation allows recovery of the unit costs for labour across China. Our estimates imply an interquartile
difference in labour costs for each industry of 30 to 80 percent. As predicted by the model, labour
costs are negatively related to the value added per capita across regions. This indicates that economic
activity locates where regional costs are lowest.
A second stage estimates production function parameters, explicitly accounting for regional cost
differences. Since firms are capable of substituting out of labour inputs when they are relatively
expensive, this fact alters estimation of the relative share of labour in production. Once this effect
is accounted for, labour cost differences result in firm productivity differences for each industry of
3 to 17 percent. The estimates show that favourable labour market conditions explain substantial
2Effective labour costs are driven by the complementarity of regional endowments with industry technology, and this
chapter refers to these additional real production possibilities as ‘productivity’.
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differences in firm productivity. Once local market costs are controlled for, ‘residual’ productivity is a
stronger predictor of firm performance characteristics such as survival and growth. This suggests that
the unobservables which make firms more competitive are often conflated with advantageous input
markets.
Related work. The importance of local market characteristics, especially in developing coun-
tries, has recently been emphasised by Karadi and Koren (2012). These authors calibrate a spatial
firm model to sector level data in developing countries to better account for the role of firm location
in measured productivity. Moretti (2011) reviews work on local labour markets and agglomeration
economies, explicitly modeling spatial equilibrium across labour markets. Distinct from this litera-
ture, we take the outcome of spatial labour markets as given and focus on the trade offs firms face and
the consequences of regional markets in productivity measurement and firm location.
Several papers have explored how different aspects of labour affect firm-level productivity. There
is substantial work on the effect of worker skills on productivity (Abowd Kramarz and Margolis (1999,
2005), Fox and Smeets (2011)). Other labour characteristics that drive productivity include manage-
rial talent and practices (Bloom and Reenen, 2007), social connections among workers (Bandiera,
Barankay, and Rasul, 2009), organisational form (Garicano and Heaton, 2010) and incentive pay
(Lazear, 2000). Other determinants of firm productivity include market structure (Syverson (2004)),
product market rivalry and technology spillovers (Bloom, Schankerman, and Van Reenen (2007)) and
vertical integration (Hortaçsu and Syverson (2007), Atalay, Hortacsu, and Syverson (2012)). In con-
trast, this chapter considers the role of differences in input markets across regions.
Within the trade literature, a few studies propose that different industries perform optimally under
different degrees of skill diversity. Based on this idea, Grossman and Maggi (2000) build a theoretical
model explaining how differences in skill dispersion across countries could determine comparative
advantage and global trade patterns. Building on this work, Morrow (2010) proposes a multi-industry
model of firms which allows for technology choice and general skill distributions to estimate the
model across developing countries, finding that skill diversity is significant in explaining productivity
and export differences.
Although we are unaware of other studies estimating model primitives as a function of local market
characteristics, reduced form empirical work is consonant with the theoretical implications. Iranzo,
Schivardi, and Tosetti (2008) find that higher skill dispersion is associated with higher TFP in Italy.
Similarly, Parrotta, Pozzoli, and Pytlikova (2011) find that diversity in education leads to higher pro-
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ductivity in Denmark. Martins (2008) finds that firm wage dispersion affects firm performance in
Portugal. Bombardini, Gallipoli, and Pupato (2011) use literacy scores to show that countries with
more dispersed skills specialise in industries characterised by lower skill complementarity. In con-
trast, this chapter combines firm and population census data to explicitly model regional differences
in input markets, leading to micro founded identification and estimates. The method used is novel,
and results of this chapter highlight the degree to which firm behaviour are influenced by economic
geography through the availability of inputs.3
Clearly this study also contributes to the empirical literature on Chinese productivity. Ma, Tang,
and Zhang (2011) show that exporting is positively correlated with TFP and that firms self select into
exporting which, ex post, further increases TFP. Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2012) estimate
Chinese firm TFP, showing that new entry accounts for two thirds of TFP growth and that TFP growth
dominates input accumulation as a source of output growth. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) posit that India
and China have lower productivity relative to the US due to resource misallocation and compute how
manufacturing TFP in India and China would increase if resource allocation was similar to that of the
US. This chapter uncovers local factors that determine productivity. How this interacts with the above
mechanisms is a potential area for further work.4
The rest of the chapter continues by laying out a model that incorporates a rich view of the labour
hiring process. The model explains how firms internalise local labour market conditions to maximise
profits, resulting in an industry specific unit cost of labour by region. Section 3 places these firms
in a general equilibrium, monopolistic competition framework, in particular addressing where firms
locate. Section 4 explains how the model can be estimated with a simple nested OLS approach, and
is illustrated using a simulated dataset generated by the model. Section 5 discusses details of the data,
while Section 6 presents our model estimates and uses them to explain the effect of different regional
input markets on firm behaviour. Section 7 concludes and the appendix is in Section 8.
2 The Role of Skill Mix in Production
The primary goal of this section is to develop a model of firm hiring which takes into account both
the wages and quantity of locally available worker types. Recently, both Borjas (2009) and Ottaviano
3The importance of backward linkages for firm behaviour are a recurring theme in both the development and economic
geography literature, see Hirschman (1958) and recently Overman and Puga (2010).
4Such regional differences might help explain the Chinese export facts of Manova and Zhang (2012) and the different
impact of liberalisation across trade regimes found by Bas and Strauss-Kahn (2012).
2 THE ROLE OF SKILL MIX IN PRODUCTION 19
and Peri (2010) have emphasised the importance of more complete model frameworks to estimate
substitution between worker types. However, in distinction to most of the labour literature, our primary
interest is firm behaviour and accordingly we develop a model that predicts hiring by firms rather than
wages to estimate substitution patterns.
The model specifies a theory of the firm which begins with a neoclassical production function
combining homogeneous inputs (materials, capital) and differentiated inputs (types of labour). While
homogeneous inputs are perfectly mobile within industries, labour is perfectly mobile within regions.
Industries are assumed to have different technologies available for combining types of labour into
teams. Since workers are imperfectly substitutable, they potentially induce spillovers within firms, a
distinct possibility allowed for by our model, and consequently are not paid their marginal product.5
We proceed with a detailed specification of the labour hiring process, solving for firms’ optimal re-
sponses to prevailing labour market supply conditions. This provides a characterisation of the unit
cost for labour by region which depends on local conditions and firm technology. This induces com-
parative advantage across regions for any given technology, and thereby helps explain productivity
differences in terms of local input markets.
2.1 Firm Production
Firm j within an industry T faces a neoclassical production technology FTj (M,K,L) which combines
materials M, capital K and labour L6 to produce output. While M and K are composed of homogeneous
units measured by value, labour is composed of a heterogeneous team of workers who provide an
aggregate vector of human capital H. An industry specific capital stock KT is mobile across regions
but immobile across industries, and in equilibrium is available at rental rate rTK . Similarly, an industry
specific stock of materials MT is also mobile within each industry and available at a price rTM.
Labour is intersectorally mobile but interregionally immobile, and consists of S skill types of
workers, indexed i ∈ {1, . . . ,S}, who are combined to provide effective labour L. The amount of L
employed by the firm depends on the composition of a team through a technological parameter θT in
5Such spillovers are internalised by firms in the model. The extent to which spillovers might also occur across industries
is beyond the scope of this study, however see Moretti (2004) for evidence in the US context.
6These variables are at firm level, however the firm subscript j is dropped in order to simplify notation.
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the following way:
L≡
(
Hθ
T
1 +H
θT
2 + . . .+H
θT
S
)1/θT
. (2.1)
Notice that in the case of θT = 1, this specification collapses to a model where L is the total level of
human capital HTOT = ∑i Hi7. More generally, the Marginal Rate of Technical Substitution of type i
for type i′ is (Hi/Hi′)
θT−1. θT < 1 implies worker types are complementary, so that the firm’s ideal
workforce tends to represent a mix of all types (Figure 1a). In contrast, for θT > 1, firms are more
dependent on singular sources of human capital as L becomes submodular, i.e. convex in the input of
each single type (Figure 1b).8 We will specify a hiring process so that despite the convexity inherent
in Figure 1b, once firms choose the quality of their workers through hiring standards h, the labour
isoquants resume their typical shapes as in Figure 2. This avoids the possibility that some worker
types are never hired, in line with expectations about real world data patterns.
Figure 1: Human Capital Isoquants
(a) Supermodular Production in H Space (b) Submodular Production in H Space
Rewriting Equation (2.1) in terms of human capital shares within the firm shows the labour pro-
vided per unit of human capital is
L/HTOT =
(
(H1/HTOT)
θT +(H2/HTOT)
θT + . . .+(HS/HTOT)
θT
)1/θT
.
Writing the shares of human capital across types of workers as H˜ ≡ (H1/HTOT, . . . ,HS/HTOT) , effec-
7The variable Hi is at firm level, however the firm subscript j is dropped in order to simplify notation.
8See Morrow (2010) for a more detailed interpretation of super- and sub-modularity and implications.
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tive labour can be written
L︸︷︷︸
Effective Labour
= φ
(
H˜,θT
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Team Productivity Effect
· HTOT︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total Human Capital
where φ
(
x,θT
)≡ (∑i xθTi )1/θT so that the output is given by FT (M,K,φ (H˜,θT ) ·HTOT).
Although the technology θT is the same for all firms in an industry, firms do not all face the
same regional factor markets. Explicitly modeling these disparate markets emphasises the role of
regional heterogeneity in supplying human capital inputs to the firm in terms of both price and quality.
This provides not only differences in productivity across regions by technology, but since industries
differ in technology, local market conditions are more or less amenable to particular industries. We
now detail the hiring process, introducing different markets and deriving firms’ optimal hiring to best
accommodate these differences.
2.2 Optimal Hiring by Region and Technology
In each region R, workers command region specific wages for each type of labour wR =(wR,1, . . . ,wR,S)
and have type-industry specific human capital mT =
(
mT1 , . . . ,m
T
S
)
. In order to hire workers, a firm
must pay a fixed search cost of f effective labour units, at which point a distribution of worker types
with regional frequencies aR = (aR,1, . . . ,aR,S) are available from the search process.9 Each worker
has a firm specific match quality h∼Ψ which is observed during search and the firm hires on the basis
of match quality. Consequently, the firm chooses a minimum threshold of match quality for each type
they will retain, h = (h1, . . . ,hS).
10 Upon keeping a preferred set of workers, the firm may repeat this
process N times until achieving their desired workforce. At the end of hiring, the amount of human
capital produced by each type i is given by11
Hi ≡ N ·aR,imTi
∫ ∞
hi
hdΨ. (2.2)
9The weights aR can capture both the frequencies of available workers in addition to the possibility that certain types of
workers may be more difficult to hire for a particular task.
10This assumption is familiar from labour search models. We do not explicitly model equilibrium unemployment due to
the lack of a simple form for cross regional empirical work (see Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010)). Unlike Helpman,
et al., differences in hiring patterns across firms within the same industry are determined by regional market conditions,
rather than a productivity draw.
11Variables hi, h, N, and Hi are at firm level, however the firm subscript j is dropped in order to simplify notation.
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From a firm’s perspective, the threshold of worker match quality h is a means to choose an optimal
level of H, holding N fixed. However, as a firm lowers its quality threshold, it faces an increasing
average cost of each type of human capital Hi . These increasing average costs induce the firm to
maintain a positive match quality threshold and to search repeatedly for suitable workers.
The total costs of hiring labour depend on the regional wage rates wR, the availability of workers
aR, and the unit cost of labour in region R using technology T , labelled cTR . Since the total number of
each type i hired is NaR,i (1−Ψ(hi)), the total hiring bill is
Total Hiring Costs : N
[
∑
i
wR,iaR,i (1−Ψ(hi))+ f cTR
]
. (2.3)
Clearly, the firm faces a trade-off between the quantity and quality of workers hired. For in-
stance, the firm might hire a large number of workers and “cherry pick” the best matches by choosing
high values for h or save on interviewing costs f by choosing a low number of prospectives N and
permissively low values for h. This trade off and its dependence on the regional labour supply char-
acteristics aR and wR is made explicit by considering the technology and region specific cost function
CT (H|aR,wR), defined by
CT ≡min
N,h
N
[
∑
i
aR,iwR,i (1−Ψ(hi))+ f cTR
]
where Hi ≤ NaR,imTi
∫ ∞
hi
hdΨ. (2.4)
Letting µi denote the Lagrange multiplier for each of the S cost minimisation constraints, the first
order conditions for {hi} imply µi = wR,i/mTi hi, while the condition for N implies
CT (H|aR,wR) =∑
i
µiHi =∑wR,iHi/mTi hi. (2.5)
Equation (2.5) shows that the multipliers µi are the marginal cost contribution (per skill unit) to Hi of
the last type i worker hired.
The trade off between being more selective (high h) and avoiding search costs ( f cTR) is clearly
illustrated by combining Equations (2.3) and (2.5), which shows:
∑
i
aR,iwR,i
∫ ∞
hi
(h−hi)/hidΨ= f cTR . (2.6)
The LHS of Equation (2.6) decreases in h, so when a firm faces lower interviewing costs it can afford
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to be more selective by increasing h. Conversely, in the presence of high interviewing costs, the
firm optimally “lowers their standards” h to increase the size of their workforce without interviewing
additional workers.
2.3 Cost Minimisation
For a firm j to produce Q j units of output at minimal cost, inputs are chosen to solve
min
K,M,H
CT (H|aR,wR)+ rTKK+ rTMM subject to FTj
(
M,K,φ
(
H˜,θT
) ·HTOT)≥ Q j. (2.7)
The first order conditions for HTOT and Hi immediately imply that
(
wR,iHi/mTi hi
)
/CT (H|aR,wR) = d lnL/d lnHi =
(
H˜i+d lnφ
(
H˜,θT
)
/d lnHi
)
. (2.8)
This fixes a key relationship about the wage premium, defined as the share of wages paid to a type
beyond the share of human capital contributed. From (2.8), let
w˜TR,i ≡
(
wR,iHi/mTi hi
)
/CT (H|aR,wR)
denote the share of wages attributable to workers of type i. Then from (2.8) we have:
Wage Premium : w˜TR,i− H˜i︸ ︷︷ ︸
Share of Cost− Share of Human Capital
= d lnφ
(
H˜,θT
)
/d lnHi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Productivity Elasticity
. (2.9)
Explicitly, d lnφ
(
H˜,θT
)
/d lnHi = H˜θ
T
i /∑z H˜θ
T
z − H˜i, so that w˜TR,i = H˜θ
T
i /∑ j H˜θ
T
j . Notably, when
labour types are perfectly substitutable (θT = 1), φ
(
H˜,θT
)
is identically 1 so the wage premium is
zero for all types.
2.4 Unit Labour Costs under Pareto Match Quality
The above reasoning shows the relationship between technology and the optimal choice of worker
types. To make this model more concrete, we assume that firm specific match quality follows a Pareto
distribution Ψ(h)≡ 1−h−k. Here k is the shape parameter12 and 1 is the minimum value h can take.
Under a Pareto distribution, a sufficient condition for a firm to optimally hire every type of worker is
12κ varies across industry but its its superscript T is dropped to simplify notation.
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that
β T ≡ θT + k− kθT > 0.
We now prove this result, stated as
Proposition 1. If β T > 0 then it is optimal for a firm to hire all types of workers.
Proof. Let cTR denote a firm’s unit labour cost when all worker types are hired, and cˇ
T
R the unit labour
cost if a subset of types T⊂ {1, . . .S} is hired. For the result, we require that cTR ≤ cˇTR for all T. Con-
sidering a firm’s cost minimisation problem when T are the only types available shows with Equation
(2.10) that
cˇTR =
[
∑
i∈T
[
aR,i
(
mTi
) kw1−kR,i / f (k−1)]θT /βT
](βT /θT)/(1−k)
.
Considering then that
cTR/cˇ
T
R =
[
1+
(
∑
i/∈T
[
aR,i
(
mTi
) kw1−kR,i ]θT /βT /∑
i∈T
[
aR,i
(
mTi
) kw1−kR,i ]θT /βT
)](βT /θT)/(1−k)
,
clearly cTR ≤ cˇTR so long as β T/θT (1− k)≤ 0, which holds for β T > 0 since k > 1.
A positive β T is guaranteed by a supermodular labour technology (θT < 1). For submodular
production (θT > 1), a positive β T is a requirement that the Pareto shape parameter k be sufficiently
close to 1. This guarantees the tail of the match quality distribution is thick enough to justify hiring at
least a few workers of each type. This induces the isoquants depicted in Figure 2, which illustrates a
more standard trade off between different types of workers, so long as the coordinates are transformed
to the space of hiring standards h.
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Figure 2: Submodular Production in h Space
The general cost function derived implies the unit labour cost of L in region R is
Unit Labour Cost Problem : cTR ≡minH CT (H|aR,wR) subject to L = φ
(
H˜,θT
) ·HTOT = 1.
From Equations (2.5) and (2.9) the unit labour cost function may be solved as
Unit Labour Costs : cTR =
[
∑
i
[
aR,i
(
mTi
) kw1−kR,i / f (k−1)]θT /βT
](βT /θT)/(1−k)
. (2.10)
Notably, the number of times a firm goes to hire workers, N, can be solved as N = 1/ f k. Thus, N is
decreasing in both the cost of hiring and k, as increases in k imply a thinner right tail of match quality,
so that repeatedly screening workers has lower returns. Finally, w˜TR,i, the share of wages attributable
to workers of type i becomes
w˜TR,i =
(
aR,i
(
mTi
) kw1−kR,i )θT /βT /∑
j
(
aR, j
(
mTj
) kw1−kR, j )θT /βT .
Equation (2.10) summarises the cost of one unit of labour L in terms of the Pareto shape parameter
k, the technology θT and regional characteristics aR and wR. Such differences in regional unit labour
costs translate directly into measured productivity differences across firms. In order to solve for total
unit costs (which include non-labour costs), we assume each production function FTj is defined by the
following Cobb-Douglas form:
FTj (M,K,L) = η
−1
j ·Mα
T
M Kα
T
K Lα
T
L . (2.11)
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Here η j is a Hicks neutral cost shifter which varies across firms, and we assume constant returns to
scale. It is then straightforward to derive total unit costs from (2.7) and (2.10) as
Total Unit Costs : uTR j = u
T
Rη j =
(
rTM/α
T
M
)αTM (rTK/αTK )αTK (cTR/αTL )αTL ·η j, (2.12)
where uTR represents the regional component of unit costs not idiosyncratic to firms.
Section 3 presents a two stage OLS procedure which can recover the differences in unit labour
costs cTR (aR,wR)/c
T
R′ (aR′ ,wR′) between any two regions R and R
′, but first we resolve firm behaviour
in general equilibrium.
3 Firm Production under Monopolistic Competition
This section combines the insights into firm behaviour just developed into a general equilibrium model
of monopolistic competition. Firms, who are ex ante identical, choose among regions to locate. Key to
a firm’s location decision are the expected profits of entry. These profits depend on 1) the distribution
of worker types and wages and 2) the competition present from other firms who enter the region. We
determine equilibrium production and location choices conditional on wages, which relates regional
costs to firm density. We also show an equilibrium wage vector exists which supports these choices
by firms.
3.1 Model Setting
Each region R is endowed with a population PR of workers composed of S types. We take the well
known approach of Melitz (2003) to model firms who face fixed entry costs Fe, receive a random cost
draw η j ∼ G and face a fixed production cost fe.13 Akin to Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007),
firms combine different types of inputs to produce. Distinct from both of these models, firms ex ante
may freely enter any region R which will determine the cost structure they face. Each firm j produces
a distinct variety, and in equilibrium a mass of firmsMTR enter and entrants with cost draws less than a
prohibitively high cost level ηTR produce. MTR and η
T
R together determine the set of varieties available
to consumers.
13G is assumed to be absolutely continuous with finite mean.
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3.2 Aggregate Income, Demand and Budget Shares
Consumption is determined by the aggregate level of income IAgg, and since labour is supplied inelas-
tically, this is necessarily
IAgg =∑
R
∑
i
wR,iaR,iPR︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total Wages of Type i in R
+∑
T
rTMM
T + rTKK
T︸ ︷︷ ︸
Non−Labour Income
. (3.1)
Consumer preferences over varieties j and quantities
{
QTR j
}
take the Dixit-Stiglitz form
UTR ≡U
(
MTR ,η
T
R ,Q
T
R
)
=MTR
∫ ηTR
0
(
QTR j
)ρ
dG( j)
in each region and industry, with total utility U (M,η ,Q) ≡ ΠTΠR
(
UTR
)σTR , where σTR are relative
weights put on final goods normalised so that ∑T,RσTR = 1.
Firms are the sole sellers of their variety, and thus are monopolists who provide their variety at a
price PTR j. Consumers, in turn, face a vector of prices
{
PTR j
}
, and a particular consumer with income I
has the following demand curve for each variety:
QTR j = I ·
(
PTR jU
T
R /σ
T
R
) 1
ρ−1 /∑
t,r
(
σ tr
) 1
ρ−1 Mtr
∫ η tr
0
((
Ptr,z
)ρ U tr) 1ρ−1 dG(z) . (3.2)
Clearly, even if consumers have different incomes, aggregate demand for variety j corresponds to that
of a representative consumer with income equal to aggregate income, IAgg.
After paying an entry cost of Fe output units, firms know their cost draw, which paired with
regional input markets determine their total unit cost uTR j. Firms maximise profits
piTR j
(
PTR j
)
=
(
PTR j−uTR j
)
QTR j−uTR fe
by choosing an optimal price PTR j = u
T
R j/ρ , resulting in a markup of 1/ρ over costs. Firms who cannot
make a positive profit do not produce to avoid paying the fixed cost of fe output units. Since profits
decrease in costs, there is a unique cutoff cost draw ηTR which implies zero profits, while firms with
η j < ηTR produce. As there are no barriers to entry besides the entry cost Fe, firms enter in every region
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until expected profits are zero. This yields the
Spatial Zero Profit Condition : E
[
piTR j
]
= Fe, ∀R,T.
The expressions which fix the cutoff cost draw ηTR and mass of entryMTR can be neatly summarised
by defining the mass of entrants who produce, M˜TR , and the (locally weighted) average cost draw in
each region, η˜TR :
M˜TR ≡MTRG
(
ηTR
)
, η˜TR ≡
∫ ηTR
0
(
ηTRzu
T
R
(
UTR
)1/ρ)ρ/(ρ−1)
dG(z)/G
(
ηTR
)
.
It is shown in Appendix 8.5.1 that ηTR depends only on fe, Fe, and G, so there is a unique cutoff cost
η = ηTR across all regions and industries. The appendix also shows that the free entry and zero profit
conditions imply that the share of income spent on goods from each region and technology pair (R,T )
is given by
Consumer Budget Share for R,T : MTRuTR/∑
t,r
Mtrutt = σTR /∑
t,r
σ tr = σ
T
R .
Having determined firm behaviour in the product market, we now examine input markets.
3.3 Regional Factor Market Clearing
The only remaining equilibrium conditions are that input prices guarantee firm input demand exhausts
material and capital stocks, in addition to each regional pool of workers. A final assumption on the
budget shares
{
σTR
}
ensures that two regions which have identical skill distributions have the same
wage schedule. Within an industry, each σTR is proportional to PR, so that σTR = σTPR for some σT .
Since production is Cobb-Douglas, the share of total costs (equal to IAgg) which go to each factor is
the factor output elasticity, so full resource utilisation of materials and capital requires
MT = αTMσ
T IAggP/rTM, KT = αTKσT IAggP/rTK . (3.3)
where P ≡ ∑RPR is the total population. These two equations capture the allocation of technology
specific resources across regions.
In contrast, labour is immobile outside of a region, and effective labour of LTR is produced by each
3 FIRM PRODUCTION UNDER MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 29
technology in each region. Since the wage bill LTRc
T
R must receive a share αTL of total revenues,
Aggregate Labour Demand : LTR = α
T
L σ
T IAggPR/cTR . (3.4)
Embedded in each LTR is the set of workers hired by firms attendant to regional market conditions.
The number of workers of type i employed with technology T in region R is labelled eTR,i. The Pareto
match assumption and firm hiring conditions imply eTR,i takes the form
14
eTR,i = a
θT /βT
R,i
(
mTi
) kθT /βT w−k/βTR,i LTR (cTR)k/βT ( f (k−1))−θT /βT . (3.5)
The total demand for employees of each type in a region R, ∑T eTR,i, must equal the supply of aR,iPR,
yielding the regional resource clearing conditions. Wages are determined by
aR,i =∑
T
eTR,i/PR = w−1R,i∑
t
σ tα tLw˜
t
R,iIAgg, ∀R, i. (3.6)
Equation (3.6) affords a interpretation of equilibrium wages. A type i’s contribution to mean wages,
aR,iwR,i, is an average of the income spent on labour in an industry, times the wages attributable to
each type:
aR,iwR,i =∑
t
σ t︸︷︷︸
Industry Share Per Capita
· α tL︸︷︷︸
Labour Share
· w˜tR,i︸︷︷︸
Type Share
·IAgg
Solving Equation (3.6) requires finding a wage for each worker type in each region that fully
employs all workers. Accordingly, showing that an equilibrium wage vector exists is slightly tricky. In
order to do so, first note that the resource clearing conditions determine wages, provided an exogenous
vector of unit labour costs
{
cTR
}
, as proved in Appendix 8.1.2:
Lemma. There is a wage functionW that uniquely solves (3.6) given unit labour costs.
Of course, unit labour costs are not exogenous as in the Lemma, but rather depend on endogenous
wages {wR,i}. However, the lemma does show that the following mapping:
{wR,i} 7→
Equation 2.10
{
cTR ({wR,i})
} 7→
Lemma
W
({
cTR ({wR,i})
})
,
14See Supplemental Appendix.
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which starts at one wage vector {wR,i} and ends at another wage vector W is well defined. This
mapping is shown in Appendix 8.1.2 to have a fixed point, which yields15
Proposition 2. An equilibrium wage vector exists which clears each regional labour market.
3.4 Relative Concentration of Firms
Of course, differences in input costs will influence the relative concentration of firms across regions.
Since regions may vary substantially in population size P, the most relevant metric is the number of
firms per capita in a region, M˜TR/PR. The number of firms per capita vary by both regional costs and
the budget shares spent on goods from each industry. The impact of different regional costs can be
clearly seen by fixing an industry T and considering the ratio of firms per capita in region R versus R′
as in Equation (3.7):
Firms per Capita, R to R′ :
(
M˜TR/PR
)
/
(
M˜TR′/PR′
)
= uTR′/u
T
R =
(
cTR′/c
T
R
)αTL (3.7)
Equation (3.7) shows that areas with lower unit labour costs have more firms per capita. Additionally,
the larger the share of labour in production, αTL , the more important are differences between regions.
This relationship is summarised as
Proposition 3. Within an industry, regions with lower labour costs have more firms per capita.
The next section lays out a strategy to structurally estimate model parameters.
4 Estimation Strategy
This section lays out a simple two stage estimator to recover the underlying structural model param-
eters above. The estimator involves two regressions, with an intervening computation which can be
done easily in most statistical software. The first stage equation determines firm labour demand and,
unlike many approaches, is based on the firm-level shares of workers hired across regions, rather than
wages. The second stage equation uses regional unit labour costs fixed by the model and first stage to
estimate the remaining parameters of the production function. To illustrate feasibility, we simulate a
15Factor price equalisation does not generally hold across labour types since trade in goods is not a substitute for trade in
factors. See Appendix 8.1.1 for some limited ways in which equalisation does hold.
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dataset consistent with the firm production problem above and show our estimation method recovers
model primitives accurately.
4.1 First Stage Estimation
The employment expression (3.5) determines the share of each type of workers hired in each region R
and industry T . Since this does not vary by firm for fixed R and T , it follows that the share of workers
of type i hired by firm j in R and T , sTR,i j, satisfies
lnsTR,i j =−
k
β T
lnwR,i+
θT
β T
lnaR,i+
θT
β T
k lnmTi +
θT
β T
ln
(
c˜TR
)k
f (k−1) + εi j, (4.1)
where εi j denotes a firm-type level error term and c˜TR denotes the unit labour cost function at wages{
wk/(k−1)θ
T
R,i
}
16. To estimate this equation we use a combination of type and region dummies.17 To
further explain how regional variation identifies the model we discuss equilibrium hiring predicted by
Equation (4.1) in Appendix 8.5.2.
In order to control for firm characteristics which might influence hiring patterns across worker
types, mTi is allowed to vary with firm observables labelled Controls j:
mTi j ≡ mTi · exp
{
Controls jγTi
}
, (4.2)
where γTi is a type-industry specific estimate of characteristics which might influence the value of each
worker type in an industry. The inclusion of Controls j makes type specific human capital vary by firm,
and accordingly we denote unit labour costs as cTR j. We now discuss how the first stage estimates are
used to estimate production function parameters in a second stage.
4.2 Second Stage Estimation
From above we can estimate θT ,k,
{
mTi /m
T
S
}
,
{
γTi
}
and therefore can estimate regional differences
in unit labour cost functions, ∆ lncTR ≡ E
[
lncTR j|R,T,Controls j
]
−E
[
lncTR j|T
]
. From above, revenues
16Formally c˜TR ≡minH CT
(
H|aR,
{
w−k/θ
T (1−k)
R,i
})
subject to L = φ
(
H˜,θT
) ·HTOT = 1.
17We suggest the convention of creating of type and region fixed effects, omitting the highest type fixed effect. The
remaining type coefficients then correspond to the estimates of
(
θT /βT
)
k lnmTi /m
T
S .
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PTR jQ
T
R j for a firm j satisfy
lnPTR jQ
T
R j = α
T
M lnM j +α
T
K lnK j +α
T
L lnL j− lnρη j. (4.3)
As firm expenditure on labour L · cTR j equals the share αTL of revenues PTR jQTR j, we have L jcTR j =
αTL PTR jQTR j and taking differences with the population mean gives
∆ lnL j = ∆ lnPTR jQ
T
R j−∆ lncTR j. (4.4)
Taking differences of Equation (4.3) with the population mean and using (4.4) yields
∆ lnPTR jQ
T
R j = α
T
M∆ lnM j +α
T
K∆ lnK j +α
T
L ∆ lnP
T
R jQ
T
R j−αTL ∆ lncTR j−∆ lnη j.
So reduction gives the estimating equation
∆ lnPTR jQ
T
R j =
αTM
1−αTL
∆ lnM j +
αTK
1−αTL
∆ lnK j− α
T
L
1−αTL
∆ lncTR j−
1
1−αTL
∆ lnη j. (4.5)
The entire estimation procedure is now briefly recapped.
4.3 Estimation Procedure Summary
1. Using sTR,i j, the share of workers of type i hired in region R and industry T , estimate Equation
(4.1), using type and region dummies.
2. Recover θ̂T , k̂,
{
m̂Ti /m
T
S
}
and
{
γ̂Ti
}
. Bootstrap standard errors or use the delta method.
3. Use Equation (2.10) to calculate estimates ∆̂ lncTR j by region and industry using the regional
data {aR}, {wR} and estimated θ̂T , k̂,
{
m̂Ti /m
T
S
}
and
{
γ̂Ti
}
from Step 1.
4. Estimate Equation (4.5) using ∆̂ lncTR j.
This specification is structural, but obviously does not compute every element of the model, and
therefore efficiency of the estimator might suffer. In Appendix 8.2, we both illustrate the estimator
and evaluate efficiency loss by simulating firms which obey the production model specified above and
apply these steps. In the simulation, the first stage can explain 99% of the variation in firm hiring of
the full model and the second stage explains 97% of the variation in firm output, suggesting that the
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time savings of this specification likely outweigh any gain in estimation accuracy within the context
of the model.
Having laid out both a production model detailing the interaction of firm technologies with local
market conditions and specifying an estimation strategy, we now move on to applying the method to
China using manufacturing and population census data. The next section discusses this data in detail
while the sequel presents our results.
5 Data
This section discusses the data, in particular regional educational attainment and wages.
5.1 Data Overview
Our firm level data comes from the 2004 Survey of Industrial Firms conducted by the Chinese National
Bureau of Statistics. It includes all enterprises with sales over 5 million RMB. The data includes firm’s
ownership, location, industry, financial variables, profit and cash flow statements. Firms report their
number of employees by education level, in addition to output, value added sales and export value.
For detailed summary statistics regarding these firms and industrial characteristics see Appendix 8.3.3.
From the Survey, a subsample was constructed of manufacturing firms who report positive net fixed
assets, material inputs, output, value added and wages. Firms with fewer than 8 employees were
excluded as they fall in a different legal regime. The final sample includes 141,464 firms in 284
prefectures and 19 industries at the two digit level.
Firm capital stock is reported fixed capital, less reported depreciation. Worker composition is
measured by the share of workers across education bins. Regional wage distributions are calculated
from the 0.5% sample of the 2005 China Population Census. The census contains information on
education level by prefecture of residence, occupation, industry code, monthly income and weekly
hours of work. We restrict the sample to employees age 15 to 65 who report positive wages and hours
of work. The regional wage distribution is recovered from the average annual income of employees
by education using census data.18 Since our firm data is from 2004 and our census data is from 2005,
one potential concern is any discrepancy that might be caused by the lag between when these datasets
were collected. Fortunately, the assumption that firm skill mix is stable over time is reasonable based
18The census data is highly representative of the firm wage data, as discussed in Appendix 8.4.1.
5 DATA 34
on existing studies.19
In addition, we use geographic data. One source is GIS data for the year 2005 to locate firms at
the county and prefecture level, available from the China Data Center at the University of Michigan.
This also provides sea port locations. This is supplemented by inland port data from The World Port
Index
Since regions in China are quite heterogeneous, the first consideration is to restrict the data to
qualitatively comparable regions. Figure 3 illustrates the prefectures of China, which we take as our
definition of a region from the perspective of the model above. Prefectures illustrated by a darker shade
in Figure 3 are excluded from the analysis, as they operate under substantially different government
policies and objectives. These regions typically have large minority populations or historically distinct
conditions, with the majority being declared autonomous regions. Autonomous regions have their own
regulations development and educational policies (see the Information Office of the State Council of
the People’s Republic of China document cited). We restrict attention to the lighter shaded regions of
Figure 3, preserving 284 prefectures displaying distinct labour market conditions.
Figure 3: Chinese Prefectures
• 33 Provinces, excluding:
– 5 Autonomous
– 1 Non-Autonomous
• 345 Prefectures, excluding:
– 53 Autonomous
– 8 Non-Autonomous
5.2 Regional Variation
Key to our analysis is regional variation in skill distribution and wages. Here we briefly discuss both.
Further discussion may be found in Appendix 8.3. Monthly incomes vary substantially across China
as illustrated in Figure 4. This is due to both the composition of skills (proxied by education) across
regions as well as the rates paid to these skills.
19Ilmakunnas and Ilmakunnas (2011) find the standard deviation of plant-level education years is very stable from 1995-
2004 in Finland. Parrotta, Pozzoli, and Pytlikova (2011) find that a firm-level education diversity index was roughly constant
over a decade in Denmark.
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Figure 4: Average Monthly Income of Employees (2005)
Figure 5 contrasts educational distributions of the labour force. Figure 5(a) shows those with a
Junior High School education (the mandated level in China), while Figure 5(b) displays those with a
Junior College or higher level of attainment. A more detailed breakdown of the distribution of wages
and educational attainment is presented in Appendix 8.3.
Figure 5: Low and High Educational Attainment Across China (2005)
(a) % Labour Force with ≤ Junior High School (b) % Labour Force with ≥ Junior College
While this study focuses on the differing composition of input markets across China as they exist
in 2004-2005, some brief remarks are in order about the origins of these substantial differences.20
These differences stem from many factors, including the dynamic nature of China’s rapidly growing
economy, targeted economic policies and geographic agglomeration of industries across China. Faber
(2012) finds that expansion of China’s National Trunk Highway System displaced economic activity
from counties peripheral to the System. Similarly, Baum-Snow, Brandt, Henderson, Turner, and Zhang
(2012) show that mass transit systems in China have increased the population density in city centers,
while radial highways around cities have dispersed population and industrial activity. An overview
of important Chinese economic policies is also provided by Defever and Riano (2012), who quantify
20We consider regional price variation at a fixed point in time. Reallocation certainly occurs and is very important in
explaining dynamics (e.g. Borjas (2003)) but are outside the scope of this chapter.
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their impact on firms.
Of particular interest for labour markets are substantial variation in wages and the attendant migra-
tion this induces. The extent to which labour market migration has been stymied by the hukou system
of internal passports is not well studied, although its impact has likely lessened since 2000.21 Given
that rural to urban migration typifies the pattern of structural transformation currently underway in
China, we control for rural and urban effects for each type of worker below. Nonetheless, it remains
unclear to what degree the hukou system alters labour flows under the present system. In particular,
high income and highly educated workers can more easily move among urban regions as local gov-
ernments are likely to approve their migration applications (Chan, Liu, and Yang, 1999). It therefore
seems likely that the size of labour markets accessible to workers is extremely heterogeneous. Given
what little is known about the actual determinants of migration in China, modeling firm decisions
when faced with dynamically changing input markets is an interesting avenue for further work.
5.3 Worker Types
Our definition of distinct, imperfectly substitutable worker types is based primarily on formal school-
ing attained. Census data from 2005 shows that the average years of schooling for workers in China
ranges from 8.5 to 11.8 years across provinces, with sparse postgraduate education. The most com-
mon level of formal education is at the Junior High School level or below. Reflecting substantial wage
differences by gender within that group, we define Type 1 workers as Junior High School or Below:
Female and Type 2 workers as Junior High School or Below: Male. Explicit differentiation in the
role of gender for low skill labour is especially important in developing countries, where a variety
of influences result in imperfect substitutability across gender.22 Completion of Senior High School
defines Type 3 and completion of Junior College or higher education defines Type 4.
Having discussed the data, we now apply the estimation procedure developed above.
21The Hukou system and its reform in the late 1990s are well explained in Chan and Buckingham (2008). The persistence
of such a stratified system has engendered deep set social attitudes which likely affect economic interactions between Hukou
groups, see Afridi, Li, and Ren (2012).
22Bernhofen and Brown (2011) distinguish between skilled male labour, unskilled male labour and female labour and find
that the factor prices across these three types of labour differ substantially.
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6 Estimation Results
This section reports our estimation results, then turns to a discussion of the quantitative labour cost
and productivity differences accounted for by local market conditions in China. The section continues
by testing the firm location implications of the model, finding broad support that economic activity
locates where estimated unit labour costs are lower. Finally, we compare estimation results of our unit
cost based method with one approach common in the literature, which assumes that labour types are
perfectly substitutable.
6.1 Estimates of Market Conditions and Production Technologies
The full first stage regression results for several manufacturing industries in China are presented in
Tables 14 and 15 of Appendix 8.4.2. A representative set of estimates for the General Machinery in-
dustry are presented in Table 1. The first box in Table 1, labelled Primary Variables, are consistent with
the model. Though values for the coefficients
(
θT/β T
)
lnmi/m4 are not specified by the model, their
estimated values do increase in type in Table 1, which is consonant with formal education increasing
worker output.
Table 1: First Stage Results: General Machinery
Primary Variables ln(% Hired) Firm Controls
ln(wR,i) -2.687*** m1 ∗Urban Dummy -1.384***
ln(aR,i) 1.794*** m2 ∗Urban Dummy -0.980***
m1 (≤Junior HS: Female) -10.170*** m3 ∗Urban Dummy 0.427***
m2 (≤Junior HS: Male) -6.171*** m4 ∗Urban Dummy 2.336***
m3 (Senior High School) -3.180*** m1∗% Foreign Equity -2.448***
m2∗% Foreign Equity -1.864***
m3∗% Foreign Equity 0.311***
Regional Controls m4∗% Foreign Equity 3.847***
m1∗% Non-Ag Hukou -5.957*** m1 ∗ ln(Firm Age) 0.934***
m2∗% Non-Ag Hukou -3.072*** m2 ∗ ln(Firm Age) 0.403***
m3∗% Non-Ag Hukou -3.218*** m3 ∗ ln(Firm Age) 0.143***
m4∗% Non-Ag Hukou -7.026*** m4 ∗ ln(Firm Age) 0.351***
Observations: 62,908. R2 : 0.139 Includes Regional Fixed Effects
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1.
The remaining two boxes include regional controls from the Census and firm level controls from
the manufacturing survey. The regional controls are by prefecture, and include the percentage of each
type with a non-agricultural Hukou. The firm level controls include the share of foreign equity, the
age of the firm, and whether the firm is in an urban area. Inclusion of controls for average worker
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age, which control for accumulated skill or vintage human capital, do not appreciably alter the results.
Other controls which did not appreciably alter the results include State Ownership and the percentage
of migrants in a region.
These first stage estimates are interesting in themselves, as the model above allows us to use these
estimates to construct the unit cost function for labour by region. We will quantify this shortly, but
to continue with the example of the General Purpose Machine industry, the implied dispersion of unit
labour costs are depicted in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Geographic Dispersion of Unit Labour Costs: General Machinery
The model primitives of our two stage estimation procedure across industries are summarised in
Tables 2 and 3. Standard errors are calculated using a bootstrap procedure stratified on industry and
region, presented in Appendix 8.4.3. Table 2 displays the estimated model primitives, showing a range
of significantly different technologies θT and match quality distributions through k. Table 3 shows the
second stage estimation results when the regional unit labour costs are calculated using regional data
and the first stage estimates.
Table 2: Model Primitive Estimates
Industry k θ β Industry k θ β
Beverages 2.12 1.24 0.75 Paper 6.25 0.73 2.48
Electrical Equipment 2.60 1.22 0.65 Plastic 3.51 1.08 0.81
Food Manufacturing 1.59 1.28 0.86 Printing 3.93 1.04 0.89
General Machinery 2.50 1.22 0.68 Radio TV PC & Comm 2.21 1.41 0.51
Iron and Steel 3.21 1.00 1.02 Rubber 1.63 1.15 0.93
Leather & Fur 2.15 0.76 1.24 Specific Machinery 1.63 1.43 0.74
Med, Prec Equip, Clocks 2.34 1.43 0.43 Textile 3.73 0.95 1.15
Metal Products 3.20 1.10 0.77 Transport Equipment 1.26 1.38 0.92
Non-ferrous Metal 2.89 1.15 0.72 Wood 1.52 1.62 0.71
Non-metallic Products 2.02 1.25 0.75
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Table 3: Second Stage Estimates
Industry αL αK αM Industry αL αK αM
Beverages 0.13 0.10 0.70 Paper 0.18 0.14 0.53
Electrical Equipment 0.25 0.14 0.47 Plastic 0.27 0.14 0.41
Food Manufacturing 0.14 0.09 0.70 Printing 0.09 0.22 0.55
General Machinery 0.17 0.12 0.60 Radio TV PC & Comm 0.16 0.21 0.43
Iron and Steel 0.40 0.07 0.48 Rubber 0.06 0.13 0.63
Leather & Fur 0.10 0.13 0.59 Specific Machinery 0.10 0.16 0.55
Med, Prec Equip, Clocks 0.20 0.16 0.43 Textile 0.12 0.11 0.61
Metal Products 0.24 0.14 0.46 Transport Equipment 0.04 0.15 0.65
Non-ferrous Metal 0.40 0.08 0.43 Wood 0.22 0.10 0.56
Non-metallic Products 0.20 0.07 0.61
While the capital coefficients may seem low, they are not out of line with other estimates which
specifically account for material inputs (e.g. Javorcik (2004)). For the specific case of China, there
are few studies estimating production coefficients.23 The most comparable study is Fleisher and Wang
(2004) who find microeconomic estimates for αK in the range of .40 to .50 (which does not differ-
entiate between capital and materials) and these estimates compare favourably with the combined
estimates of αK +αM in Table 3.
6.2 Implied Productivity Differences Across Firms
Table 4 quantifies the implied differences in unit labour costs and productivity across regions implied
by Table 2. The cTR column of Table 4 displays the interquartile (75%/25%) unit labour cost ratios
by industry, where unit labour costs have been calculated according to the model. The uTR column of
Table 4 contains the differences in productivity implied by unit labour cost differences, taking into
account second stage production parameter estimates. Specifically, if firms 1 and 2 face unit labour
costs of c1RT and c
2
RT and have the same wage bill W , they will employ labour of L
1 = W/c1RT and
L2 =W/c2RT . Thus if these firms hire the same capital and material inputs (K,M), then the ratio of
their output is
Y 1/Y 2 =
(
Mα
T
M Kα
T
K Lα
T
L
1
)
/
(
Mα
T
M Kα
T
K Lα
T
L
2
)
= (L1/L2)
αTL =
(
c2RT/c
1
RT
)αTL .
For example, contrast two firms in General Machinery at the 25th and 75th unit labour cost percentile.
If both firms have the same wage bill, the labour (L) available to the lower cost firm is 1.41 times
23Though not directly comparable, macroeconomic level estimates include Chow (1993) and Ozyurt (2009) who find
much higher capital coefficients. These studies do not account for materials.
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greater than the higher cost firm. From Table 3 above, the estimated share of wages in production is
αTL = 0.17, so the lower cost firm will produce 1.410.17 = 1.06 times as much output as the higher cost
firm, holding all else constant.
Table 4: Intra-industry Unit Labour Cost and Productivity Ratios
cTR u
T
R c
T
R u
T
R
Industry 75/25 75/25 Industry 75/25 75/25
Beverages 1.51 1.06 Paper 1.66 1.07
Electrical Equipment 1.38 1.08 Plastic 1.35 1.09
Food Manufacturing 1.81 1.09 Printing 1.37 1.03
General Machinery 1.41 1.06 Radio TV PC & Comm 1.44 1.06
Iron and Steel 1.34 1.13 Rubber 2.16 1.04
Leather & Fur 1.92 1.04 Specific Machinery 1.99 1.08
Med, Prec Equip, Clocks 1.80 1.13 Textile 1.37 1.04
Metal Products 1.33 1.07 Transport Equipment 4.01 1.04
Non-ferrous Metal 1.45 1.17 Wood 1.47 1.10
Non-metallic Products 1.42 1.08
Table 4 indicates that the range of total unit costs faced by firms within the same industry are
indeed substantial, even after explicitly taking into account the technology θT and the ability to sub-
stitute across several types of workers. However, the second stage estimates indicate these differences
are attenuated by substitution into capital and materials. Thus, while differences in regional markets
indicate an interquartile range of 30-80% in unit cost differences, substitution into other factors re-
duces this range to between 3-17%. These rather substantial differences reiterate an important issue
raised by Kugler and Verhoogen (2011): since TFP is often the ‘primary measure of [...] performance’,
accounting for local factor markets might substantially alter estimates of policy effects.
Since firms locate freely, the model predicts that these substantial cost differences drive economic
activity towards more advantageous locations, which we now examine.
6.3 Firm Location
Per capita volumes of economic activity across regions are determined by Equation (3.7), which states
that relatively lower industry labour costs should attract relatively more firms to a region. Table 7 sum-
marises estimates of this relationship, controlling for regional distance to the nearest port (weighted
by the share of value added in a region). Whenever the relationship between value added and labour
costs is statistically significant, the relationship is negative, in line with the model.24
24These results are robust if distance is unweighted, and to the inclusion of Economic Zone status.
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Table 5: Determinants of Regional (Log) Value Added per Capita
Std 100 km Std Std
Industry ln
(
cTR
)
Err to Port Err Const Err Obs R2
Beverages -0.696b (.274) -0.122 (.200) 18.96a (3.36) 155 .03
Electrical Equipment -0.057 (.403) -1.567a (.259) 11.98b (4.80) 166 .22
Food Manufacturing -0.553b (.229) -0.397b (.179) 15.49a (2.15) 171 .04
General Machinery -0.705c (.400) -1.314a (.340) 19.68a (4.86) 195 .11
Iron and Steel -1.245b (.565) -0.576a (.194) 16.30a (2.22) 160 .06
Leather & Fur -1.255a (.249) -1.028b (.421) 25.81a (3.05) 89 .27
Med, Prec Equip & Clocks -0.267 (.300) -1.135b (.432) 13.13a (3.39) 68 .07
Metal Products -0.236 (.463) -1.239a (.260) 13.24a (4.86) 157 .14
Non-ferrous Metal -1.977a (.544) -0.468c (.275) 27.29a (4.57) 139 .10
Non-metallic Products -0.827a (.290) -0.910a (.155) 20.89a (3.38) 259 .11
Paper -0.911a (.197) -0.320 (.246) 20.04a (2.08) 159 .12
Plastic -0.556 (.352) -1.406a (.221) 16.86a (3.99) 159 .22
Printing 0.103 (.655) -0.123 (.257) 8.54 (7.12) 98 .01
Radio TV PC & Comm -0.212 (.366) -0.741b (.333) 13.92a (4.60) 90 .04
Rubber -0.424c (.219) -0.470 (.398) 14.06a (2.07) 79 .06
Specific Machinery -0.316c (.184) -0.680a (.194) 14.74a (2.28) 167 .07
Textile -0.934a (.273) -1.168a (.153) 19.70a (2.44) 186 .18
Transport Equipment -0.105 (.099) -1.119a (.253) 12.69a (1.30) 168 .10
Wood -2.234a (.338) -1.038a (.267) 47.02a (5.63) 133 .20
Note: a, b and c denote 1, 5 and 10% significance level respectively.
In contrast to the present setting, most firm models used in production function estimation assume
perfect labour substitutability. One implication of perfect substitutability is that, conditional on wages,
the local composition of the workforce is irrelevant for hiring patterns. We have just seen that our
approach, which is more sensitive to local factor market characteristics, helps explain firm location.
We now compare our approach with others.
6.4 Comparison with Conventional Labour Measures
The estimates above reflect a procedure using regional variation to recover the unit cost of labour.
Often, such information is not incorporated into production estimation. Instead, the number of em-
ployees or total wage bill are used to capture the effective labour available to a firm. The estimation
results using these labour measures are contrasted with our method in Table 6. The production coef-
ficients using the total wage bill or total employment are very similar, reflecting the high correlation
of these variables. However, both measures mask regional differences in factor markets. Once local
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substitution patterns are taken into account explicitly, substantial differences emerge.25
Table 6: Second Stage Estimates vs Homogeneous Labour Estimates
Unit Labour Cost Total Wage Bill Total Employment
Industry αL αK αM αL αK αM αL αK αM
Beverages 0.13 0.10 0.70 0.23 0.06 0.71 0.22 0.07 0.73
Electrical Equipment 0.25 0.14 0.47 0.34 0.12 0.47 0.32 0.12 0.51
Food Manufacturing 0.14 0.09 0.70 0.16 0.06 0.73 0.17 0.06 0.75
General Machinery 0.17 0.12 0.60 0.25 0.09 0.61 0.23 0.09 0.64
Iron and Steel 0.40 0.07 0.48 0.25 0.07 0.68 0.29 0.05 0.70
Leather & Fur 0.10 0.13 0.59 0.27 0.09 0.55 0.30 0.09 0.56
Med, Prec Equip, Clocks 0.20 0.16 0.43 0.44 0.08 0.38 0.36 0.10 0.44
Metal Products 0.24 0.14 0.46 0.30 0.12 0.48 0.30 0.12 0.51
Non-ferrous Metal 0.40 0.08 0.43 0.17 0.10 0.65 0.22 0.08 0.65
Non-metallic Products 0.20 0.07 0.61 0.20 0.06 0.67 0.18 0.06 0.70
Paper 0.18 0.14 0.53 0.28 0.11 0.52 0.31 0.10 0.54
Plastic 0.27 0.14 0.41 0.31 0.13 0.43 0.32 0.13 0.45
Printing 0.09 0.22 0.55 0.40 0.14 0.44 0.34 0.17 0.49
Radio TV PC & Comm 0.16 0.21 0.43 0.48 0.14 0.35 0.40 0.16 0.41
Rubber 0.06 0.13 0.63 0.31 0.07 0.55 0.32 0.06 0.56
Specific Machinery 0.10 0.16 0.55 0.31 0.10 0.48 0.26 0.11 0.52
Textile 0.12 0.11 0.61 0.29 0.07 0.56 0.29 0.06 0.58
Transport Equipment 0.04 0.15 0.65 0.31 0.09 0.53 0.27 0.09 0.57
Wood 0.22 0.10 0.56 0.23 0.08 0.62 0.26 0.07 0.63
Average 0.18 0.13 0.55 0.29 0.09 0.54 0.28 0.09 0.58
Pushing this comparison further, Table 7 predicts the three year survival rate of firms by residual
firm productivity. The first column shows the results under our unit cost method. The second and third
columns show the results when labour is measured as perfectly substitutable (either by employment
or wages). Note that in all cases, regional and industry effects are controlled for. The Table illustrates
that productivity estimates which account for regional factor markets are almost twice as important
in predicting firm survival as the other measures. Section 8.4.5 of the Appendix shows that similar
results hold when examining sales growth and propensity to export: productivity under the unit cost
approach is more important in predicting firm performance, suggesting the other measures conflate
the role of advantageous factor markets with productivity.
25The residuals remaining after the second estimation step, which are often interpreted as idiosyncratic firm productivity,
are compared across methods in Appendix 8.4.4.
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Table 7: Explaining Survival with Productivity
Survival Rate (2005-7)
Productivity under Unit Cost method 0.019***
(0.003)
Productivity under L =Employment 0.010***
(0.002)
Productivity under L =Wage Bill 0.010***
(0.002)
Prefecture and Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 141,409 141,409 141,409
R-squared 0.023 0.022 0.022
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1.
7 Conclusion
This chapter examines the importance of local supply characteristics in determining firm input usage
and productivity. To do so, a theory and empirical method are developed to identify firm input demand
across industries and heterogeneous labour markets. The model derives labour demand as driven by
the local distribution of wages and available skills. Firm behaviour in general equilibrium is derived,
and determines firm location as a function of regional costs. This results in estimating equations which
can be easily implemented in two steps. The first step exploits differences in firm hiring patterns
across distinct regional factor markets to recover firm labour demand by type. The second step uses
the estimates of the first stage to introduce local labour costs into production function estimation. Both
steps characterise the impact of local market conditions on firm behaviour through recovery of model
primitives. This is of particular interest when explaining the relative productivity or location of firms,
especially in settings where local characteristics are known to be highly dissimilar.
Our empirical strategy combines information from the Chinese manufacturing, population census,
and geographic data from the mid-2000s. The estimates provide a quantitative linkage from local mar-
ket conditions to productivity. The results suggest that team technologies combined with favourable
factor market conditions explain substantial differences in firm productivity. Other methods which
do not model worker substitution or factor markets yield relatively skewed productivity estimates in
China. This supports the thesis that modeling a firm’s local environment may yield substantial in-
sights into production patterns. Our results indicate that differences in local markets are quantitatively
important.
The importance of local factor markets for understanding firm behaviour suggests new dimensions
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for policy analysis. For instance, regions with labour markets which generate lower unit labour costs
tend to attract higher levels of firm activity within an industry. As unit labour costs depend not only
on the level of wages, but rather the distribution of wages and worker types that represent substitution
options, this yields a more varied view of how educational policy or flows of different worker types
could impact firms.
This chapter also colours the interpretation of heterogeneous productivity at the firm level, since a
component of differences across firms is due to the influence of local supply conditions. Productivity
estimates which result from our model are more important in predicting firm performance than models
based on perfectly substitutable worker types. This suggests that if firm productivity is a measure of
‘competitiveness’ leading to dynamic advantages such as innovation or exporting, then regional factor
markets should be controlled for. Taken as a whole, our results show that policy changes which
influence the composition of regional labour markets, such as the construction of Special Economic
Zones or liberalisation of the Hukou system, will have sizable effects on firm behaviour, productivity
and location.
Finally, nothing precludes the application of this chapter’s approach beyond China, and it is suit-
able for analysing regions which exhibit a high degree of labour market heterogeneity. As the model
affords the interpretation of trade between countries which have high barriers to immigration but low
barriers to capital and input flows, it is also suitable for analysing firm behaviour across national bor-
ders. Further work could leverage or extend the approach of combining firm, census and geographic
data to better understand the role of local factor markets in hiring, input usage and firm dynamics.
8 Appendix
8.1 Further Model Discussion and Proofs
8.1.1 Relative Prices and Limited Factor Price Equalisation
The formula for unit labour costs shows that regions with different skill distributions, say region R and
R′, typically cannot have both cTR = c
T
R′ and wR = wR′ . However, factor price equalisation for labour
holds in a limited fashion in two ways. First, Equation (3.4) a limited form of factor price equalisation
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holds within each industry: the industry wage bill per capita is equalised, formally
cTRL
T
R/PR = cTR′L
T
R′/PR′ for all region pairs
(
R,R′
)
.
Second, since ∑i w˜TR,i = 1, (3.6) implies
Average Wages : ∑
i
aR,iwR,i =∑
t
α tLσ
tIAgg,
i.e. that average wages are constant across regions, despite differences in unit labour costs.
8.1.2 Existence of Regional Wages to Clear Input Markets
What is required is to exhibit a wage vector {wR,i} that ensures Equation (3.6) holds. Since all prices
are nominal, WLOG we normalise IAgg = 1 in the following.
Lemma. There is a wage function that uniquely solves (3.6) given unit labour costs.
Proof. Formally, we need to exhibitW such that
aR,i =WR,i
({
cT
′
R′
})−1
∑
t
α tLσ
t (ctR)k/β t−1
WR,i
({
cT
′
R′
})1−k
aR,i (mti)
k
f (k−1)

θ t/β t
∀R, i.
Fix
{
cT
′
R′
}
and define hR,i (x)≡∑t α tLσ t (ctR)k/β
t−1 (x1−kaR,i (mti) k/ f (k−1))θ t/β t , gR,i (x)≡ aR,ix. For
the result we require a unique x s.t. gR,i (x) = hR,i (x). gR,i is strictly increasing and ranges from 0 to
∞, while hR,i (x) is strictly decreasing, and ranges from ∞ to 0, so x exists and is unique.
Lemma. The function
{
cTR ◦W
({
cTR
})}
, where cTR is the unit cost function of Equation (2.10), has a
fixed point
{
ĉTR
}
and soW
({
ĉTR
})
is a solution to Equation (3.6).
Proof. We first show that any equilibrium wage vector must lie in a compact set×R,i
[
wR,i,wR,i
]
which
contains strictly positive values. From (3.6), w˜TR,i ∈ [0,1] so wR,i ≤ wR,i ≡ ∑t α tLσ t/aR,i. Now let
bR ≡mini ∑t
α tLσ
t
(
aR,i
(
mti
) k)θ t/β t /∑
i
[
aR,i
(
mti
) k]θ t/β t aR,i,
and we will show that a lower bound for equilibrium wages is wR ≡
[
bR, . . . , bR
]
for each R.
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Consider that forW evaluated at
{
cTR (wR)
}
,
WR,i =∑
t
α tLσ
t
(
aR,i
(
mti
) k (WR,i/wR)1−k)θ t/β t /∑
i
[
aR,i
(
mti
) k]θ t/β t aR,i. (8.1)
Evaluating Equation (8.1), ifWR,i ≤wR thenWR,i ≥wR, and otherwise,WR,i ≥wR so {wR} is a lower
bound for W
({
cTR (wR)
})
. Since necessarily W
({
cTR (wˆR)
})
= {wˆR}, W is increasing in
{
cTR
}
, and
cTR (wR) is increasing in wR, we have {wˆR} =W
({
cTR (wˆR)
}) ≥W({cTR (wR)}) ≥ {wR}. In conclu-
sion, all equilibrium wages must lie in ×R,i
[
wR,i,wR,i
]
.
Now define a strictly positive, compact domain for
{
cTR
}
, ×R
[
cTR ,c
T
R
]
, by
cTR ≡ inf×i[wR,i,wR,i]
cTR (wR) = c
T
R (wR) , c
T
R ≡ sup
×i[wR,i,wR,i]
cTR (wR) = c
T
R (wR) .
Now consider the mapping C
({
cTR
})≡ {cTR ◦W({cTR})} on×R [cTR ,cTR], which is continuous on this
domain. By above,WR,i
({
cTR
})≤wR,i for each R, i soC({cTR})≤ {cTR}. Also by above, C({cTR})≥{
cTR ◦W
({
cTR (wR)
})}≥ {cTR ({wR})}= {cTR}. ThusCmaps×R [cTR ,cTR] into itself and by Brouwer’s
fixed point theorem, there exists a fixed point
{
ĉTR
}
, which impliesW
({
ĉTR
})
is an equilibrium wage
vector.
8.2 Model Simulation and Estimator Viability
A model simulation was constructed using parameters given in Table 8. In the simulation, firms
maximise profits conditional on local market conditions, and applying the procedure above produces
Tables 9a and 9b. The estimation results are given in the Estimate column while the model analytical
values are reported in the Predicted column. The results are quite satisfactory, insofar as the estimates
are not only consistent but also close to the predicted values. Figure 7 further confirms this by plotting
the simulated and predicted differences in the share of workers hired. For ease of comparison across
panels, Figure 7 plots regional frequencies along the horizontal axis and (linearly) normalised wages
for each worker type. As suggested by the Figure, the adjusted R2 in both cases are quite high: .99 for
the first stage and .97 for the second stage.
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Table 8: Simulation details
Variable Description Value
θT Technological parameter. 2
k Pareto shape parameter. 1.5
{mi} Human capital shifters. {4,8,12,16,20}
{wR,i} Regional wages by type. ∼LogNormal µ = (12,24,36,48,60), σ = 1/3.
{aR,i} Regional type frequencies. ∼LogNormal µ = (.4, .3, .15, .1, .05), σ = 1/3,
scaled so that frequencies sum to one.
K, M Firm capital and materials. ∼LogNormal µ = 1, σ = 1.
L Level of L employed by firm. Profit maximising given K, M and region.
αM,αK ,αL Production Parameters. αM = 1/6, αK = 1/3, αL = 1/2.
Control Misc variable for output. ∼LogNormal µ = 0, σ = 1.
Coeff Exponent on Control. Control Coeff= pi .{
ω j
}
Firm idiosyncratic wage costs. ∼LogNormal µ = 0, σ = .1.
Sample: 200 regions with 20 firms per region, with errors ∼LogNormal(µ = 0, σ = 1/2).
Table 9: Simulation Results
(a) Simulation First Stage Estimates: Technology and Human Capital
Variable Parameter Estimate Std Err Predicted
{lnaR,i}
(
θT/βT
)
3.912 .0019 4
{lnwR,i}
(−k/βT ) -2.922 .0021 -3
Dummy (Type = 1)
(
θT/βT
)
k (lnm1/m5) -9.376 .0057 -9.657
Dummy (Type = 2)
(
θT/βT
)
k (lnm2/m5) -5.295 .0045 -5.498
Dummy (Type = 3)
(
θT/βT
)
k (lnm3/m5) -2.950 .0031 -3.065
Dummy (Type = 4)
(
θT/βT
)
k (lnm4/m5) -1.274 .0024 -1.339
(b) Simulation Second Stage Estimates: Production Parameters
Variable Parameter Estimate Std Err Predicted
lnM αM/(1−αL) .3298 .0079 .3333
lnK αK/(1−αL) .6680 .0080 .6667
lncRT −αL/(1−αL) -.9303 .0748 -1
Control Control Coeff 3.148 .0079 3.141
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Figure 7: Simulation Fit
8.3 Further Details on Regional Variation In China
8.3.1 Educational Summary Statistics
Figures 8a and 8b reveal more details about regional variation across China. Figure 8a illustrates the
average years of schooling for the Chinese labour force.
Figure 8: Chinese Educational Attainment (2005)
(a) Labour Force Schooling (2005) (b) Distribution of Attainment (2005)
UNICEF suggests that the typical Chinese primary school entrance age is 7.26 Compulsory educa-
tion lasts nine years (primary and secondary school) and ends around age sixteen. Figure 8b illustrates
the distribution of education by classification of (potential) workers. In the Figure, the labour Force
includes both workers and the unemployed. Workers are those of age 15 to 65 who work outside the
agricultural sector. Employees is the subset of workers who are not employers, self-employed, or in
26Source: childinfo.org
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a family business. Figure 8b illustrates that the frequency of each type of worker under each of these
definitions of labour. The measures are quite similar, with the exception that unemployment is more
prevalent among the less skilled.
Table 10: Educational and Wage Distribution by Province (2005)
Province Fraction of Labour Force by Education Avg Monthly Wage by Education
≤Junior HS ≤Junior HS Senior College ≤Junior HS ≤Junior HS Senior College
(Female) (Male) HS or Above (Female) (Male) HS or Above
Anhui 0.296 0.485 0.155 0.063 581 862 866 1210
Beijing 0.140 0.284 0.299 0.277 796 1059 1314 2866
Chongqing 0.272 0.408 0.227 0.093 582 820 872 1379
Fujian 0.348 0.453 0.146 0.052 695 942 1103 1855
Gansu 0.216 0.399 0.271 0.114 507 738 869 1135
Guangdong 0.327 0.362 0.231 0.080 748 967 1281 2719
Guizhou 0.292 0.478 0.162 0.069 572 758 925 1189
Hainan 0.328 0.334 0.259 0.080 532 694 894 1527
Hebei 0.230 0.515 0.190 0.066 515 793 832 1233
Heilongjiang 0.217 0.393 0.285 0.104 515 740 797 1096
Henan 0.229 0.428 0.234 0.109 487 675 714 1079
Hubei 0.271 0.384 0.264 0.081 541 757 809 1262
Hunan 0.263 0.444 0.229 0.063 634 828 889 1267
Jiangsu 0.314 0.400 0.210 0.076 758 994 1086 1773
Jiangxi 0.291 0.456 0.196 0.056 525 783 794 1240
Jilin 0.204 0.382 0.307 0.107 522 745 809 1163
Liaoning 0.250 0.410 0.219 0.120 576 822 848 1366
Shaanxi 0.203 0.406 0.277 0.114 497 731 805 1149
Shandong 0.288 0.441 0.203 0.068 602 823 863 1398
Shanghai 0.221 0.321 0.272 0.186 891 1155 1450 3085
Shanxi 0.169 0.520 0.221 0.089 502 872 857 1113
Sichuan 0.277 0.480 0.162 0.081 541 737 829 1477
Tianjin 0.258 0.321 0.285 0.136 995 1019 1074 1617
Yunnan 0.275 0.495 0.160 0.070 504 697 896 1542
Zhejiang 0.357 0.469 0.129 0.045 817 1097 1299 2333
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8.3.2 Provincial Summary Statistics
Table 11: Descriptive Statistics by Province (2005)
Manufacturing Population Census
Firm Avg # of # Region- Monthly Avg Yrs
Province Count Workers Regions Industries Wage School
Anhui 2,296 208 17 822 832 8.925
Beijing 3,676 145 2 128 1665 11.542
Chongqing 1,574 287 3 184 862 9.606
Fujian 7,534 212 9 504 945 8.170
Gansu 461 274 14 658 805 9.728
Guangdong 21,575 275 21 1269 1137 9.607
Guizhou 812 246 9 464 805 8.565
Hainan 126 149 3 151 830 9.772
Hebei 5,104 231 11 623 781 9.527
Heilongjiang 921 256 13 622 774 10.197
Henan 5,849 228 17 798 720 10.053
Hubei 2,685 247 14 742 789 9.731
Hunan 3,500 195 14 751 843 9.588
Jiangsu 22,197 170 13 756 1013 9.431
Jiangxi 1,501 245 11 556 766 9.208
Jilin 927 274 9 477 796 10.340
Liaoning 5,141 170 14 770 865 10.152
Shaanxi 1,207 368 10 548 787 10.068
Shandong 12,958 216 17 947 825 9.596
Shanghai 9,857 147 2 119 1577 10.569
Shanxi 1,118 386 11 619 847 9.895
Sichuan 3,209 238 21 887 800 9.149
Tianjin 2,671 195 2 128 1119 10.243
Yunnan 733 240 16 695 794 8.675
Zhejiang 27,639 144 11 629 1098 8.201
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8.3.3 Industrial Summary Statistics
Table 12 presents the distribution of firms by industry and other descriptive statistics.
Table 12: Manufacturing Survey Descriptive Statistics (2005)
Share of
# of # of Avg # of White State Foreign
Industry firms Regions workers Female Collar Export Equity Equity
Beverages 2,225 155 219.20 0.281 0.114 0.150 0.107 0.121
Electrical Equipment 12,241 166 201.58 0.289 0.106 0.351 0.030 0.195
Food Manufacturing 3,807 171 193.98 0.321 0.091 0.266 0.060 0.202
General Machinery 15,727 195 152.68 0.205 0.117 0.262 0.047 0.115
Iron and Steel 4,676 160 227.40 0.148 0.088 0.101 0.032 0.056
Leather & Fur 4,852 89 320.70 0.362 0.036 0.682 0.005 0.335
Med, Prec Equip, Clocks 2,702 68 214.89 0.296 0.180 0.457 0.063 0.299
Metal Products 10,686 157 146.93 0.233 0.086 0.332 0.028 0.161
Non-ferrous Metal 3,607 139 157.75 0.186 0.093 0.180 0.035 0.093
Non-metallic Products 15,347 259 195.57 0.207 0.090 0.169 0.059 0.088
Paper 5,698 159 151.05 0.269 0.061 0.127 0.026 0.131
Plastic 9,235 159 140.47 0.298 0.065 0.327 0.019 0.235
Printing 3,382 98 133.01 0.303 0.084 0.118 0.150 0.109
Radio TV PC & Comm 6,699 90 402.04 0.342 0.120 0.571 0.038 0.459
Rubber 2,212 79 226.25 0.294 0.067 0.377 0.027 0.218
Specific Machinery 7,816 167 176.76 0.197 0.154 0.244 0.072 0.166
Textile 18,292 186 222.43 0.390 0.044 0.406 0.018 0.168
Transport Equipment 8,632 168 252.01 0.228 0.120 0.240 0.088 0.138
Wood 3,629 133 137.04 0.288 0.050 0.290 0.025 0.137
8.4 Estimates Referenced in Main Text
8.4.1 Verisimilitude of Census and Firm Wages
One of the main concerns about combining census data with manufacturing data is the representative-
ness of regional labour market conditions in determining actual wages within firms. It turns out they
are remarkably good predictors of a firm’s labour expenses. We construct a predictor of firm wages
based on Census data and test it as follows: First, compute the average wages per prefecture. Sec-
ond, make an estimate CensusWage by multiplying each firm’s distribution of workers by the average
wages of each type from the population census. Third, regress actual firm wages on CensusWage. The
results are presented in Table 13 of Appendix 8.4.1. Not only is the R2 of this predictor very high for
each industry, but the coefficient on CensusWage is close to one in all cases, showing that one-for-one
the census based averages are excellent at explaining the variation in the wage bill across firms.
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Table 13: Census Wages as a Predictor of Reported Firm Wages
Industry Dependent Variable: ln(Firm Wage)
ln(Census Wage) Std Dev Constant Std Dev Obs R2
Beverages 1.052*** (0.0147) -0.904*** (0.204) 2223 0.85
Electrical Equipment 1.018*** (0.0103) -0.370*** (0.138) 12213 0.86
Food Manufacturing 1.032*** (0.0104) -0.602*** (0.144) 3766 0.83
General Machinery 1.020*** (0.0063) -0.365*** (0.091) 15711 0.84
Iron and Steel 1.049*** (0.0082) -0.777*** (0.116) 4663 0.87
Leather & Fur 0.982*** (0.0112) 0.116 (0.165) 4851 0.87
Med, Prec Equip, Clocks 1.018*** (0.0221) -0.332 (0.308) 2689 0.83
Metal Products 1.012*** (0.0094) -0.286** (0.130) 10654 0.83
Non-ferrous Metal 1.054*** (0.0092) -0.833*** (0.127) 3588 0.88
Non-metallic Products 0.981*** (0.0085) 0.16 (0.122) 15329 0.80
Paper 1.012*** (0.0086) -0.335*** (0.120) 5695 0.82
Plastic 1.015*** (0.0129) -0.340** (0.170) 9214 0.85
Printing 1.055*** (0.0135) -0.839*** (0.189) 3377 0.83
Radio TV PC & Comm 1.021*** (0.0172) -0.354 (0.224) 6685 0.86
Rubber 1.000*** (0.0132) -0.133 (0.182) 2195 0.87
Specific Machinery 1.036*** (0.0105) -0.580*** (0.139) 7780 0.83
Textile 0.981*** (0.0060) 0.132 (0.084) 18281 0.86
Transport Equipment 1.050*** (0.0071) -0.755*** (0.099) 8618 0.86
Wood 0.965*** (0.0136) 0.309 (0.197) 3619 0.78
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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8.4.2 First Stage Results By Industry
Table 14: First Stage Estimates I
Industry B
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Dependent Variable: ln(%type)
ln(wR,i) -1.808a -2.977a -0.870 -2.687a -2.150a -0.708c -4.517a -3.174a -3.096a
ln(aR,i) 1.673a 1.878a 1.489a 1.794a 1.018a 0.636a 3.358a 1.439a 1.627a
m1 (≤Junior HS: Fem) -8.447a -9.491a -3.186 -10.170a 7.190a -2.052 -13.450a -5.800a -1.189
m2 (≤Junior HS: Male) -5.947c -7.181a -1.504 -6.171a 12.370a -1.089 -11.160a -2.176c 3.768c
m3 (Senior High School) -2.470 -4.475a 1.123 -3.180a 14.210a -2.058c -4.100b -0.758 6.119a
m1∗% Non-Ag Hukou 0.837 -7.619a -2.341b -5.957a -2.373c -4.544a -7.142a -6.038a -4.591a
m2∗% Non-Ag Hukou 0.306 -3.272a -1.880 -3.072a -1.355 -2.882c -3.957c -1.805b -0.370
m3∗% Non-Ag Hukou -1.102 -0.593 -0.837 -3.218a -2.394a -1.606b 0.315 -1.104b -0.903
m4∗% Non-Ag Hukou -3.913 -4.572a -0.426 -7.026a 10.130a -8.496a 1.793 -2.491b 3.403
m1 ∗Urban Dummy -0.271 -1.379a -1.462a -1.384a -1.393a -0.0822 -1.032a -1.408a -1.188a
m2 ∗Urban Dummy -0.007 -0.991a -1.085a -0.980a -0.585a -0.128 -1.176a -0.533a -0.601a
m3 ∗Urban Dummy 0.286c 0.139b 0.175 0.427a 0.503a 0.220c -0.249 0.247a 0.108
m4 ∗Urban Dummy 2.212a 1.513a 1.743a 2.336a 3.275a 0.683a 1.053a 2.147a 1.791a
m1∗% Foreign Equity 0.531a 1.030a 0.841a 0.934a 0.751a -0.107 1.952a 0.876a 1.366a
m2∗% Foreign Equity 0.422a 0.678a 0.661a 0.403a 0.354a -0.0680 1.840a 0.335a 0.432a
m3∗% Foreign Equity 0.106 0.259a 0.197b 0.143a 0.083 0.257a 0.574a 0.145a 0.093
m4∗% Foreign Equity -0.005 0.232a 0.015 0.351a -0.069 0.249 0.033 -0.150 0.589a
m1 ∗ ln(Firm Age) -2.803a -0.215 -0.983a -2.448a -2.160a 0.113 0.727b -0.627a -2.156a
m2 ∗ ln(Firm Age) -2.290a -0.547a -0.494c -1.864a -1.662a -0.190b 0.319 -0.788a -1.838a
m3 ∗ ln(Firm Age) 0.714a -0.114 0.016 0.311a 0.862a 0.198 -0.510b 0.417a 0.695a
m4 ∗ ln(Firm Age) 2.840a 1.621a 2.301a 3.847a 5.656a 3.133a 0.279 3.488a 4.413a
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,900 48,960 15,228 62,908 18,704 19,408 10,808 42,744 14,428
R-squared 0.124 0.117 0.098 0.139 0.168 0.208 0.246 0.124 0.145
Note: a, b and c denote 1, 5 and 10% significance level respectively.
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Table 15: First Stage Estimates II
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Dependent Variable: ln(%type)
ln(wR,i) -1.693a -1.542a -3.324a -3.491a -3.371a -0.854 -1.260a -2.230a -0.372 -1.220b
ln(aR,i) 1.664a 0.332b 1.321a 1.212a 2.785a 1.267a 1.961a 0.830a 1.477a 2.286a
m1 (≤Junior HS: Fem) -7.246a -3.469c -7.881a -5.515b -13.770a -1.997 -10.130a 1.588 -6.326a -10.890a
m2 (≤Junior HS: Male) -3.128a -0.645 -4.596a -2.913 -11.970a 0.188 -4.811a 2.703b -3.359b -9.086a
m3 (Senior High School) -0.808 0.076 -2.657b -1.849 -7.325a 2.347 -1.515 3.468a -1.290 -6.106b
m1∗% Non-Ag Hukou -2.750a -6.210a -6.682a -5.979a -7.176a -5.162a -4.763a -6.271a -5.279a -0.301
m2∗% Non-Ag Hukou -1.750a -6.148a -4.710a -4.386a -5.210a -2.819c -4.295a -5.555a -3.153a -0.308
m3∗% Non-Ag Hukou -2.198a -3.251a -2.685a -1.835b 0.597 -3.361a -1.463a -3.264a -1.039b -2.549a
m4∗% Non-Ag Hukou -3.926a -7.690a -7.074a -4.440c -3.291a -2.211 -2.447 -4.025a -3.450b -13.060a
m1 ∗Urban Dummy -1.333a -0.691a -1.057a -1.711a -1.881a -0.819a -1.597a -0.650a -1.130a -1.630a
m2 ∗Urban Dummy -0.834a -0.338b -0.590a -1.170a -1.619a -0.603a -1.234a -0.421a -0.714a -0.720a
m3 ∗Urban Dummy 0.250a 0.350a 0.272a 0.198 -0.512a -0.035 0.216b 0.285a 0.233a 0.129
m4 ∗Urban Dummy 2.570a 2.644a 2.413a 2.251a 0.902a 2.211a 1.924a 2.709a 1.381a 3.331a
m1∗% Foreign Equity 0.834a 0.407a 0.877a 0.193 1.340a 0.620a 1.588a 0.214a 1.023a 0.415a
m2∗% Foreign Equity 0.244a 0.153c 0.361a -0.029 1.072a 0.234c 0.750a 0.202a 0.547a 0.176
m3∗% Foreign Equity 0.028 0.039 0.048 0.242a 0.294a 0.002 0.169a 0.137a 0.129a -0.142
m4∗% Foreign Equity -0.310a -0.012 0.000 0.176 -0.160b -0.191 0.097 0.442a 0.168b 0.197
m1 ∗ ln(Firm Age) -1.016a -1.899a -0.857a -0.247 0.310 -0.576 -1.601a -0.384a -1.266a -0.423
m2 ∗ ln(Firm Age) -0.768a -0.819a -0.773a -0.402 0.223 -0.242 -1.675a -0.058 -1.171a 0.066
m3 ∗ ln(Firm Age) 0.105 0.457a 0.398a -0.023 -0.049 0.319 0.100 0.445a 0.588a -0.468
m4 ∗ ln(Firm Age) 3.429a 4.850a 3.776a 3.143a 0.321a 2.577a 1.629a 4.391a 2.298a 3.850a
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 61,388 22,792 36,940 13,528 26,796 8,848 31,264 73,168 34,528 14,516
R-squared 0.150 0.164 0.130 0.107 0.188 0.120 0.177 0.221 0.129 0.245
Note: a, b and c denote 1, 5 and 10% significance level respectively.
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8.4.3 First and Second Stage Models Parameter Estimates
Table 16: Model Primitive Estimates
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8.4.4 Residual Comparison: Unit Labour Costs vs Substitutable Labour
Of particular interest for work on productivity are the residuals remaining after the second estimation
step, which are often interpreted as idiosyncratic firm productivity. Figure 9 contrasts the results of
our method with the result when total employment is used as a measure of labour. Examining the
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45 degree line also plotted in the Figure, a general pattern emerges: above average firms under the
employment measure are slightly less productive under the unit cost approach, while below average
firms are more productive. This suggests that a more detailed analysis of the role of local factor
markets may substantially alter interpretation of differences in firm productivity.
Figure 9: Productivity: Unit Labour Costs vs Total Employment (General Machinery)
8.4.5 Firm Performance Characteristics and Productivity
Table 17: Explaining Growth with Productivity
Sales Growth Rate (2005-7)
Productivity under Unit Cost method -0.074**
(0.030)
Productivity under L =Employment -0.052**
(0.021)
Productivity under L =Wage Bill -0.054**
(0.022)
Prefecture and Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 119,159 119,159 119,159
R-squared 0.027 0.027 0.027
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1.
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Table 18: Explaining Propensity to Export with Productivity
Export Dummy (2005)
Productivity under Unit Cost method 0.024***
(0.007)
Productivity under L =Employment 0.015***
(0.004)
Productivity under L =Wage Bill 0.017***
(0.004)
Prefecture and Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 141,409 141,409 141,409
R-squared 0.202 0.202 0.202
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1.
8.5 Supplemental Appendix
8.5.1 Derivation of Region-Techonology Budget Shares
Using the profit maximising price PTR j and combining Equations (2.12), (3.1) and (3.2) then yields the
equilibrium quantity produced,
QTR j = ρIAgg
(
uTRη j
(
UTR /σ
T
R
)1/ρ)ρ/(ρ−1)
/uTR j∑
t,r
(
σ tr
)1/(1−ρ) M˜trη˜ tr. (8.2)
Aggregating revenues using Equation (8.2) shows that each consumer’s budget share allocated to
region R and industry T is
Consumer Budget Share for R,T :
(
σTR
)1/(1−ρ) M˜TR η˜TR /∑
t,r
(
σ tr
)1/(1−ρ) M˜trη˜ tr. (8.3)
Consequently, since free entry implies expected profits must equal expected fixed costs, the mass of
entrantsMTR solves the implicit form27
1−ρ
ρ
IAgg
((
σTR
)1/(1−ρ) M˜TR η˜TR /∑
t,r
(
σ tr
)1/(1−ρ) M˜trη˜ tr
)
=MTRuTR
(
feG
(
ηTR
)
+Fe
)
, (8.4)
27To see a solution exists, note that for fixed prices,
{
η˜TR
}
, and
{
ηTR
}
, necessarily MTR ∈ ATR ≡[
0,(1−ρ) IAgg/ρuTR Fe
]
. Existence follows from the Brouwer fixed point theorem on the domain×R,T ATR for H
({
M˜TR
})
≡
(1−ρ) IAgg
((
σTR
)1/(1−ρ) M˜TR η˜TR /∑t,r (σ tr)1/(1−ρ) M˜trη˜ tr)/ρuTR ( feG(ηTR)+Fe) .
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while the equilibrium cost cutoffs ηTR solve the zero profit condition28
1−ρ
ρ
IAgg
(
σTR
)1/(1−ρ)(
uTRη
T
R
(
UTR
)1/ρ)ρ/(ρ−1)
= uTR fe∑
t,r
(
σ tr
)1/(1−ρ) M˜trη˜ tr. (8.5)
Equations (8.4) and (8.5) fix ηTR since combining them shows
∫ ηTR
0
(
ηTRz/η
T
R
)ρ/(ρ−1)
dG(z)/G
(
ηTR
)
= 1+Fe/ feG
(
ηTR
)
.
In particular, ηTR does not vary by region or technology. Thus, Equation (8.5) shows that
UTR u
T
R/σ
T
R =
[
(1−ρ) IAgg/ρ fe∑
t,r
(
σ tr
)1/(1−ρ) M˜trη˜ tr
]1−ρ
/
(
ηTR
)ρ
. (8.6)
where the RHS does not vary by region or technology. Combining this equation with (3.2) shows
QTR j = Q
T ′
R′ j for all (T,R) and (T
′,R′), so that MTRuTR/σTR = MT
′
R′u
T ′
R′/σ
T ′
R′ . At the same time, using
Equation (8.6) reduces (8.3) to
Consumer Budget Share for R,T : MTRuTR/∑
t,r
Mtrutt = σTR /∑
t,r
σ tr = σ
T
R .
Since ∑t,rσ tr = 1, each region and industry receive a share σTR of consumer expenditure.
8.5.2 Regional Variation in Input Use
Equation (4.1) specifies the relative shares of each type of worker hired. Since input markets are
competitive, firms and workers take regional labour market characteristics as given. As characteristics
such as wages worker availability and human capital vary, the share of each labour type hired differs
across regions. These differences can be broken up into direct and indirect effects. Direct effects
ignore substitution by holding the unit labour cost c˜RT constant, while indirect effects measure how
regional differences give rise to substitution. The direct effects are easy to read off of Equation (4.1),
28To see a solution exists, note that for fixed prices,
{
MT ′R′
}
and
{
UTR
}
, the LHS ranges from 0 to ∞ as ηTR varies, while
the RHS is bounded away from 0 and ∞ when min
{
η˜ trG
(
η tr
)}
> 0. η˜TR G
(
ηTR
)
> 0 follows from inada type conditions on
goods from each T and R.
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showing:
Direct Effects : d lnsR,T,i/d lnwR,i|c˜RT constant =−k/β T < 0, (8.7)
d lnsR,T,i/d lnaR,i|c˜RT constant = θT/β T > 0, (8.8)
d lnsR,T,i/d lnmTi
∣∣
c˜RT constant
= kθT/β T > 0. (8.9)
These direct effects have the obvious signs: higher wages (wR,i ↑) discourage hiring a particular type
while greater availability (aR,i ↑) and higher human capital (mT,i ↑) encourage hiring that type. The
indirect effects of substitution through c˜RT are less obvious as seen by
d ln c˜kRT/d lnwR,i =
(
k/θT
)[
aR,i
(
mTi
) kw1−k−βT /θTR,i ]θT /βT c˜k(θT /βT)RT > 0, (8.10)
d ln c˜kRT/d lnaR,i =−
[
aR,i
(
mTi
) kw1−k−βT /θTR,i ]θT /βT c˜k(θT /βT)RT < 0, (8.11)
d ln c˜kRT/d lnm
T
i =−k
[
aR,i
(
mTi
) kw1−k−βT /θTR,i ]θT /βT c˜k(θT /βT)RT < 0. (8.12)
Thus, the indirect effects counteract the direct effects through substitution. To see the total of the
direct and indirect effects, define the Type-Region-Technology coefficients χi,R,T :
χi,R,T ≡ 1−
[
aR,i
(
mTi
) kw1−k−βT /θTR,i ]θT /βT c˜k(θT /βT)RT .
Investigation shows that each χi,R,T is between zero and one. Combining Equations (8.7-8.9) and
Equations (8.10-8.12) shows that the direct effect dominates since
Total Effects : d lnsR,T,i/d lnwR,i =
[−k/β T ]χi,R,T < 0, (8.13)
d lnsR,T,i/d lnaR,i =
[
θT/β T
]
χi,R,T > 0, (8.14)
d lnsR,T,i/d lnmTi =
[
kθT/β T
]
χi,R,T > 0. (8.15)
Equations (8.13-8.15) summarise the relationship between regions and labour market character-
istics in a parsimonious way. For small changes in labour market characteristics, the log share of a
type hired in linear in log characteristics with a slope determined by model parameters and a regional
shifter χi,R,T . These (local) isoquants for the share of type i workers hired in region R are depicted in
Figure 10.
8 APPENDIX 60
Figure 10: Local Isoquants for Share of Workers Hired
8.5.3 Regional Variation in Theory: Isoquants
Equations (8.13-8.15) also characterise local isoquants of hiring the same share of a type across re-
gions. It is immediate that for small changes in market characteristics,
(
∆w, ∆a, ∆m
)
, the share
of a type hired is constant so long as
−(k/θT )∆w/wR,i+∆a/aR,i+ k∆m/mTi = 0.
For instance, firms in regions R and R′ will hire the same fraction of type i workers for small differences
in characteristics (∆w,∆a) so long as
∆w/∆a =
(
θT/k
)
wR,i/aR,i. (8.16)
By itself, an increase in type i wages ∆w would cause firms to hire a lower share of type i workers as
indicated by the direct effect. However, Equation (8.16) shows that firms would keep the same share
of type i workers if the availability ∆a increases concurrently so that Equation (8.16) holds.
8.5.4 Derivation of Unit Labour Costs
Unit labour costs by definition solve
Unit Labour Costs : cTR ≡minH CT (H|aR,wR) subject to L = φ
(
H˜,θT
) ·HTOT = 1.
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Under the parameterisation Ψ(h) = 1−h−k, Equations (2.2) become
Hi = aR,ik/(k−1) ·mTi h1−ki ·N. (8.17)
From above, wR,iHi/mTi hiCT (H|aR,wR) = Hθ
T
i /∑ j Hθ
T
j , and L = 1 =
(
∑ j Hθ
T
j
)1/θT
so
hi = wR,iH
1−θT
i /m
T
i CT (H|aR,wR) . (8.18)
Substitution now yields
Hi = aR,ik/(k−1) ·mTi
(
wR,iH1−θ
T
i /m
T
i CT (H|aR,wR)
)1−k
·N. (8.19)
Further reduction and the definition of β T shows that
Hβ
T
i = H
θT+k−kθT
i = aR,ik/(k−1) ·
(
mTi
) kw1−kR,i CT (H|aR,wR)k−1 N. (8.20)
Again using
(
∑ j Hθ
T
j
)1/θT
= 1 then shows
1 =∑
i
[
aR,ik/(k−1) ·mTi kw1−kR,i
(
cTR
)k−1
N
]θT /βT
. (8.21)
From the definition of the cost function we have
cTR = N
[
∑
i
aR,iwR,ih−ki + f c
T
R
]
=∑
i
wR,i ((k−1)/k)Hi/mTi hi+N f cTR .
Therefore from wR,iHi/mTi hiCT (H|aR,wR) = Hθ
T
i it follows
1 =∑
i
(k−1)/k ·HθTi +N f = (k−1)/k+N f ,
and therefore N = 1/ f k. Now from Equation (8.21) cTR is seen to be Equation (2.10).
8 APPENDIX 62
8.5.5 Derivation of Employment Shares
Combining Equations (8.18), (8.20) and N = 1/ f k shows
hi = a
(1−θT)/βT
R,i
(
mTi
)−θT /βT w1/βTR,i (cTR)−1/βT /( f (k−1))(1−θT)/βT . (8.22)
Let ATR,i be the number of type i workers hired to make L = 1, exclusive of fixed search costs. By
definition, ATR,i = N|L=1 aR,i (1−Ψ(hi)) = aR,ih−ki / f k. Using Equation (8.22),
ATR,i = k
−1 (k−1)aθT /βTR,i
(
mTi
) kθT /βT w−k/βTR,i (cTR)k/βT (k−1)−θT /βT f−1.
Labour is also consumed by the fixed search costs which consist of N|L=1 · f = 1/k labour units. There-
fore, if A˜TR,i denotes the total number of type i workers hired to make L = 1, necessarily A˜
T
R,i = A
T
R,i+
A˜TR,i/k so A˜
T
R,i = k (k−1)−1 ATR,i, and the total number of type i workers hired in region R using tech-
nology T is LTR A˜
T
R,i. The total number of employees in R, T is ∑i LTR A˜TR,i = LTR
(
cTR
)k/βT (c˜TR)−kθT /βT ,
where c˜TR denotes the unit labour cost function at wages
{
wk/(k−1)θ
T
R,i
}
29.
29Formally c˜TR ≡minH CT
(
H|aR,
{
w−k/θ
T (1−k)
R,i
})
subject to L = φ
(
H˜,θT
) ·HTOT = 1.
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Part III
Foreign Ownership Share and Property Rights:
Evidence from Thai Manufacturing Firms
1 Introduction
The theories proposed to explain firm boundaries have been highly influential and significantly devel-
oped in the past century. The literature was started by Coase (1937) who explains the existence and
size of firms through transaction costs. Then Williamson (1971,1973,1979) adds some content to this
idea by including the fact that transactions with an agent outside the firm involve incomplete contracts
and relationship-specific investments that result in the well-known hold-up problem. This problem
vanishes when transactions are done within the firm. This is the core of transaction cost economics.
There is also another approach to the theory of the firm that is due to Grossman and Hart (1986) and
this leads to property-rights theories.
The theories of property rights feature incompleteness of contracts, relationship-specific invest-
ment and the hold-up problem like the ones in the transaction-cost literature but they also exist within
the boundaries of the firms.30 It is impossible to list all possible contingencies in a contract. Hence,
among parties inside a firm, the owner of the firm has the right to decide what to do in situations which
are not foreseen in the contract. In other words, the owner has residual rights of control. If there are
two vertically integrated entities, the one with ownership and, hence, residual rights will be able to
affect ex-post division of surplus. This in turn affects each party’s decision on the level of relationship-
specific investments and the degree of the hold-up problem. Optimally, the ownership should be given
to the party whose investment is more important to production. Property-rights theories have been
supported by many empirical studies, which include Baker and Hubbard (2004) where property-rights
theories explain truck ownership and Acemoglu, Aghion, Griffith, and Zilibotti (2010) which shows
that a UK producer is more likely to own its supplier if the producer’s R&D intensity at industry level
is high relative to its supplier’s.31
30See Whinston (2001) for a thorough comparison between transaction-cost and property-rights theories.
31See Aghion and Holden (2011), Antràs (2011) and Hart and Moore (2007) for a complete summary of property-rights
literature.
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The property rights approach to theory of the firm has been extended to explain many important
economic issues. Antràs (2003) proposes a property-rights model to answer why trade in capital in-
tensive goods has a greater tendency to be traded within the boundaries of the firm. Antràs (2005) uses
similar model to explain how product cycles lead to changes in ownership structures over time. Besley
and Ghatak (2001) extend Grossman and Hart’s model to analyse how public good ownership affects
its provision. Aghion, Griffith, and Howitt (2006) investigate the effect of competition on ownership
structure. Acemoglu, Antras, and Helpman (2007) analyse how incompleteness of contracts leads to
the adoption of less advanced technologies. These are examples of numerous studies based on the
property rights approach.
Nearly all the papers in the literature, including all aforementioned papers, treat ownership as
binary. In other words, a firm can either wholly own its supplier or let the supplier be independent.
Nonetheless, a majority of firms partially own their affiliates. In my dataset, among all Thai manu-
facturing firms with some foreign ownership, only around 30% of them are 100% owned by foreign
firms. The rest have foreign ownership shares ranging from 1% to 99% as you can see from Figure 11.
Hence treating ownership as continuous matches with firms’ integration choice in reality. When firms
decide to integrate with their suppliers, they have to choose the optimal amount of supplier’s equity
that they should acquire and this can be anything from 0 to 100 percent of the total equity.
There are two peaks in the distribution of foreign ownership shares and one of them is around 50%.
One may think that there must be a restriction on foreign ownership shares. Out of 125 industries, there
are only 22 industries where the maximum foreign ownership share is less than fifty percent. A case
where these industries are dropped is done as a robustness check and the main results of this chapter
do not change.
Furthermore, the empirical literature on intra-firm trade is based on different ownership thresholds.
For example, U.S. Census Bureau classifies a trade transaction to be intra-firm if one party owns at
least 6% of the other32 while the ownership threshold used by the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) is 10%.33 The threshold is higher outside the U.S.; for instance, the ownership threshold is
50% in French trade data.34 The subjectivity in ownership thresholds can have a significant impact
on the empirical tests of firm boundaries. When ownership is treated as continuous, this problem is
32The empirical papers based on this set of data includes Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2010) and Nunn and
Trefler (2008).
33The empirical part in Antràs (2003) is based on this dataset.
34For more details about the data, see Corcos, Irac, Mion, and Verdier (2012) and Defever and Toubal (2007).
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circumvented.
Figure 11: Distribution of Foreign Ownership Shares in Thailand
Several papers also highlight that moving away from treating ownership as binary is non-trivial.
Hart and Moore (1990) proposed a property-rights model where there is a discrete number of assets
in a production process and conclude that all assets that are complementary should be under common
ownership. Maskin and Tirole (1999) show in a similar framework that joint ownership can be more
efficient. Consistent with Maskin and Tirole’s (1999) prediction, Fehr, Kremhelmer, and Schmidt’s
(2008) experiments35 suggest that 100% ownership is not optimal and they observed that a majority
of experiment participants optimally choose joint ownership (50-50) over sole ownership. It is clear
that firms can choose different degree of integration and I believe that an insight into a firm’s decision
making on optimal ownership share will broaden our understanding of firm boundaries.
The aim of this chapter is to test whether the property rights approach to the theory of the firm can
explain firms’ optimal degree of integration both theoretically and empirically. I propose a property-
rights model where the degree of integration is continuous and becomes a choice variable. Then, I use
the Thai manufacturing Census to test the model’s predictions. To the best of my knowledge, this is
the first time that property-rights theories have been used to explain the optimal degree of integration
theoretically and empirically because existing papers generally treat ownership as binary or discrete.
35In the experiments, players bargain over ownership rights on a firm (joint ownership or wholly owned entity) and
then make relationship-specific investments. The ownership pattern that minimises the under-investment by both parties is
regarded to be more optimal.
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Ferreira, Ornelas, and Turner (2011) use a mechanism design approach to characterise the optimal
restructuring mechanism. Their model also has continuous ownership but the authors aim to explain
the optimal allocation of corporate ownership and control, whereas I follow Grossman and Hart (1986)
and assume that there is no separation between ownership and control.
The property-rights model proposed here has a similar setting to the theoretical models in Antràs
(2003) and Antras and Helpman (2004). There are many differentiated varieties in each industry and
the demand is of CES form. Each final good producer needs to match with a supplier to produce a
commodity. Once matched, the final good producer chooses the optimal amount of supplier’s equity
that they should acquire (this will be called ownership share from this point onwards) which can be
anything between 0 and 100%.36 At the same time, the side payments are agreed and paid. Input
production involves capital investment from the final good producers and labour from suppliers as in
Antràs (2003). These investments in capital and labour are relationship specific and their quality are
not verifiable by third parties. Therefore, it is futile to write any ex ante contracts and both parties will
Nash bargain over the surplus after the investments have been made. Then the final good producer
costlessly transforms the inputs into final goods and the revenue will be split according to the Nash
bargaining result.
Ownership share affects the Nash bargaining result in two ways. Firstly, it determines the final
good producer’s outside option. The higher the ownership share is, the more of the inputs that the final
good producer can seize when the negotiation breaks down. The seized inputs can be transformed
into final goods at negligible costs. This leads to a higher outside option for the final good producer.
Supplier’s outside option is always zero as he does not have the technology to convert remaining inputs
into final goods when the negotiation breaks down.37 Secondly, the quasi rent (total surplus less the
values of both parties’ outside options) will be split according to the ownership share. In Antràs (2003)
and Antras and Helpman (2004), the Nash bargaining share is exogenous and fixed but it is endogenous
here. Letting the ownership share be the Nash bargaining share is logical. If your ownership share
is large, you should get a big fraction of the quasi rent. Hence, higher ownership share increases
both the outside option and the fraction of quasi rent obtained by the final good producer. The Nash
36Zero ownership share means that the supplier is independent from the final good producer. 100% ownership means that
the final good producer own all the supplier’s assets.
37The assumption of suppliers’ zero outside option is a modeling trick which allows authors to avoid introducing com-
plicated matching process into the model. This assumption is common in the property rights literature which includes, for
instance, Antràs (2003) and Antras and Helpman (2004). The assumption is only dropped in the papers where the effect of
some elements of the matching process on ownership is the focal point of the studies (i.e. McLaren (2000) and Grossman
and Helpman (2002)), however this is outside the scope of this chapter.
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bargaining result is that each party gets a fraction of the quasi rent and its outside option. Therefore,
higher ownership share will lower the return received by the supplier and, hence, its investment. Final
good producers have to consider this trade off when choosing the optimal ownership share.
Backward induction yields two testable predictions. Firstly, the degree of integration is expected to
be high when the relative importance of final good producer’s investment which is proxied by capital
intensity38 is high. On the other hand, when the supplier’s contribution which is proxied by skill
intensity is large, final good producers optimally choose lower ownership share. The intuition is that
the parent firm is willing to increase the ownership which raises the degree of underinvestment by its
supplier only when the supplier’s investment is not significant relative to its own investment.
The second prediction from the model states that the marginal effects of capital and skill intensities
on ownership should be higher when the elasticity of substitution across varieties is high. Final good
producers increase ownership in order to be able to seize a bigger share of inputs when negotiation
breaks down resulting in a higher outside option. When the elasticity is low which implies that the
market is not competitive, equilibrium price is steep. In this case, seizing a small amount of inputs can
still generate high outside option without increasing the ownership. Hence ownership is less sensitive
to the importance of headquarter’s investment under low elasticity. The opposite is true when the
elasticity is high.
Thai manufacturing census 2007 is used to test the above predictions. Each firm must report the
foreign ownership share along with the nationality of the top three investors. They must also report
their export share and main export destination. Given the dataset, the universe of foreign affiliates
in Thailand can be divided into groups by their purpose of integration. By definition, horizontally
integrated firms duplicates its parent’s production with the main purpose of serving the host economy
alone in order to avoid relevant trade costs. If a foreign affiliate sells most of its production in Thailand,
it is more likely to be under horizontal integration.39 On the other hand, if it exports a lot, it is likely to
be a part of a global production chain and hence under vertical integration.40 For the main analysis, I
divide foreign owned firms into three groups (horizontal, mixed and vertical integration) according to
their export share in order to test the predictions which only apply to vertically integrated firms. The
38See section 3.1 for the explanation on the choice of the proxies.
39Atalay, Hortacsu, and Syverson (2012) and Ramondo, Rappoport, and Ruhl (2011) both found that the domestic flows
between establishments owned by the same corporation are very rare and small. Hence most of the affiliate’s local sales are
mainly to unrelated parties in the host countries.
40It is possible for these firms to be Thai multinationals with some foreign shareholders and they are clearly not under
vertical integration. Nonetheless, this is unlikely because there are only a few Thai multinationals. As a robustness check,
firm size is included as a control and that does not alter the main results.
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results under other definitions of vertical integration are shown in the robustness check section.
One may think that there must be a restriction on foreign ownership shares in Thailand which may
explain why there are two peaks in Figure 11; one of them is around 50% and another one is at 100%
foreign ownership share. Nevertheless, there are hardly any restrictions to foreign ownership in Thai
manufacturing sector. Of course, foreigners are not freely allowed to operate in some manufacturing
industries which are related to weapons, alcohol and tobacco like in any other countries. However, out
of 125 industries, there are only 22 industries, which includes the aforementioned industries, where
the maximum foreign ownership share is less than 50 percent. Moreover, 90 industries have maximum
foreign ownership higher than 90 percent. This shows that the restrictions on foreign ownership are
minimal. One of the robustness checks shows that dropping those 22 industries with low maximum
foreign ownership share does not change the empirical results.
The first prediction is confirmed by the data as the empirical results suggest that the effects of
capital and skill intensities on ownership share are positive and negative respectively for vertically
integrated firms. The results are highly robust as they survive stricter definitions of vertical integration,
division of foreign firms into four groups instead of three, controlling for firm size and dropping
land costs from capital expenditure. Furthermore, they reveal that the effects of factor intensities on
ownership are heterogeneous across integration types as summarised in Figures 12 and 13, which show
the effects of capital and skill intensities on ownership respectively. The figures show that the effects
of those factor intensities on ownership are similar for firms under vertical and horizontal integration
(capital and skill intensities have positive and negative effects on ownership respectively under both
integration types) while the effects are reversed under mixed integration. This emphasises that it is
important to only include vertically integrated firms in the sample when testing property-rights theories
which only apply to those firms.
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Figure 12: Marginal Effect of Capital Intensity on Ownership Share
Note: the Y-axis measures the estimated value of the marginal effect of capital intensity on ownership
share.
Figure 13: Marginal Effect of Skill Intensity on Ownership Share
Note: the Y-axis measures the estimated value of the marginal effect of skill intensity on ownership
share.
The empirical results also support the second prediction. When foreign owned exporting firms are
divided into two groups according to their elasticity of substitution across varieties, the effects of factor
intensities on ownership are magnified when they face higher elasticity. The result is summarised in
Figure 14. The darker columns represent the marginal effect of capital intensity on ownership. Both
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columns are positive but the effect is larger for firms with high elasticity. The effect of skill intensity
on ownership is also magnified with higher elasticity.
Figure 14: Effects of Capital and Skill Intensity on Ownership across Low and High Elasticity Groups
Note: the Y-axis measures the estimated value of the marginal effect of capital and skill intensity on
ownership share.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical model
and its predictions. The estimation strategy is explained in Section 3 while Section 4 is devoted to
describing the data used in the chapter. Section 5 and 6 show the empirical results from the main
regressions and robustness checks, respectively. Finally, Section 7 summarises this chapter and the
appendix of this chapter is in Section 8.
2 The Model
The following model is an extension to the model in Antràs (2003) and Antras and Helpman (2004)
with three main modifications. Firstly, the ownership choice is binary in Antràs (2003) and Antras
and Helpman (2004) while it is continuous in this model, which means that the foreign multinationals
can choose the optimal degree of integration. Secondly, the quasi rent share is no longer fixed and
exogenous but endogenously determined in the model. This is a crucial extension if one wants to study
the optimal ownership share. This is because higher ownership share should correspond to higher
quasi rent share. Lastly, the fraction of inputs that the parent firm can seize when negotiation breaks
down is also endogenous. When parent firms are allowed to choose different degree of integration, it
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is important to let the fraction of inputs that the parent firm can seize when negotiation breaks down
vary with the degree of integration.
Consider a world with two countries, North and South where the North is more developed than the
South. There are two factors of production: capital and labour. Let the cost of capital in both countries
be the same and normalised to 1. Wages are determined outside this model but the wage in the South
is assumed to be low enough to force all final good producers in the North to have their intermediate
inputs produced in the South. This assumption is made to match the aim of this chapter which is
to analyse the degree of integration not the location of input production. The following sub-sections
explain the model and its equilibrium in detail.
2.1 Demand
The world is populated by a unit measure of consumers with identical preferences represented by
U = y0+
1
µ
ΣJj=1Y
µ
j , 0 < µ < 1,
where y0 is consumption of the homogeneous good and Yj is aggregate consumption in sector j ex-
pressed by the following expression; Yj =
[∫
y j (i)
α j di
]1/α j where 0 < α j < 1 and α j varies across
industries. There are J non-homogeneous sectors and i indexes varieties. Assume that goods are more
substitutable within the same industry which translates into α j > µ . This yields the following inverse
demand function
y j (i) = Y
−(α j−µ)/(1−α j)
j p j (i)
−1/(1−α j) (2.1)
where y j (i) represents the demand received by a final good producer producing variety i which belongs
to industry j.
2.2 Production
Final good producers (F) are in the North while suppliers (S) are in the South. There are a large
number of suppliers and they are ex-ante identical. This implies that all suppliers are expected to
get zero profit in the equilibrium. In order to produce an output, F needs to match with a supplier
in the South and choose the fraction of S that F wants to acquire. Let this fraction be denoted by
γ ∈ [0,1]. Then S makes a side payment to F. This side payment can be negative which would mean
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that F makes a payment to S. The side payment is introduced to the model as a mechanism to allow
suppliers’ expected profit to be zero.41 F and S contribute capital (k j(i)) and labour (l j (i)) respectively
into the input production. The input production function has the following form.
x j(i) =
[
k j(i)
η (i)
]η(i)[ l j (i)
1−η (i)
]1−η(i)
, 0 < η (i)< 1, (2.2)
where x j(i) is the quantity of manufactured intermediate input for the production of variety i in indus-
try j. The variety index i is also firm index as each variety is produced by one firm in the equilibrium.
The parameter η (i) measures the importance of capital investment relative to investment in labour.
Here I follow Defever and Toubal (2007) and let the parameter be firm specific.
The production of final good is done by F. Only F has the technology to convert the intermediate
inputs into outputs. For simplicity, it is assumed that F can transform 1 unit of intermediate input into
1 unit of output costlessly. In other words, the final good production function has the following form.
y j (i) = x j (i) (2.3)
2.3 Incompleteness of Contracts
F’s investment in capital k j(i) and S’s investment in l j (i) are non-verifiable to a third party. They are
also relationship-specific which means that the investments are useless outside this relationship. The
parties cannot commit not to renegotiate an initial contract (if one is written) and the precise nature of
the required input is revealed only ex-post and is not verifiable by a third party. As renegotiation will
take place if a contract is written anyway, there is no point in signing an ex-ante contract. Hence F and
S bargain over the surplus only after the investments have been made.
It is also assumed that the amount of intermediate inputs can not be verified by a third party.
Otherwise, the investments are indirectly contractible through signing a contract specifying the value
of intermediate inputs produced. Nevertheless, the ownership share (γ) and the side payment are
contractible ex ante.42
The ex-post bargaining follows a generalised Nash bargaining game. F and S get the fraction γ
and (1− γ) of the ex-post gains (quasi rent) respectively. In the case of a negotiation break down, F
41This modeling trick is common in the literature. For an example, please see Antràs (2003). A more detailed explanation
can be found in the last paragraph of Section 2.3.
42This follows an assumption in Grossman and Hart (1986).
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can seize the fraction δ of x j (i) and S is left with (1− δ )x j (i). The remaining intermediate inputs
has no value to S because it does not have the technology to convert them into output. In other words,
suppliers have zero outside option. On the other hand, F can turn the seized inputs into outputs and
this gives rise to F’s outside option of δα j R j (i). The whole production process is summarised in the
next subsection.
The assumption of suppliers’ zero outside option is a modeling trick which allows authors to avoid
introducing complicated matching process into the model. This assumption is common in the prop-
erty rights literature which includes, for instance, Antràs (2003) and Antras and Helpman (2004).
Nonetheless, the assumption is dropped in the papers where the effect of some elements of the match-
ing process on ownership is the focal point of the studies (i.e. McLaren (2000) and Grossman and
Helpman (2002)). In these papers, the suppliers investments can also be used by other final good
producers (getting a new match) which give some outside options to the suppliers when negotiation
breaks down. This issue is outside the scope of this chapter and I follow the literature by assuming that
suppliers have zero outside option. The case where suppliers face positive outside option is a potential
area for further work.
2.4 Production Timeline
This section provides a summary of all production stages starting from the matching between final
good producers and suppliers until the division of surplus from selling final products. The graphical
illustration of the timeline is shown in Figure 15.
1. A final good producer (F) in the North matches with a supplier (S) in the South where there are
many ex ante identical suppliers.
2. F chooses γ which is the fraction of S that F wants to acquire and S observes it.
3. Side payment from S to F. This side payment can be negative (F pays S).
4. F and S invest in capital (k) and labour (l) respectively into the input production.
5. Input x j (i) is produced.
6. Nash bargaining over the produced inputs.
7. F turns the inputs into outputs costlessly, y j (i) = x j (i) .
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8. Surplus R j (i) is realised and split according to the bargaining result.
Figure 15: Production Timeline
2.5 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
The equilibrium values can be calculated from backward induction. The surplus or revenue from
output sale has the following form.
R j(i) = p j(i)y j(i)
= Y µ−α jj x j (i)
α j
R j(i) = Y
µ−α j
j
[
k j(i)
η (i)
]α jη(i)[ l j (i)
1−η (i)
]α j[1−η(i)]
(2.4)
If negotiation breaks down, F seizes the fraction δ of x j (i). This generates a surplus of δα j R j (i) .
Hence, F earns its outside option plus a fraction γ of the quasi rents. As a result, F earns
δα j R j (i)+ γ(1−δα j)R j (i) (2.5)
while S receives
(1− γ)(1−δα j)R j (i) . (2.6)
As k j(i) and l j (i) are non-contractible ex-ante, F and S invest non-cooperatively. As mentioned
at the beginning of the model, the cost of capital in both countries is assumed to be the same and
normalised to 1. Capital is assumed to be mobile across countries so its rental rate should be the same
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across countries. F’s investment decision becomes
max
k j(i)
δα j R j (i)+ γ(1−δα j)R j (i)− k j (i)
= max
k j(i)
φY µ−α jj
[
l j (i)
1−η (i)
]α j[1−η(i)][ 1
η (i)
]α jη(i)
k j(i)α jη(i)− k j (i)
where φ = [δα j + γ(1−δα j)]. The first order condition yields
k j(i) = φY
µ−α j
j
[
l j (i)
1−η (i)
]α j[1−η(i)][k j(i)
η (i)
]α jη(i)
α jη (i) (2.7)
k j(i) = α jη (i)φR j (i) . (2.8)
This first order condition implies that the marginal cost of capital investment must be optimally equal
to its marginal return. It is clear that F wants to invest more if its investment is more important to the
production of the input (i.e. higher η (i)). S also chooses the level of labour investment to maximise
its profit. S’s optimisation problem has the following form.
max
l j(i)
(1− γ)(1−δα j)R j (i)− l j (i)
The optimal level of labour investment becomes
l j (i) = α j [1−η (i)] (1−φ)Y µ−α jj
[
k j(i)
η (i)
]α jη(i)[ l j (i)
1−η (i)
]α j[1−η(i)]
(2.9)
l j (i) = α j [1−η (i)] (1−φ)R j (i) . (2.10)
Similar to the previous first order condition, this first order condition implies that the marginal cost of
labour investment must be optimally equal to its marginal return. It is clear that S wants to invest more
if its investment is more important to the production of the input (i.e. lower η (i)). Combine Equation
(2.8) and (2.10) and we get the relationship between the optimal levels of investment in capital and
labour
k j(i) =
η (i)
[1−η (i)]
φ
[1−φ ] l j (i) . (2.11)
The capital-labour ratio is increasing in η (i) and φ . Clearly, F would like to invest more if its share
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of the revenue (φ) is higher or its investment is more important in the production of inputs relative to
labour (higher η (i)).43 The optimal level of capital and labour as functions of parameters η (i) and
φ can be obtained from substituting Equation (2.11) into Equation (2.7) and (2.9) respectively. Their
expressions are shown below.
k j(i) = φ
1
1−α j
[
1−φ
φ
] α j−α jη(i)
1−α j
Y
µ−α j
1−α j
j α
1
1−α j
j η (i) (2.12)
l j (i) = (1−φ)
1
1−α j
[
φ
(1−φ)
] α jη(i)
1−α j
Y
µ−α j
1−α j
j α
1
1−α j
j [1−η (i)] (2.13)
The equilibrium price can be calculated from the demand function (Equation (2.1)), input produc-
tion function (Equation (2.2)) and the optimal values of capital and labour investment derived above.
This yields the following function for the equilibrium price.
p j (i) =
{
α j
[
φη(i) [1−φ ]1−η(i)
]}−1
(2.14)
The equilibrium side payment T must be just enough to make S’s participation constraint bind. In
other words, the side payment should have the value that drives S’s profit to zero. The equilibrium
side payment is
T = (1−φ)R j (i)− l j (i) . (2.15)
Finally, the last step of the backward induction is to find the optimal γ. F chooses γ to maximise its
profits inclusive of the side payment. Its profit maximisation problem becomes
max
γ
R j (i)− k j (i)− l j (i) .
This problem can be solved by inputting the values of capital and labour from Equation (2.8) and
43With higher η (i), F finds that a small increase in its investment can boost the size of the total revenue a lot and this
makes a rise in capital investment more worthwhile.
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(2.10) respectively. This optimisation problem becomes
max
γ
{
1−α j {η (i)φ +[1−η (i)] [1−φ ]}
}
Y
µ−α j
1−α j
j
[
α jφη(i) [1−φ ]1−η(i)
] α j
1−α j .
where φ = [δα j + γ(1−δα j)]. As mentioned at the beginning of the model, when parent firms are
allowed to choose different degree of integration, it is important to let the fraction of inputs that the
parent firm can seize when negotiation breaks down (δ ) to vary with the degree of integration (γ). The
fraction δ is assumed to have the same value as γ. This assumption brings the model closer to reality.
For example, a shareholder with half of the total number of equity shares of a firm is entitled to own
half of all the firm’s assets including all intermediate inputs. In other words, if γ = 0.5, the final good
producer must also be able to recoup half of all the assets which include the inputs produced. Given
the assumption, φ becomes γα j + γ (1− γα j). Some derivation yields the following expression which
pins down the equilibrium γ as a function of η (i) and α j.
γα j + γ (1− γα j) = η (i) [α jη (i)+1−α j]−
√
η (i) [1−η (i)][1−α jη (i)][α jη (i)+1−α j]
2η (i)−1 (2.16)
The first result from this expression is that the optimal degree of integration (γ) is increasing with
F’s relative importance of its investment (η (i)). The right-hand-side is similar to the one in Antras
and Helpman (2004) and they are both increasing with η (i). The left-hand-side is increasing with γ
because γ is a fraction with value less than one.44 Hence higher η (i) leads to larger optimal degree
of integration γ as depicted by the lower simulation lines in Figure 16 where γ and η (i) are on the
vertical and horizontal axis respectively. The first graph on the left has α = 0.25 which translates
into low elasticity while the value of α in the second and third graphs are 0.5 and 0.75 respectively.
The simulations also show that the positive relationship takes place regardless of the value of α j. The
intuition for this result is simple. Final good producers optimally choose higher degree of integration
when the importance of its investment relative to the supplier’s investment is higher taking into account
the hold-up problem (S’s underinvestment is worse when it receives a lower share of the surplus).
Another novel prediction from Equation (2.16) is that the magnitude of the impact of η (i) on γ is
crucially dependent on the elasticity of substitution across varieties in that industry. This is not the case
44 d(γ
α j+γ(1−γα j ))
dγ = (α jγ
α j−1−α jγα j )+(1− γ) and both terms are positive as long as 0 < γ < 1
2 THE MODEL 78
under the settings in Antràs (2003) and Antras and Helpman (2004) where the Nash bargaining share
and the fraction of inputs that can be seized are exogenous. The differences are shown in Figure 16.
The three graphs have different values of α j and α j is increasing from the left graph to the right graph.
The elasticity of substitution across varieties is increasing with α j,45 so the elasticity of substitution
is also increasing from left to right. Each graph contains two simulation lines. The simulation lines,
which are based on Antràs (2003) and Antras and Helpman (2004), are always higher than the lines
from this model. This is because an increase in γ under the setting in those papers only increases the
outside option while it also raises the Nash bargaining share in this model. Hence parent firms do not
have to raise γ as much when η (i) is high and this explains why the simulation lines based on this
model are lower.
Furthermore, it is clear from the graphs that under the settings in Antràs (2003) and Antras and
Helpman (2004), the elasticity of substitution hardly affects the optimal ownership lines. On the
contrary, it affects the optimal ownership lines under this model significantly. When the elasticity is
low (left graph), an increase in η (i) hardly changes γ while γ rises faster with a change in η (i) in the
graph on the right. In other words, the impact of η (i) on γ is higher when the elasticity of substitution
is high. When α j is low, varieties are less substitutable. Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES)
demand and the monopolistic nature of this model dictate that optimal price will be higher while
quantity will be lower. If negotiation breaks down, seizing a small amount of inputs will yield a large
revenue due to the high output price. This means that the outside option is quite high even when γ
is low anyway. So optimal γ increases slowly with η under low α j. The opposite is true under high
elasticity of substitution.
45The elasticity of substitution is equal to 11−α j .
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Figure 16: Predictions Across Low to High Substitutability
Note: The y-axis measures the optimal ownership share (γ) while the x-axis shows how important F’s
investment is relative to S’s (η). The elasticity of substitution of the final good (α) is increasing from
the left graph to the right ones.
3 Estimation Strategy
The model yields two testable predictions for firms under vertical integration. The setup of the
property-rights model explained in the previous section is such that the production of the input is
done in the South by the supplier while the final goods are produced in the North. Hence, the predic-
tions from the model only apply to vertically integrated firms. Antràs (2003) and Antras and Helpman
(2004) have a similar setup and their predictions are only applied to firms under vertical integration
as well. The first testable prediction is that the optimal degree of integration is increasing with the
importance of final good producer’s investment relative to supplier’s investment. Another testable
prediction is that the impact of the importance of final good producer’s investment on the optimal
degree of integration is increasing with the elasticity of substitution. This section explains how these
predictions can be tested on vertically integrated firms.
3.1 Estimation Strategy to Test the First Prediction
The first testable prediction is that final good producers should optimally choose a higher degree of
integration when the importance of its investment relative to supplier’s investment is higher under
vertical integration. The theoretical result is similar to the ones in Antràs (2003) and Antras and
Helpman (2004) but their ownership is binary. Moreover, the Nash bargaining share and the fraction
of inputs that can be seized are fixed and exogenous in those papers. Because the result is only
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applicable to vertically integrated firms, the definition of different types of integration and the method
to identify them will be explained in the following paragraphs. Discussions about other types of
integration are not required when Antras’ model is tested with trade data because the authors assume
that all intra-firm trade transactions are done under vertical integration which is not always true.
By definition, a foreign affiliate is horizontally integrated when it duplicates its parent’s produc-
tion with the main purpose of serving the host economy alone in order to avoid relevant trade costs.
Nonetheless, in this chapter, a foreign affiliate has horizontal relationship with its parent if its produc-
tion is mainly for consumption in the host country alone. This is because I do not observe the infor-
mation about parent company production. It would be more precise if that information is available but
a dataset with such information, ownership shares and domestic sales is not available anywhere. The
best available data that can pin down whether an affiliate is horizontally or vertically integration with
its parent is the highly confidential U.S. multinationals data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) used by Ramondo, Rappoport, and Ruhl (2011). Their paper has the best dataset to study U.S.
multinationals, 46 but even that dataset is not appropriate to use here as it has no information about
ownership shares which is the core of this chapter and their samples only include U.S. affiliates with
ownership more than 50% .
There are some supporting pieces of evidence that the definition of horizontal integration in this
chapter is not far from the strictest definition. Firstly, Ramondo, Rappoport, and Ruhl (2011) also
interpret the high level of affiliate’s sale to parties in the host country as an evidence of horizontal
integration. Secondly, one may think that an affiliate with large domestic sales might be selling to
another affiliate in the same host country and this should be interpreted as vertical instead of hori-
zontal integration. In contrast to that belief, Atalay, Hortacsu, and Syverson (2012) and Ramondo,
Rappoport, and Ruhl (2011) both found that the domestic flows between establishments owned by
the same corporation are very rare and small. Hence most of the affiliate’s local sales are mainly to
unrelated parties in the host countries.
A parent firm is vertically integrated with its supplier if the production done at the supplier’s
plant is a part of a production chain. Therefore, strictly speaking, a foreign affiliate in the South is
under vertical integration if it produces inputs and exports them to the foreign headquarter for final
good production. With the data that I have, it is not possible to check whether the foreign affiliate’s
46The dataset has information about parent’s and affiliate’s sales to both related and unrelated parties. Hence, parent’s
product codes can be compared to affiliate’s one. With the available information on affiliate’s local sales, it is straight
forward to pinpoint which firms have horizontal relationship with their parents.
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products are used as inputs for the final production or not. Hence, a less strict description of vertical
integration is used here. If a foreign affiliate exports a lot of its products to a foreign country, it is
more likely to be under vertical integration. Nonetheless, a stricter definition of vertical integration
will be used in the robustness check section. With the stricter definition, a foreign affiliate is vertically
integrated if it exports a lot and export to the country where its parent company locates.
In the main regression, foreign owned firms will be divided into three groups; vertical, horizontal
and mixed integration. Firms under mixed integration are foreign affiliates and they export enough
to the point where their aim is to serve both local and foreign markets. Clearly these firms should
neither be classified as vertically nor horizontally integrated. The division of foreign firms into three
groups has two advantages. Firstly, the thresholds happen to yield a pure horizontally integrated group
as all of the firms in this group do not export. Therefore, this group can be treated as pure horizontal
integration because their production is purely for domestic consumption. Another advantage of having
three groups is the ease of interpretation. If there are more than three groups, it is hard to classify the
groups in the middle. If there are just two groups, the firms around the threshold are very similar
while they are divided into different groups making the distinction between two groups unclear. When
there are three groups, the distinction between horizontal and vertical integration is stark and the
classification of the group in the middle (mixed integration) is more definite. Nonetheless, the case
where those firms are divided into four groups is also analysed in this chapter as a robustness check.
In order to test the first prediction, I follow Antràs (2003) and assume that capital intensity is a
good proxy for the importance of parent company’s investment. Antras uses Figure 17 to show that
the decision on capital investment is done mainly by the parent company. Hence, capital intensity
should be a good proxy for the importance of parent company’s contribution. As the importance of
parent company’s investment is always relative to supplier’s, I propose skill intensity as a proxy for
the importance of supplier’s investment. There are two pieces of evidence to support this. Firstly, the
shares of British affiliates in which parent firms have strong influence on the recruitment of executives
and senior managers are very low as shown in Figure 17. This means that affiliates are the ones who
make decision about hiring skilled workers. Another piece of evidence is from the same article that
Antras took the table from. Young, Hood, and Hamill (1985) asked the same set of affiliates about
who makes decisions on training and 90 percent reported that the decision is made by affiliates not
the parent company. It is quite clear that one important contribution from affiliates is recruiting and
training skilled workers. Hence, skill intensity should be a good proxy for the importance of supplier’s
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investment.
Figure 17: Decision-making in U.S. Based Multinationals
The first testable prediction suggests that the degree of integration or ownership share ( f share)
should be positively correlated with capital intensity [log(K/L)] while it has negative relationship
with skill intensity [log(S/L)] under vertical integration. In order to test the prediction, integration
types dummies (Hor, Mix and Ver) are created as explained in Table 19. The main regression equation
is
f sharei jc =β0+β1log(K/L)i+β2log(S/L)i+β3Mixi+β4Veri
+β5Mixi ∗ log(K/L)i+β6Mixi ∗ log(S/L)i
+β7Veri ∗ log(K/L)i+β8Veri ∗ log(S/L)i
+ parentcountryFEc+ industryFE j + f irmcontrolsi+ εi jc (3.1)
where i, j and c are firm, industry and parent country index respectively. Under this regression, the
model predicts that the effects of log(K/L) and log(S/L) on f share are positive and negative re-
spectively under vertical integration which implies that (β1 +β7) should be positive while (β2 +β8)
should be negative. Similarly, (β1 +β5) and (β2 +β6) captures the effect of log(K/L) and log(S/L)
on f share respectively under mixed integration. The dummy for horizontal integration (Hor) is not
included in the main regression in order to prevent perfect colinearity. Hence, β1 and β2 captures the
effect of log(K/L) and log(S/L) on f share under horizontal integration. The model neither makes
a prediction about the estimates under mixed nor horizontal integration but they will be documented
and compared against the results under vertical integration in this chapter. If the results vary across
integration types then it is crucial to take the integration type of each observation (i.e. each intra-firm
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trade pair) into account.
Table 19: Firm-level Variable Description
Variable Description
f sharei jc Foreign ownership share
Hori Dummy for Horizontal integration
Mixi Dummy for Mixed integration
Veri Dummy for Vertical integration
backtohqic This dummy is 1 when the firm exports to the parent country
Export share
highelasticity j This dummy is 1 when the elasticity of substitution is high.
Parent country fixed effects are necessarily included in the regression. Desai, Foley, and Hines
(2004) report that there are some policies in the U.S. which encourage U.S. parent firms to acquire
more shares of their affiliates. Moreover, it is possible that investors from different cultures have
different preferences on optimal ownership shares. The parent country fixed effects will capture these
effects.
Other controls include industry fixed effects and firm-level controls. Any industry-level factors
that can affect ownership shares (i.e. some industries are associated with high possibility of greenfield
investments which normally come with full ownership) are taken care of by the industry fixed effects.
The main firm-level controls are R&D intensity and firm size. Existing papers in the literature nor-
mally include R&D intensity as a control because parent firms might also contribute some technology
for R&D at the affiliates and this can affect the optimal ownership share. I also control for the possibil-
ity that ownership decision can be affected by the size of the affiliate as firm size is usually associated
with higher scale economies or the likelihood of being a stock exchange listed company. This chapter
follows the existing literature and uses log(sale) and total employment as proxies for firm size.
3.2 Estimation Strategy to Test the Second Prediction
Another testable prediction from the model is that the impact of the importance of the parent’s invest-
ment on optimal ownership share is higher when the elasticity of substitution is high under vertical
integration. In contrast to the previous section, the sample will be restricted to firms under vertical
integration only in this section. Then firms are divided into two groups (low and high elasticity) in
the main specification. A dummy “highelasticity” is created and it is 1 when relevant elasticity of
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substitution falls in to high elasticity group.47 The main regression becomes
f sharei jc =β0+β1log(K/L)i+β2log(S/L)i+β3highelasticity j
+β4highelasticity j ∗ log(K/L)i+β5highelasticity j ∗ log(S/L)i
+ parentcountryFEc+ f irmcontrolsi+ εi jc. (3.2)
The model predicts that the effects of log(K/L) and log(S/L) on f share are larger when firms are
in high elasticity group. In other words, β4 and β5 are predicted to be positive and negative respec-
tively. The explanations for the inclusion of parent country fixed effects and firm-level controls are
the same as explained earlier. Nonetheless, industry fixed effects are not included here as elasticity of
substitution only varies across industries.
4 Data
This section discusses the Thai manufacturing census, foreign ownership shares, characteristics of
firms under different integration types and the data on elasticity of substitution.
4.1 Data Overview
Data used in this study comes from the 2007 industrial census, compiled by the National Statistics Of-
fice (NSO) of Thailand every 10 years. The establishments under the scope of this census were those
engaged primarily in manufacturing industry (category D International Standard Industrial Classifica-
tion of All Economic Activities; ISIC: Revision 3). The 2007 industrial census covered all establish-
ments with 10 employees or more in all regions throughout the nation.
The census used a Stratified Systematic Sampling methodology. Regions and provinces or cities
were constituted strata while type of industrial activities and groups of industrial establishment were
constituted sub-stratum. The sampling units were establishments. An interview method was employed
in the data collection (the National Statistical Office of Thailand, 2010).
The variables available in the dataset are categorised into six parts: (i) general information on
establishments, (ii) persons engaged and remuneration, (iii) cost of production and expenditure of
establishments, (iv) production and receipts of establishments, (v) fixed assets of establishments, and
47The case where firms are divided into 3 groups according to their elasticity is also tested as a robustness check.
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(vi) research and development and laboratory spending and activities.
The total number of enterprises surveyed is 73,931. NSO provides weight for each firm and
the weights are used in all regressions. Out of 73,931 firms, 6,825 firms (9.23%) export. There
are 2,753 foreign-owned enterprises which is around 3.7% of the total number of firms surveyed.
Approximately, 2.5% of all firms are both exporting and foreign-owned.
Each establishment is assigned with a four-digit industry code. The industry codes used in the
data are ISIC revision 3 and there are 125 industries at the 4-digit level. All firms reported detailed
descriptions of their main products and then NSO officials assigned the most appropriate industry code
to each firm.
4.2 Firm-level Trade
Each firm is obliged to report its export share which is the annual value of exports divided by the total
value of sale. The dataset also provides the sale revenue and this allows me to calculate the value
of firm-level exports. All exporting firms must also declare their top exporting destination country.
Figure 18 shows the distribution of exporting firms’ export share. Around 17% of all exporting firms
export all of their production while the rest of the distribution is close to uniform distribution with a
spike at the lower end of the distribution.
Figure 18: Distribution of Exporting Firms’ Export Share
The dataset also includes the import share which is the value of imported inputs divided by the total
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expenditure on inputs. Therefore the value of imported inputs is calculated from the product of import
share and the total input expenditure. The sourcing countries of the imports are not reported. Out
of 73,931 firms, 6,624 firms (9%) import some inputs. Figure 19 shows the distribution of importing
firms’ import share. The distribution is quite uniform with a peak near the lower end of the distribution.
Figure 19: Distribution of Importing Firms’ Import Share
4.3 Capital, Skill and R&D Intensity
Capital input (K) is measured as the average of the beginning and the end of year total asset values.
Another definition of capital input is the value of total assets less cost of land, which I use as a
robustness check. labour input (L) is the total number of workers in the enterprise, including owner,
unpaid workers and production workers. R&D input is the sum of all expenditures related to R&D.
Following the trade literature, the number of skilled workers (S) is proxied by the number of non-
production workers.
Following the intra-firm trade literature, capital intensity is defined to be the ratio between capital
input and labour input (K/L). Similarly, skill intensity and R&D intensity are S/L and RD/L respec-
tively. Table 29 in the appendix shows the correlation matrix of these factor intensities and export
dummy.
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4.4 Foreign Ownership Share and Characteristics of the Foreign Investors
The unique feature of this dataset is that firm-level foreign equity shares are reported along with the
nationalities of the top three foreign investors. The distribution of foreign ownership shares among
foreign owned firms is shown in Figure 11. There are clearly two peaks: one in the middle and another
one at the far end of the distribution. With a closer look, the middle peak is exactly at 49% foreign
ownership share which is nearly three times larger than the frequency at 50%. At the far end of the
distribution, around 31% of the foreign owned firms are fully owned by foreign investors. Other
levels of ownership share have significantly lower frequency than these two peaks but they are also
significantly higher than zero.
The main benefit of using the Thai manufacturing census is that the investors’ nationalities are
reported. Investors’ nationalities have to be taken into account when foreign ownership share is anal-
ysed because many countries use the tax system which rewards firms who choose the government’s
preferred level of foreign equity. For instance, Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004) mention that U.S.
multinationals face lower tax if they own their foreign affiliates by more than 50%. Also, different
cultures may have different preferences on the optimal level of ownership share. As I can control for
the foreign investors’ nationalities, my analysis is free from these caveats.
Another advantage of the Thai data is that there are hardly any restrictions to foreign ownership
in Thai manufacturing sector. Of course, foreigners are not freely allowed to operate in some man-
ufacturing industries which are related to weapons, alcohol and tobacco like in any other countries.
Nonetheless, out of 125 industries, there are only 22 industries where the maximum foreign ownership
share is less than 50 percent. Moreover, 90 industries have maximum foreign ownership higher than
90 percent. This shows that the restrictions on foreign ownership are minimal. One of the robustness
checks shows that dropping those 22 industries with low maximum foreign ownership share does not
change the empirical results.
The characteristics of the top twenty investor countries, in terms of number of affiliates, are shown
in Table 20. Additional characteristics of affiliates belonging to these countries can be found in Table
30 in the appendix. The country characteristics are taken from Hall and Jones (1999) and Penn World
Table version 7.0 [Heston, Summers, and Aten (2011)].
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Table 20: The Characteristics of the Top Twenty Investor Countries
Country # of Avg Avg # of Relative Relative Relative Avg distance
affiliates fshare workers log GDP/Pop log Human cap/Pop log Capital/Pop % export (km)
Australia 28 56.11 201.21 1.20 1.69 1.28 40.9 7489
Belgium 13 68.85 256.92 1.20 1.58 1.26 59.7 9262
China 202 36.90 197.13 0.89 1.14 0.93 20.9 3301
France 53 53.08 157.79 1.19 1.23 1.27 38.5 9455
Germany 53 48.00 228.75 1.19 1.51 1.28 38.7 9074
Hong Kong 52 52.96 783.12 1.16 1.38 1.15 54.6 1725
India 32 43.56 239.28 0.93 0.63 0.92 47.6 2925
Italy 22 50.55 93.45 1.19 1.19 1.27 22.6 8840
Japan 1206 66.66 425.33 1.15 1.51 1.24 35.5 4613
Malaysia 112 59.64 151.03 1.06 1.04 1.13 27.8 1185
Myanmar 27 44.70 7.63 0.80 0.42 0.79 3.0 576
Netherlands 40 73.83 380.63 1.19 1.52 1.26 44.4 9184
South Korea 125 74.72 200.73 1.10 1.43 1.13 25.5 3727
Singapore 297 74.76 210.66 1.16 0.92 1.23 25.1 1436
Sweden 13 44.54 222.85 1.19 1.61 1.26 65.7 8278
Switzerland 51 67.29 468.61 1.20 1.57 1.30 63.1 9132
Taiwan 457 53.83 159.60 1.12 1.30 1.14 28.4 2531
UK 44 64.07 503.93 1.18 1.53 1.21 53.2 9542
USA 164 62.55 368.28 1.22 1.86 1.28 50.2 14169
4.5 Integration Types
Foreign-owned establishments can be divided into groups by their purpose of integration. If a foreign
affiliate sells most of its output in Thailand, it is more likely to be under horizontal integration.48 On
the other hand, if it exports a lot, it is likely to be a part of a global production chain49and, hence,
vertically integrated. In the main specification, foreign owned firms are divided into three quantiles by
their export shares. In other words, all the foreign owned firms with export share below the thirty-third
percentile are under horizontal integration (Hor) while firms with export share above the sixty-sixth
percentile are under vertical integration (Ver). The firms with export share between the two thresholds
are classified as “mixed integration” (Mix). The thirty-third and sixty-sixth percentiles of export share
turn out to be 0 and 60 respectively. This division into 3 groups are shown in Figure 20. The reasons
for dividing foreign firms into three groups are explained in the estimation strategy. Summary statistics
for the three groups are displayed in Table 21.
48Atalay, Hortacsu, and Syverson (2012) and Ramondo, Rappoport, and Ruhl (2011) both found that the domestic flows
between establishments owned by the same corporation are very rare and small. Hence most of the affiliate’s local sales are
mainly to unrelated parties in the host countries.
49It is possible for these firms to be Thai multinationals with some foreign shareholders and they are clearly not under
vertical integration. Nonetheless, this is unlikely because there are only a few Thai multinationals. Moreover, firm size is
included as a control and this should partly take into account of the existence of these few multinationals which are huge in
size.
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Figure 20: Division of Foreign Owned Firms into Three Quantiles by Their Export Share
Table 21: The Characteristics of Firms in the Three Integration Groups
Group # of Avg Avg Avg Avg Avg # of
affiliates fshare K/L S/L RD/L workers
Horizontal 910 52.51 1038828 0.24 4780491 180.35
Mixed 954 62.36 1704384 0.22 6758509 317.97
Vertical 882 70.10 1709997 0.16 6813344 566.47
Group Avg backtohq Avg log GDP/Pop Avg distance
% export of parent countries of parent countries
Horizontal 0 n/a 9.63 4447
Mixed 24 0.42 9.81 4873
Vertical 90 0.54 9.82 5309
4.6 Elasticity of Substitution
The estimates of elasticity of substitution are taken from Broda, Greenfield, and Weinstein (2006).
The authors used 6-digit HS import data (1992 classification system) from the COMTRADE database
from 1994 - 2003 to estimate import demand elasticities for 73 countries in the world. The estimation
strategy section describes that the required demand elasticities should be taken from the final market.
Therefore import demand elasticities of the countries that import Thai products available in their paper
exactly meet the requirement. The data provides an estimate for each HS3 code-country pair. As the
industry code used in the Thai database is ISIC revision 3, I use a concordance table from United
Nations Statistics Division website to assign the elasticities to each ISIC-country pair.
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Ideally, there should be such elasticity estimates for all Thai trading partners, however the esti-
mates are not available for many industry - country pairs. This drops more than half of all observa-
tions. Therefore, the average of the elasticities weighted by export shares to different destinations is
used instead. In other words, for each ISIC code, I calculate the average of the elasticities across all the
countries available in the data weighted by the share of Thai exports to those destinations. Nonethe-
less, the case where industry-country pair elasticities are used is also analysed as a robustness check
even though the sample size is much smaller.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Empirical Results on the First Prediction
Before discussing the main results, columns (1) and (2) in Table 22 give two interesting messages.
Column (1) shows the result from regressing the foreign owned dummy on three factor intensities. The
regression in column (2) is similar except that the dependent variable is now foreign ownership share
which is continuous. Similar to the empirical results in existing papers where ownership is binary,
the estimates in (1) are significant and the coefficients of capital and R&D intensity are positive. This
shows that the same pattern is also observed in Thai data when ownership is binary. Another important
message is that switching to continuous ownership is not trivial. In column (2), none of the estimates
are significant and the point estimate on R&D intensity is even negative and these are very different
from the results in column (1) which is based on binary ownership.
Section 3.1 explains the method to test the first theoretical prediction. It suggests that the de-
gree of integration or ownership share ( f share) should be positively correlated with capital intensity
[log(K/L)] while it has a negative relationship with skill intensity [log(S/L)] for firms under vertical
integration. From Equation (3.1), the model predicts that the effects of log(K/L) and log(S/L) on
f share are positive and negative respectively under vertical integration which implies that (β1 +β7)
should be positive while (β2+β8) should be negative.
Column (3) in Table 22 confirms that (β1+β7) and (β2+β8) are positive and negative respectively.
In other words, capital intensity is positively correlated with foreign ownership while skill intensity
is negatively correlated with it for vertically integrated firms. The industry and parent country fixed
effects are included so the results are true when comparing two foreign firms with investors from the
same country that operate in the same industry.
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Proxies for firm size which are log revenue and employment are added to the regression and the
result is shown in column (4). Large firms are more likely to be listed on the stock exchange and
involved with other factors that can influence the relationship between factor intensities and foreign
ownership share. The coefficients on these proxies are statistically zero and the result from column
(3) remains valid. Hence, the results are robust even when firm size is included as a control.
Table 22: Main Regression Results: First Prediction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Foreign owned dummy fshare fshare fshare
ln (K/L) 0.136* 1.255 2.330** 2.180**
(0.075) (1.045) (0.897) (0.904)
ln (S/L) -0.368*** -0.893 -1.270 -1.153
(0.027) (1.026) (0.915) (0.905)
ln (RD/L) 0.012*** -0.086 0.170 0.164
(0.003) (0.091) (0.177) (0.179)
Mix (dummy) 52.350** 51.960**
(20.410) (20.750)
Ver (dummy) 8.315 6.722
(19.340) (18.940)
ln (K/L)*Mix -2.765* -2.765*
(1.441) (1.451)
ln (S/L)*Mix 4.107** 4.079**
(1.571) (1.594)
ln (RD/L)*Mix -0.538** -0.538**
(0.224) (0.227)
ln (K/L)*Ver 0.009 0.092
(1.371) (1.348)
ln (S/L)*Ver -2.440** -2.427**
(1.225) (1.211)
ln (RD/L)*Ver -0.301 -0.302
(0.224) (0.225)
ln (sale) 0.274
(0.300)
L 0.0003
(0.001)
Constant -4.804*** 1.174 -11.300 -13.910
(0.932) (12.190) (9.483) (9.767)
Estimation Probit OLS OLS OLS
Sector fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent country fixed effect No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 72,302 2,746 2,746 2,746
Sample All firms Foreign owned firms
R-squared N/A 0.260 0.306 0.307
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 and all standard errors are clustered by industry.
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Another interesting result from these regressions is that the marginal effects of factor intensities
on foreign ownership share vary across integration types. The point estimates of relevant coefficients
under different integration types are plotted in Figure 21. The marginal effects of capital and skill
intensities on foreign ownership under horizontal integration are similar to the ones under vertical
integration whereas the opposite effects are observed under mixed integration.
This result suggests that the normal rational behind the property rights model might be sufficient
to explain the degree of ownership under horizontal integration while extra elements are needed in
order to explain the opposite results under mixed integration. An extension to my model and further
empirical tests on this surprising result are outside the scope of this chapter and left to further work.
Moreover, the heterogeneous effects across integration types also signal that the composition of
firms is crucial in studying the determinants of ownership or boundaries of the firm. For example,
each intra-firm trade data consists of a combination of firms under mixed and vertical integration. If a
particular dataset has a big share of firms under vertical integration, the overall effects of skill intensity
can be negative like the empirical results in Antràs (2003). Some other papers which include Nunn
and Trefler (2008) and Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2010) might be based on a dataset where
the share of mixed integration is large as their regression results suggest that ownership is positively
related to skill intensity.
Figure 21: Coefficient Plot: First Prediction
Note: the Y-axis measures the estimated value of the marginal effect of capital and skill intensity on
ownership share.
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5.2 Empirical Results on the Second Prediction
The second testable prediction states that the impact of the importance of parent’s investment on
optimal ownership share is higher when the elasticity of substitution is high for firms under vertical
integration. In other words, the model predicts that the effects of log(K/L) and log(S/L) on f share
are larger when firms are in a higher elasticity group. The estimation strategy to test this statement is
explained in Section 3.2. From regression Equation (3.2), β4 and β5 are predicted to be positive and
negative respectively.
In this section, the focus is on vertically integrated firms, the horizontally integrated firms are
dropped. Two definitions of vertical integration are employed here. The results in column (1)-(3) are
based on all foreign owned firms that export and can be matched with one of the weighted average
estimate of the elasticity of substitution from Broda, Greenfield, and Weinstein (2006). Clearly that
is a weak definition of vertical integration, hence the sample used in regression (4)-(5) only includes
foreign owned firms that export more than 60 percent of its production which is the same definition
used in previous sections.
The results in Table 23 show that the sign of β4 and β5 are positive and negative respectively for
both definitions of vertical integration. The coefficient on the interaction between log capital intensity
and elasticity dummy is positive and significant which implies that the effect of capital intensity on
ownership share is higher when elasticity of substitution is higher. The coefficient of the interaction
between log skill intensity and elasticity dummy is negative as predicted, however it is not statistically
significant.
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Table 23: Main Regression Results: Second Prediction
Dependent variable:fshare (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample All exporting foreign owned Ver only (export share > 60)
ln (K/L) 0.008 1.277 2.212* 0.274 1.719 1.212
(0.808) (0.957) (1.201) (1.060) (1.092) (1.343)
ln (S/L) -0.480 -0.610 -0.145 -3.044** -3.426* -3.239*
(1.082) (1.382) (1.298) (1.287) (1.862) (1.808)
ln (RD/L) -0.305*** -0.250 -0.263 -0.400*** -0.319* -0.312*
(0.109) (0.168) (0.170) (0.129) (0.167) (0.167)
highelasticity (dummy) -46.680*** -52.420*** -80.750*** -77.870***
(15.990) (17.350) (20.680) (20.93)
ln (K/L)*highelasticity 3.436*** 3.842*** 5.390*** 5.179***
(1.203) (1.280) (1.523) (1.536)
ln (S/L)*highelasticity -0.432 -0.698 -2.248 -2.217
(2.053) (2.014) (2.469) (2.456)
ln (RD/L)*highelasticity -0.125 -0.158 -0.102 -0.091
(0.225) (0.218) (0.241) (0.242)
ln (sale) 1.230 -0.650
(0.921) (1.102)
L 0.002 0.000
(0.001) (0.002)
Constant 55.340*** 73.11*** 62.730*** 44.650*** 72.770*** 78.000***
(14.63) (15.53) (19.630) (13.910) (15.110) (17.950)
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Parent country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1765 1765 1765 809 809 809
R-squared 0.109 0.116 0.124 0.197 0.220 0.220
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 and all standard errors are clustered by industry.
The coefficient plot in Figure 22 summarises the effects of factor intensities on ownership share
across low and high elasticity groups. It shows two important trends. Firstly, the effects of factor in-
tensities are magnified when the elasticity of substitution is higher as predicted by the model. Another
result is that the effects are also larger when the stricter definition of vertical integration is used. The
second result is not surprising because from the previous section we know that the effects are reversed
under mixed integration. Moving from “all exporting foreign owned firms” to “vertical integration
only” will definitely strengthen the effects.
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Figure 22: Coefficient Plot: Second Prediction
Note: the Y-axis measures the estimated value of the marginal effect of capital and skill intensity on
ownership share.
6 Robustness Checks
6.1 Robustness Checks on the Results from the First Prediction
6.1.1 Stricter Definitions of Vertical Integration
Up to this point, vertically integrated firms are defined to be foreign owned firms that export more then
60 percent of their output. This section explores whether the empirical results on the first prediction
are robust to stricter definitions of vertical integration. Two sets of definitions are proposed here. One
set of definitions involves with raising the exporting threshold. The other set of definitions involves
with both increasing exporting threshold and a dummy which is one if a firm exports to the country
where its headquarter locates.
A foreign owned firm is more likely to be vertically integrated if it exports majority of its output.
For instance, if a foreign owned firm exports all of its output, the firm surely can not be under hori-
zontal integration and it is highly likely to be a part of a production chain, hence vertically integrated.
Columns (1)-(4) in Table 24 show the marginal effects of factor intensities on ownership share across
different export thresholds. All firms with export share less than the export threshold are not con-
sidered to be vertically integrated and excluded from the sample. The thresholds are increasing from
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70 percent in column (1) to 100 percent in column (4). The results confirm that the marginal effects
of capital and skill intensities are still positive and negative respectively as predicted by the model.
Moreover, the marginal effect of capital on ownership share is increasing when firms in the sample
are more likely to be vertically integrated. On the contrary, the marginal effect of skill intensity on
ownership share gets smaller with a higher export threshold.
Traditional definition of vertical integration suggests that vertically integrated affiliates are sup-
posed to produce intermediate inputs and ship them to their parent firms abroad. The dataset allows
me to check whether a foreign owned firm exports back to its parent country or not and this is cap-
tured by “backtohq” dummy. Similar to columns (1) to (4), the export threshold is also increasing from
columns (5) to (8). The regressions confirm that the marginal effect of capital and skill intensities are
still positive and negative respectively. Therefore the empirical results on the first prediction are highly
robust across other definitions of vertical integration. The effect of capital intensity increases with the
exporting threshold like in columns (1)-(4). Nonetheless, the effects are larger for those firms which
do not export back to parent country.
Table 24: Results When Stricter Definitions of Vertical Integration are Used
Dependent variable:fshare (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sample: Foreign owned with %exp>70 %exp>80 %exp>90 %exp=100 %exp>70 %exp>80 %exp>90 %exp=100
ln (K/L) 2.628** 3.103** 3.410** 4.137* 5.964*** 6.692*** 5.088** 6.056**
(1.171) (1.383) (1.496) (2.359) (1.540) (1.817) (2.207) (2.818)
ln (S/L) -3.191*** -2.849** -2.516* -2.492 -2.088* -1.966* -0.558 0.109
(0.882) (1.110) (1.268) (1.885) (1.145) (1.150) (1.788) (2.148)
ln (RD/L) -0.095 -0.168 0.084 -0.163 0.103 0.082 0.367 -0.201
(0.190) (0.188) (0.190) (0.169) (0.226) (0.236) (0.236) (0.376)
backtohq 69.370*** 72.130*** 26.560 26.220
(16.630) (19.990) (26.990) (46.250)
ln(K/L)*backtohq -5.294*** -5.383*** -2.283 -2.526
(1.308) (1.597) (2.459) (4.084)
ln(S/L)*backtohq -2.167 -2.015 -3.697 -4.500*
(1.715) (1.967) (2.464) (2.376)
ln(R&D/L)*backtohq -0.332 -0.385 -0.473 0.071
(0.317) (0.324) (0.376) (0.530)
Constant 12.890 -17.510 6.696 -2.204 -19.970 -70.200** -5.878 -17.340
(13.720) (18.530) (17.640) (27.490) (16.770) (28.010) (23.780) (31.520)
Sector fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 769 628 482 287 769 628 482 287
R-squared 0.361 0.357 0.387 0.463 0.382 0.381 0.402 0.475
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 and all standard errors are clustered by industry.
6.1.2 Exclusion of Industries with Low Maximum Foreign Ownership Share
As explained in Section 3, there are hardly any restrictions on foreign ownership in Thai manufacturing
sector. There are only 22 out of 125 industries where maximum ownership shares are less than fifty
percent. This might be because there are actually some government controls in these industries (i.e.
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weapon, alcohol and tobacco production) or the foreign investors are not interested in investing in
them (i.e. carpentry and cassette tape production). Irrespective of the reason, columns (1)-(3) in
Table 25 display the empirical results for the first prediction when all firms in those 22 industries are
excluded. The regressions are exactly the same as the ones in columns (2)-(4) in Table 22, but with
restricted sample. The results here are very similar to those in Table 22. This is not surprising as only
43 out of 2,746 foreign owned firms are dropped here which implies that there are not many foreign
owned firms in those potentially problematic industries anyway.
Table 25: Results for Section 6.1.2 and 6.1.3
Dependent variable:fshare (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample No industries with max(fshare)<50 All foreign owned but K excludes Land
ln (K/L) 1.277 2.355** 2.205** 1.712* 2.668*** 2.575***
(1.048) (0.907) (0.915) (0.952) (0.863) (0.866)
ln (S/L) -0.908 -1.278 -1.160 -0.903 -1.301 -1.222
(1.031) (0.924) (0.914) (1.047) (0.914) (0.901)
ln (RD/L) -0.088 0.171 0.165 -0.086 0.175 0.171
(0.091) (0.177) (0.179) (0.092) (0.184) (0.185)
Mix (dummy) 53.000** 52.600** 48.640** 48.460**
(20.310) (20.650) (20.630) (21.000)
Ver (dummy) 8.550 6.945 11.430 10.450
(19.670) (19.250) (18.710) (18.310)
ln (K/L)*Mix -2.807* -2.806* -2.513* -2.518*
(1.435) (1.445) (1.465) (1.478)
ln (S/L)*Mix 4.105** 4.075** 4.233** 4.220**
(1.582) (1.604) (1.627) (1.646)
ln (RD/L)*Mix -0.542** -0.541** -0.540** -0.540**
(0.225) (0.227) (0.232) (0.233)
ln (K/L)*Ver 0.000 0.085 -0.255 -0.205
(1.394) (1.370) (1.342) (1.319)
ln (S/L)*Ver -2.461** -2.450** -2.410* -2.386*
(1.239) (1.225) (1.221) (1.208)
ln (RD/L)*Ver -0.309 -0.309 -0.302 -0.303
(0.225) (0.225) (0.227) (0.227)
ln (sale) 0.272 0.163
(0.301) (0.295)
L 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.861 -11.590 -14.160 -1.925 -12.490 -14.190
(12.240) (9.600) (9.882) (10.850) (9.083) (9.434)
Sector fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,703 2,703 2,703 2,741 2,741 2,741
R-squared 0.248 0.296 0.297 0.262 0.307 0.307
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 and all standard errors are clustered by industry.
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6.1.3 Capital is Total Value of Fixed Assets Less Cost of Land
Land ownership by foreigners in Thailand was not fully allowed during the time when the data was
collected. Therefore, this section analyses whether removing land costs from capital will change the
main results. Similar to previous section, columns (4)-(6) in Table 25 are based on the same regression
used in columns (2)-(4) in Table 22, but with a new definition of capital.50 Again, the marginal effects
of capital and skill intensities are still positive and negative respectively as predicted. Nonetheless,
the coefficient of the interaction between capital intensity and Ver dummy is negative here. It is
statistically insignificant and relatively small though.
6.1.4 Division of Exporting Foreign Affiliates into Four Quantiles
The division of foreign owned firms into three groups can be seen as highly subjective. Therefore,
as a robustness check, all foreign owned exporters are divided into four groups here. The dummies
for the the four quantiles are exp1, exp2, exp3 and exp4. The last quantile has the highest export
share. Notice that the lowest quantile (exp1) is under mixed integration not horizontal integration.51
The results are similar to the main results in Section 5. The correlation between capital intensity and
fshare is positive for firms in a higher quantile (vertical integration) while the correlation is negative
for firms in a lower quantile (mixed integration). This strengthens the validity of the main results.
50The number of observations falls by five because those firms now have values of capital less than ten baht (less than a
pound) which is the capital threshold used in this chapter to exclude outliers.
51It is not possible to include non-exporting firms here because they must always be in the same quantile. That would
give a much bigger weight to horizontally integrated group which would bias the results
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Table 26: Regression Results When Exporting Foreign Affiliates are Divided into Four Quantiles
Dependent variable:fshare (1) (2)
ln (K/L) -1.902 -2.688*
ln (S/L) 1.833 2.087
ln (RD/L) -0.389** -0.407**
exp2 -58.360* -64.360**
exp3 -64.690* -69.920**
exp4 -55.130* -61.500**
ln (K/L)*exp2 4.335** 4.769**
ln (S/L)*exp2 0.447 0.394
ln (RD/L)*exp2 0.135 0.127
ln (K/L)*exp3 4.240* 4.622**
ln (S/L)*exp3 -5.802** -5.802**
ln (RD/L)*exp3 0.106 0.113
ln (K/L)*exp4 4.315** 4.758**
ln (S/L)*exp4 -4.696** -4.714**
ln (RD/L)*exp4 0.410* 0.409*
Log (sale) 1.144
L 0.000
Constant 20.890 5.234
Sector fixed effect Yes Yes
Investor fixed effect Yes Yes
Observations 1814 1814
R-squared 0.308 0.310
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, SE is clustered by industry
6.2 Robustness Checks on the Results From the Second Prediction
6.2.1 Division of Firms into Three Groups
Firms were divided into two groups with equal size by the value of their elasticity of substitution in
Section 5.2. In this section, firms are separated into three quantiles according to weighted average
elasticity assigned to each of them. The regressions in Table 23 are reproduced here with three groups
of firms instead of two. The results in Table 27 reassure that the empirical results on the second
prediction is robust against different methods used to divide firms into groups.
The coefficients on the interaction terms between capital intensity and medium or high elasticity
dummy are all positive. Actually, the results here are even more stark than before as the size of those
coefficients are increasing with the elasticity. In other words, it confirms that firms with a higher
elasticity face bigger marginal effect of capital intensity on foreign ownership as predicted by the
model and the effect is even larger when elasticity increases. The coefficients on the interaction terms
between skill intensity and medium or high elasticity dummy are negative only when the sample con-
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sists of firms under vertical integration. This further strengthens the validity of the second prediction.
Nonetheless, the estimates are not statistically significant and its marginal effect on ownership does
not seem to increase from medium to high elasticity group.
Table 27: Separate Elasticity of Substitution into Three Groups; Low, Medium and High
Dependent variable:fshare (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample All exporting foreign owned Ver only (export share > 60)
ln (K/L) 0.00833 0.547 1.556 0.274 2.378** 2.147
(0.808) (0.953) (1.192) (1.060) (1.174) (1.563)
ln (S/L) -0.480 -0.0310 0.701 -3.044** -3.190 -3.074
(1.082) (1.451) (1.402) (1.287) (2.012) (1.956)
ln (RD/L) -0.305*** -0.305 -0.328* -0.400*** -0.430** -0.428**
(0.109) (0.189) (0.191) (0.129) (0.193) (0.192)
medium elasticity (dummy) -38.44** -46.12** -65.03** -64.38**
(18.81) (19.87) (29.54) (30.32)
high elasticity (dummy) -29.86* -35.29* -101.4*** -99.52***
(16.73) (18.10) (21.60) (22.96)
ln (K/L)*mediumelasticity 1.766 2.330 3.753* 3.712*
(1.421) (1.479) (2.139) (2.180)
ln (S/L)*mediumelasticity -4.214*** -4.465*** -3.299 -3.222
(1.602) (1.614) (2.965) (2.948)
ln (RD/L)*mediumelasticity 0.240 0.228 0.421 0.430
(0.241) (0.233) (0.285) (0.286)
ln (K/L)*highelasticity 2.390* 2.780** 7.530*** 7.389***
(1.306) (1.377) (1.456) (1.530)
ln (S/L)*highelasticity 1.734 1.515 -0.0983 -0.0928
(2.283) (2.229) (2.541) (2.541)
ln (RD/L)*highelasticity -0.227 -0.236 -0.148 -0.142
(0.252) (0.251) (0.370) (0.371)
lsale 1.252 -0.283
(0.918) (1.135)
L 0.00130 -0.000385
(0.00123) (0.00214)
Constant 55.34*** 64.08*** 54.30*** 44.65*** 83.23*** 85.32***
(14.63) (15.73) (19.62) (13.91) (17.68) (18.40)
Parent country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1765 1765 1765 809 809 809
R-squared 0.109 0.129 0.137 0.197 0.244 0.244
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 and all standard errors are clustered by industry.
6.2.2 Deviation From Weighted Average Elasticities
According to the model, each foreign owned firm should be assigned with the elasticity of substitution
belonging to the final destination country of its product. However, the data only allows me to observe
the main exporting destination not the whole production chain. Hence, it is not possible to identify
the final market for each firm. Even if the final market can be identified, available elasticity estimates
from Broda, Greenfield, and Weinstein (2006) and current concordance table would fail to assign the
elasticity to more than half of all foreign owned firms that export anyway as explained in Section 4.6.
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This leads to the use of weighted average elasticity of substitution.
In order to show that the results in Section 5.2 are not driven by the choice of elasticity, two other
sets of elasticities are used here. The results in columns (1)-(3) in Table 28 are based on the elasticity
estimates for the U.S. As Broda and Weinstein are equipped with data that can accurately estimate
the elasticity of substitution in the U.S., their elasticity estimates for the U.S. industries may be more
credible than the estimates for other countries. The results are very similar to the ones in columns (1)-
(3) in Table 23. The coefficients on the interaction term between capital intensity and high elasticity
dummy are positive and significant. Moreover, the interaction term between skill intensity and high
elasticity dummy is negative, however it is not statistically significant.
The estimates in columns (4)-(5) in Table 28 are based on the actual industry-country pair elastic-
ity. In other words, each firm is assigned with the elasticity of substitution belonging to the industry
of its product in the export destination country. As explained earlier, not all industry-country pairs are
available and this drops more than half of all the observations. Nonetheless, the results are reported in
columns (4)-(5). The coefficients on the interaction term between capital intensity and high elasticity
dummy are positive but only significant when firm size is not controlled. This partly confirms the
main empirical results on the second prediction. On the contrary, the coefficients on the interaction
term between skill intensity and high elasticity dummy are positive, but neither of them are statis-
tically significant. It is clear here that this empirical test can be improved by getting another set of
elasticity estimates and concordance table that is capable of assigning the actual industry-country pair
elasticity without dropping more than half of all observations. Another route for improvement is to
add appropriate industry-level controls to these regressions.
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Table 28: Results When Weighted Average Elasticities are Not Used
Dependent variable:fshare (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample All obs that can be matched using All obs that have exact
USA elasticity industry-country match
ln (K/L) 0.413 0.917 1.281 4.220*** 2.286* 1.338
(1.124) (1.284) (1.168) (1.283) (1.366) (1.684)
ln (S/L) -0.544 -0.481 -0.185 -0.149 -0.824 -0.177
(1.203) (1.668) (1.518) (1.386) (1.576) (1.540)
ln (RD/L) -0.269** -0.210 -0.214 0.030 0.129 0.046
(0.110) (0.132) (0.131) (0.177) (0.282) (0.257)
highelasticity (dummy) -62.880** -64.550** -53.290* -41.750
(29.560) (29.840) (27.880) (31.860)
ln (K/L)*highelasticity 3.996** 4.076** 4.561** 3.893
(1.824) (1.847) (2.121) (2.429)
ln (S/L)*highelasticity -0.290 -0.387 1.175 1.826
(2.260) (2.264) (2.788) (2.672)
ln (RD/L)*highelasticity -0.181 -0.188 -0.226 -0.264
(0.200) (0.194) (0.356) (0.337)
ln (sale) 0.696 3.245***
(1.135) (0.945)
L 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant 14.870 54.020** 44.150 10.720 32.660* -16.510
(17.460) (25.590) (35.220) (15.730) (18.090) (26.170)
Parent country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1440 1440 1440 664 664 664
R-squared 0.257 0.264 0.265 0.021 0.029 0.061
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 and all standard errors are clustered by industry.
7 Conclusion
This chapter provides an insight into the determinants of ownership share under property-rights theo-
ries theoretically and empirically. I propose a property-rights model where the degree of integration is
continuous and becomes a choice variable. Due to incompleteness of contracts and investment speci-
ficity, higher ownership share leads to a bigger incentive for parent firm to invest but decreases its
supplier’s contribution. The model yields two main predictions for firms under vertical integration.
Firstly, the degree of integration is expected to be high when the relative importance of headquarter’s
investment which is proxied by capital intensity is high. When supplier’s contribution which is proxied
by skill intensity is large, parent firms optimally choose lower ownership share. Thai manufacturing
census allows me to divide the universe of foreign owned affiliates into three groups; horizontal, ver-
tical and mixed integration. Empirical results confirm the first prediction of the model. The results are
highly robust against many checks. Furthermore, they reveal that the effects of factor intensities on
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ownership are heterogeneous across integration types as summarised in Figure 21. This emphasises
that it is important to only include vertically integrated firms in the sample when testing property-rights
theories which are only applied to those firms.
The second prediction from the model states that the marginal effects of capital and skill intensities
on ownership should be higher when the elasticity of substitution across varieties is high. Final good
producers increase ownership in order to be able to seize a bigger share of inputs when negotiation
breaks down resulting in a higher outside option. When the elasticity is low, which implies that the
market is not competitive, equilibrium price is steep. In this case, seizing a small amount of inputs can
still generate high outside option without increasing the ownership. Hence ownership is less sensitive
to the importance of headquarter’s invest under low elasticity. The empirical results along with their
robustness checks confirm the prediction. This strengthens the validity of the property-rights model
in this chapter which is based on continuous and endogenous degree of integration.
8 Appendix
8.1 Correlation Matrix
Table 29: Correlation Matrix
ln(K/L) ln(S/L) ln(RD/L) Export
ln(K/L) 1
ln(S/L) -0.041*** 1
ln(RD/L) 0.116*** 0.096*** 1
Export 0.215*** -0.277*** 0.131*** 1
Significance: *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.
8.2 Additional Parent Country Characteristics
Table 30 shows some additional characteristics of affiliates belonging to the top twenty parent coun-
tries. The variable descriptions can be found in Table 19.
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Table 30: Additional Characteristics of the Top Twenty Investor Countries
Country # of Avg Avg Avg backtohq Share of affiliates under
affiliates K/L S/L R&D/L Hor Mixed Ver
Australia 28 2814723 0.308 5357059 0.353 0.393 0.179 0.429
Belgium 13 937703 0.091 2309356 0.100 0.231 0.154 0.615
China 202 725630 0.254 6487039 0.133 0.619 0.193 0.188
France 53 815653 0.176 797932 0.469 0.415 0.245 0.340
Germany 53 3747060 0.257 4109435 0.529 0.358 0.321 0.321
Hong Kong 52 723192 0.172 14982074 0.128 0.269 0.212 0.519
India 32 693529 0.431 392871 0.316 0.406 0.094 0.500
Italy 22 508974 0.265 808056 0.500 0.727 0.091 0.182
Japan 1206 1968073 0.173 6686360 0.666 0.325 0.387 0.288
Malaysia 112 2639905 0.199 1597495 0.569 0.500 0.259 0.241
Myanmar 27 208982 0.255 0 0.000 0.963 0.000 0.037
Netherlands 40 1524504 0.338 9265085 0.226 0.225 0.400 0.375
South Korea 125 618592 0.129 2957708 0.141 0.552 0.216 0.232
Singapore 297 531776 0.330 1302517 0.705 0.162 0.653 0.185
Sweden 13 534353 0.063 0 0.600 0.231 0.077 0.692
Switzerland 51 2390224 0.188 2112962 0.304 0.098 0.314 0.588
Taiwan 457 695000 0.150 5265778 0.268 0.527 0.230 0.243
UK 44 2552842 0.190 26061589 0.333 0.205 0.273 0.523
USA 164 1650720 0.197 6617809 0.568 0.293 0.250 0.457
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Part IV
Product Quality and Intra-firm Trade
1 Introduction
The intra-firm trade literature has been highly influential and significantly developed in the past
decade. Many prominent papers have discovered several determinants of ownership structure which
directly affect the level of intra-firm trade relative to arm’s length trade. Antràs (2003) proposed a
property-rights model to answer why trade in capital intensive goods has a greater tendency to be
traded within the boundaries of the firms. Antras and Helpman (2004) extend the model in Antràs
(2003) to show that firm productivity is also an important determinant of ownership structure. Antras
and Helpman (2007) further extend the model to show that judicial quality in the sourcing countries
play an important role in determining the boundaries of the firm. Grossman and Helpman (2002)
propose a model where matching costs under arm’s length trade influence headquarter decisions on
ownership structure.
Both Antràs (2003) and Grossman and Helpman (2002) assume that input quality is non-verifiable
to a third party, which gives rise to the incompleteness of contracts and the hold-up problem. Clearly,
the hold-up problem is more severe when the desired level of input quality is higher. Nonetheless,
input quality in these papers are binary; either high or zero quality. Inputs are useless when their
quality is zero. Also, there is no link from input quality to product quality in these papers.
Several papers empirically document that higher input quality is required to produce high quality
output. Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) use the Colombian manufacturing census to explore the em-
pirical relationships between input and output prices. They find that large plants use more expensive
inputs and charge more for their outputs. Verhoogen (2008) also documents that upgrading the quality
of the factors of production is important in producing a better-quality good for export.
The aim of this chapter is to explain how the desired level of input quality affects firms’ decision
on their ownership structure. This chapter presents a heterogeneous-firm model with product-quality
differentiation where firms choose whether to produce relevant inputs in-house or outsource input
production. Product quality is increasing with input quality and quality is continuous. Quality is
non-verifiable by a third party, hence it is futile to write an ex ante contract specifying quality be-
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cause renogotiation will take place after relationship-specific inputs are produced. Hence both parties
negotiate only after the inputs have been made.
The quality aspect in this model follows the setting in Hallak and Sivadasan (2011). Product qual-
ity enters the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function as a demand shifter. Firms face
higher marginal and fixed costs when they increase the quality of their products. The incompleteness
of contracts environment in this chapter is similar to the one in Grossman and Helpman (2002) where
the hold-up problem does not occur under vertical integration while it leads to sub-optimal level of
investments for firms under outsourcing.
The model in this chapter is based on transaction cost theory while the model in the previous
chapter is based on property-rights theory. The hold-up problem exists even under vertical integration
in the previous chapter while vertically integrated firms in this chapter face no under-investment prob-
lem. Both models are built to identify determinants of ownership, however the model in this chapter
is chosen to be based on transactional cost theory. This is because the extra complexity that comes
with the property-rights theory does not provide additional insight into analysing the effect of product
quality on ownership. By opting for transactional cost theory, much richer findings are generated and
closed form solutions can be found.
Under arm’s length relationship, suppliers realise that their investment on input quality can not be
contracted upon and it will be sunk at the negotiation. This leads to a sub-optimal level of investment
on input quality. The under-investment problem becomes worse when input quality is higher because
it involves with higher level of investment which is not contractible.
Vertically integrated firms do not face the under-investment problem because they wholly own
their suppliers. When firms produce relevant inputs themselves, there is nothing to negotiate and,
therefore, they do not face the hold-up problem. Nonetheless, firms under vertical integration face
higher fixed costs relative to outsoucing pairs because final good producers have to oversee both input
and output production. The increase in managerial tasks is reflected in the higher fixed costs.
Firms are heterogeneous in their productivity. More productive firms face lower marginal costs.
Firms face a trade-off between a sub-optimal quality (under outsourcing) and a higher fixed cost
(under vertical integration). Their ownership decisions depend on their productivity and the values of
several important parameters, such as intensity of preference for quality and the degree of the hold-
up problem. There are three possible equilibria and the existence of each equilibrium depends on
parameter values. The model provides closed form solutions for all variables across all equilibria.
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In general, when the hold-up problem - which leads to sub-optimal product quality - becomes
less severe and quality does not matter much, then outsourcing is preferred. Conversely, when quality
matters a lot, firms are willing to pay a higher fixed cost and opt for vertical integration in order to
avoid the hold-up problem. Also, more productive firms are more likely to choose vertical integration
when quality matters because they are more capable of covering the higher fixed costs. The effects
of the hold-up problem and the intensity of preference-for-quality on the productivity threshold are
larger when productivity lowers the endogenous part of fixed costs instead of marginal costs. This is
because profits are less sensitive to a change in productivity when productivity only affects fixed costs.
The rest of this chapter continues by detailing the demand and production setting of the model.
The firm’s optimisation problem is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 explores all possible industrial
equilibria. The determinants of ownership structures under two different assumptions on productivity
are explained in Section 5 and 6. Section 7 concludes. The appendix of this chapter is in Section 8.
2 The model
This section describes the basic setup of the model. The environment of the model is similar to the
one in Hallak and Sivadasan (2011) and Grossman and Helpman (2002) combined. The latter pro-
vides an incompleteness of contract setting while the former gives a framework with vertical product
differentiation. Consider a world with two countries: the North and the South. There is only one
factor of production, labour. Assume that the wage in the South is low enough to attract all final goods
producers to produce their inputs in the South. Final goods are only consumed in the North, hence
the South only acts as the base for input production. Final good production is done in the North. The
partial equilibrium model assumes monopolistic competition among the final good producers in the
North. This section continues with describing the demand structure in the North, production function,
ownership structures and the incompleteness of contracts.
2.1 Demand
A representative consumer has constant elasticity of substitution (CES) demand. The utility system is
augmented to account for product quality variation across varieties. Utility is given by
U = (
∫
j∈Ω
(
λ δj q j
) σ−1
σ
d j)
σ
σ−1
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where j is the variety index. σ captures the elasticity of substitution across varieties in a given industry
and it is greater than one (σ > 1). λ j and q j are the quality and quantity of variety j respectively, while
Ω is the set of all varieties available in the industry.
The quality term in the demand function acts as a demand shifter and it captures all attributes of
a product that consumers value other than price.52 δ is the intensity of preference for quality and it is
higher than zero (δ > 0) . This parameter should varies across industries and countries. For instance,
if people in the North become richer, this can be interpreted as an increase in δ . Moreover, it can
also vary across industries because product markets’ scope for quality differentiation varies across
industries as suggested by Khandelwal (2010).
Utility maximisation yields the following optimal demand for variety j:
q j = p−σj λ
δ (σ−1)
j
E
P
(2.1)
where E is the total expenditure on all varieties in this industry and P is the price index which is
defined as P =
∫
p−σj λ
δ (σ−1)
j d j.
2.2 Production
Potential final good producers in the North (only firms in the North have the technology to produce
final goods) pay a fixed entry cost, fe, and take a productivity draw, ψ j, from a known distribution
G(ψ) with the support (0,∞). Then, they decide whether to begin a production or leave the market.
If they decide to start a production, each of them has to choose whether to integrate a supplier in
the South (vertical integration) or outsource input production to a supplier (outsourcing) instead. The
matching process does not involve with any costs. All potential suppliers in the South are ex-ante
identical and the supply of these firms is infinitely elastic. The differences between the two choices
are described in the next section.
There are two production stages; Input production stage and Final good production stage. Product
quality is increasing with input quality and they are assumed to be equal in this model and both denoted
by λ j. The production functions for the input production are the same across ownership structures
except the exogenous fixed cost which is higher under vertical integration. Both fixed and marginal
costs across ownership structures are summarised in Table 31.
52Many other papers also include quality as a demand shifter. Those papers include Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) and
Hallak and Schott (2011).
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Table 31: Marginal and Fixed Costs for Input Production
Vertical Integration Outsourcing
Marginal Cost c(λ ,ψ) 1ψ λ
β 1
ψ λ
β
Fixed Cost F (λ ,ζ ) Fv+ 1ζ λ
α Fo+ 1ζ λ
α
Both marginal and fixed costs for the input production are increasing with quality (λ ). Both
costs are in terms of wages paid to their workers. Marginal costs are identical across ownership
structures and they rise with quality, but decrease with productivity. The assumption that marginal
costs are increasing with quality is common in the product quality literature. For instance, firms need
workers with higher human capital (higher wage) to produce higher quality input. β captures how
fast marginal cost increases with quality. It is assumed to be lower than 1 in order to ensure concavity
of the profit function. Hence, we have 0 < β < 1 which means that the costs do not increase with
quality excessively fast. Marginal costs are lower when the final good producer is more productive.
For example, a more productive final good producer may help its supplier design its production line
such that fewer skilled workers are needed to produce one unit of input for a given level of quality.
The fixed cost has two components. The first component is exogenous to quality level and it is
higher for firms under vertical integration (Fv > Fo) . The assumption is common in intra-firm trade
literature.53 Following the work by Shaked and Sutton (1983) and Sutton (2007), the second compo-
nent of the fixed cost is increasing with quality. α captures how fast fixed costs rise with quality and it
is assumed to be positive (α > 0) . In the main model, ζ is treated as a constant. It is included here for
latter section which analyses the case where productivity lowers fixed costs instead of marginal costs.
In order to assure the concavity of the profit function, it requires the following two assumptions.
Assumption 1. κ = α− (σ −1)(δ −β )> 0
If assumption 1 does not hold, the profit function becomes convex and first order conditions give
the values that generates the smallest profits. In that case, the optimal quality would be infinity as
costs of quality are small and its return is large. This condition implies that the cost of quality should
be increasing fast enough with the benefit from additional quality. This gives an upper boundary of
δ which is ασ−1 +β > δ . When δ is above this value, quality is so important to the demand relative
to the costs of quality and this leads to a non-concave profit function and a corner solution where all
firms choose quality to be infinity.
53For example, see Antras and Helpman (2004), Grossman and Helpman (2002) and Defever and Toubal (2007).
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Assumption 2. δ > β
This assumption is made to make sure that the marginal benefit of quality is higher than the
marginal cost of quality. It is only when this inequality holds that firm choose positive quality.
Once inputs have been produced in the South, they are shipped to the North for final good produc-
tion and sale. Shipping the inputs to the North does not involve with any trade costs. The final good
producers can costlessly transform each unit of input into one unit of output with quality λ and this is
summarised in Equation (2.2) and (2.3).
λFinal Good = λInput = λ (2.2)
qFinal Good = qInput = q (2.3)
2.3 Ownership Structure
There are two types of ownership structure;Vertical integration and Outsourcing. Each final good
producer under vertical integration, denoted by subscript v, acquires a supplier in the South and control
both output and input production. Therefore, they make decisions on input quality and quantity. They
pay for all the costs of input production. It is assumed that the hold-up problem does not happen under
vertical integration. Nonetheless, the exogenous fixed cost faced by vertically integrated firms (Fv) is
assumed to be higher than the fixed costs under outsourcing (Fo) .This is because these firms have to
control both input and output production and this generates extra costs.
Under outsourcing, each final good producer (denoted by subscript o)54 outsources the production
of input to a supplier in the South. There are a large number of suppliers in the South and they are
ex-ante identical. This implies that all suppliers are expected to get zero profit in the equilibrium. A
final good producer matches with a supplier, then the supplier makes a side payment to the final good
producer. This side payment can be negative which would mean that the final good producer makes
a payment to the supplier. The side payment is introduced to the model as a mechanism to allow
suppliers’ expected profit to be zero. In other words, final good producers under outsourcing always
set side payment, T, such that their suppliers earn zero profit. The assumption of suppliers’ zero
outside option is a modeling trick which allows authors to avoid introducing complicated matching
54Because subscript v and o will be used through out this chapter, the variety index j under productivity, price, quantity
and quality variables is dropped in order to save some notation and reduce confusion.
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process into the model. This assumption is common in the intra-firm trade literature which includes,
for instance, Antràs (2003) and Antras and Helpman (2004). Nonetheless, the assumption is dropped
in the papers where the effect of some elements of the matching process on ownership is the focal
point of the studies (i.e. McLaren (2000) and Grossman and Helpman (2002)). In these papers, the
suppliers investments can also be used by other final good producers (getting a new match) which give
some outside options to the suppliers when negotiation breaks down. This issue is outside the scope
of this chapter and I follow the literature by assuming that suppliers have zero outside option. The
case where suppliers face positive outside option is a potential area for further work.
Each final good producer only has the control over output production while the input production
is under the control of its supplier. In other words, final good producer chooses optimal output price
and quality while its supplier chooses the quality and quantity of inputs and bears all input production
costs. Because there is a separate control over intermediate and final production lines (leaner organi-
sation), the exogenous part of fixed costs faced by the final good producer is less than the ones faced
by a vertically integrated firm (Fo < Fv).
Arm’s length relationship is subject to the hold-up problem. Product and input quality are not ver-
ifiable in the court of law but observable to all firms and consumers. Therefore, any ex-ante contracts
specifying a fixed price for each unit of input will never be agreed by final good producers because
suppliers will always choose zero input quality under such contracts. As a result, final good produc-
ers are only willing to negotiate when inputs have already been produced and their quality observed.
Moreover, inputs are relationship-specific and they have no values outside the relationship. Suppli-
ers foresee that their investment on input quality will be sunk at the negotiation and they carry out
sub-optimal investment in input quality and quantity.
3 Firms’ Optimisation
3.1 Vertical Integration
Final good producers under vertical integration have the control over input production. Hence they
will choose product quality and quantity to maximise their profits. As vertically integrated firms
produce input in-house, the hold-up problem does not occur under vertical integration. Hence, they
will not face under-investment. Nonetheless, the exogenous part of fixed costs faced by vertically
integrated firms is higher than the one under outsourcing. Profit maximisation yields the following
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optimal values for price, quality and quantity.
λv =
[
(δ −β )
α
(
σ −1
σ
)σ
ψσ−1ζ
E
P
]1/κ
(3.1)
pv =
(
σ
σ −1
)
1
ψ
λ βv (3.2)
=
(
σ
σ −1
) α−β−(σ−1)δ
κ
(ψ)
(σ−1)β
κ −1
[
(δ −β )
α
ζ
E
P
]β/κ
qv = p−σv λ
δ (σ−1)
v
E
P
(3.3)
where κ = α− (σ −1)(δ −β ) and it is assumed to be greater than zero as explained in Assumption
1.
The optimal quality level is shown in Equation (3.1). As κ is positive and σ > 1 , more productive
firms choose higher quality level because it is relatively cheaper for them to produce high quality prod-
ucts. λv is increasing with δ which captures how important quality is to consumers. It is decreasing
with α and β as they capture the costs of raising quality.
Equation (3.2) shows that the optimal price is equal to the product of mark-up and marginal costs.
The price is increasing with quality which directly affects the marginal costs. The overall effect
of productivity on price is ambiguous. A more productive firm has higher ψ which directly reduces
marginal costs and, hence, price. However, higher productivity allows the firm to choose higher quality
which increases the price. Price is increasing with productivity only when quality is highly responsive
to an increase in ψ and that happens when the elasticity of substitution (σ) is high and marginal costs
are sensitive to an increase in λ (β is high). In other words, that happens when (σ−1)βκ > 1 which can
be reduced to δ > ασ−1 .
The expression of the optimal quantity is shown in Equation (3.3). The effect of ψ on optimal
quantity is ambiguous due to the ambiguity of the effect of productivity on price. Given all these
optimal values, the expressions for revenue and profit can be derived and they are shown below.
rv = H (ψ)
α(σ−1)
κ [ζ ]
α−κ
κ
(
E
P
) α
κ
(3.4)
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piv = J (ψ)
α(σ−1)
κ [ζ ]
α−κ
κ
(
E
P
) α
κ
−Fv (3.5)
where H =
(σ−1
σ
) ασ−κ
κ
(
δ−β
α
) α−κ
κ
and J =
[ κ
α−κ
](σ−1
σ
) ασ
κ
(
δ−β
α
) α
κ
.
Eventhough the effects of productivity on price and quantity are ambiguous, higher ψ leads to
higher revenue and profit as shown in Equation (3.4) and (3.17). This is simply because quality
matters in this setting and higher productivity leads to a lower cost and higher quality which increases
demand. Also, the revenue from the case where productivity increases price and lowers quantity
should be similar to the revenue under the case where productivity lowers price and increases quantity.
Hence, quality which is always increasing with productivity dominates.
3.2 Outsourcing
Final good producers under outsourcing simply buy relationship-specific inputs from their suppliers
in the South. Suppliers are ex-ante identical, hence final good producers are indifferent in matching
with any suppliers. Once the matching has taken place, suppliers have to pay side payment, T , which
can be negative, to their partners.
Each supplier carries out input production, so they choose input quality and input quantity. They
also bear all the costs of input production. Each final good producer obtains inputs from its supplier
and transforms each unit of input into one unit of output costlessly. Hence, final good producers
choose output quantity and price.
When contracts are incomplete, input quality are not verifiable in the court of law but observable
by both parties. As a result, final good producers will never accept any ex-ante contracts specifying a
number of inputs at a fixed price. Otherwise, their suppliers will simply choose to produce the lowest
possible input quality (λ = 0). Final good producers and their suppliers only negotiate after inputs
have been produced and their quality observed. Suppliers no longer have the incentive to choose the
lowest possible input quality because that will yield low revenue and their share of the surplus will be
low. Nonetheless, suppliers realise that all the input production costs will be sunk when they negotiate
and this gives them a low bargaining power. This leads to sub-optimal investment in quality. This
setting has one-sided hold-up problem because the only person who invests is the supplier which is
different from previous chapter where both final good producer and supplier invest.
The bargaining process follows Generalised Nash Bargaining. Both parties have zero outside
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option because the inputs are specific to their intended user and can not be used by other firms. After
the bargaining process, each supplier under outsourcing receives a fraction φ of the total revenue. It
is a share so its value is bounded by zero and one; 0 < φ < 1. φ is exogenous in this model, and it
represents the supplier’s bargaining power.55
Given the Nash bargaining share of φ and side payment T , supplier’s profit maximisation problem
becomes
maxq,λpiSupplier = (φ p− c(λ ,ψ))q−F (λ ,ψ)−T.
It can be proven that final good producers will always use up all the inputs provided by their
partners. The intuition is that final good producers do not pay marginal costs while the marginal
benefit is split between them and their suppliers. As a result, the output quantity will optimally be
equal to input quantity. Suppliers realise this fact and take into account of the effect of their decision
on the number of units produced on price which is captured in the demand expressed in Equation (2.1).
This results in the following optimal values for quality, price and quantity.
λo =
[
φσ
(δ −β )
α
(
σ −1
σ
)σ
ψσ−1ζ
E
P
]1/κ
(3.6)
po =
1
φ
(
σ
σ −1
)
1
ψ
λ βo
= φ
σβ−κ
κ
(
σ
σ −1
) α−β−(σ−1)δ
κ
(ψ)
(σ−1)β
κ −1
[
(δ −β )
α
ζ
E
P
]β/κ
(3.7)
qo = p−σo λ
δ (σ−1)
o
E
P
(3.8)
The intuition behind the effects of productivity and other parameters on these values is the same as
in the vertical integration case. Nonetheless, the expressions are different and they will be compared
in the next section.
55An increase in φ can be interpreted as an improvement in judicial quality in the South which will increase the supplier’s
bargaining power.
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Given the optimal quality, quantity and price, final good producers choose the side payment T
such that piSupplier = 0. The side payment has the following expression.
T = (φ po− 1ψ λ
β
o )qo−Fo−
1
ζ
λαo (3.9)
Under outsourcing, final good producers face the following profit function.
pio = (1−φ)poqo+T
Substituting in all relevant values, the optimal revenue and profit under outsourcing are shown
below.
ro = φ [σα−κ]/κH (ψ)
α(σ−1)
κ [ζ ]
α−κ
κ
(
E
P
) α
κ
(3.10)
pio =
[
φ−1
α
α−κ −1
]
φ
σα
κ J (ψ)
α(σ−1)
κ [ζ ]
α−κ
κ
(
E
P
) α
κ
−Fv (3.11)
where H =
(σ−1
σ
) ασ−κ
κ
(
δ−β
α
) α−κ
κ
and J =
[ κ
α−κ
](σ−1
σ
) ασ
κ
(
δ−β
α
) α
κ
. Again, the intuition behind the
effects of productivity and other parameters on profit and revenue is the same as in the vertical inte-
gration case.
3.3 Vertical Integration vs Outsourcing
This section compares the equilibrium values of quality, price, quantity and profit across ownership
structures.
3.3.1 Quality
Vertical integration case;
λv =
[
(δ −β )
α
(
σ −1
σ
)σ
ψσ−1ζ
E
P
]1/κ
.
Outsourcing case;
λo =
[
φσ
(δ −β )
α
(
σ −1
σ
)σ
ψσ−1ζ
E
P
]1/κ
.
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In other words, we have
λo = φσ/κλv. (3.12)
φσ/κ is positive and less than one. This implies that, given a productivity level, firms under outsourc-
ing always produces lower product quality. This is a result of the hold-up problem and arm’s length
suppliers make sub-optimal investment on quality. As κ = α− (σ −1)(δ −β ), κ is decreasing with
δ . When quality matters more (an increase in δ ), the quality gap becomes larger and the hold-up
problem becomes more severe.
3.3.2 Price
Vertical integration case;
pv =
(
σ
σ −1
) α−β−(σ−1)δ
κ
(ψ)
(σ−1)β
κ −1
[
(δ −β )
α
ζ
E
P
]β/κ
.
Outsourcing case;
po = φ
σβ−κ
κ
(
σ
σ −1
) α−β−(σ−1)δ
κ
(ψ)
(σ−1)β
κ −1
[
(δ −β )
α
ζ
E
P
]β/κ
.
In other words, we have
po = φ
σβ−κ
κ pv. (3.13)
Which price is higher depends on the value of relevant parameters. Firms under outsourcing
charge lower price when σβ−κκ > 1. This is because the hold-up problem lowers product quality under
outsourcing and that decreases the price whereas potential under-investment in input quantity will
increase the price. If the hold-up problem affects product quality more, price under outsourcing will
be lower. This happens when σβ−κκ > 1 which reduces to
δ >
α−β
σ −1 . (3.14)
This is intuitive. The previous section concludes that the quality gap rises when quality matters more
(δ is high). In other words, the under-investment in quality is severe enough to make po < pv when
δ is higher than α−βσ−1 . Moreover the gap is increasing with δ when the inequality holds and this is
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simply because the quality gap widens.
3.3.3 Quantity
Vertical integration case;
qv = p−σv λ
δ (σ−1)
v
E
P
.
Outsourcing case;
qo = p−σo λ
δ (σ−1)
o
E
P
.
After substituting in relevant values, we have
qo = φ
σ(α−β )
κ qv. (3.15)
The quantity supplied by firms under outsourcing is lower for a given productivity level when α > β .
Optimal quantity depends on price and quality. Higher quality raises demand while higher price
lowers it. The hold-up problem affects both price and quality. The effect of lower quality on demand
dominates when α > β . To reconcile this with the difference in prices, po is lower than pv when
the under-investment in quantity is small. This section suggests that there is no under-investment in
quantity when β > α . Under this condition, po must be lower than pv. This is confirmed because the
inequality in (3.14) holds when β > α because δ is greater than zero.
3.3.4 Revenue
Vertical integration case:
rv = H (ψ)
α(σ−1)
κ [ζ ]
α−κ
κ
(
E
P
) α
κ
Outsourcing case:
ro = φ [σα−κ]/κH (ψ)
α(σ−1)
κ [ζ ]
α−κ
κ
(
E
P
) α
κ
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where H =
(σ−1
σ
) ασ−κ
κ
(
δ−β
α
) α−κ
κ
. This implies that we have
ro = φ [σα−κ]/κrv. (3.16)
From Assumption 1 (κ > 0) and 2 (δ > β ), the expression for κ [κ =α−(σ−1)(δ −β )] implies
that α > κ as (σ −1)(δ −β ) is positive. Therefore, σα must be higher than κ and the revenue under
outsourcing is lower than firms under vertical integration controlling for productivity level. This holds
for all δ within the range specified in Assumption 1 regardless of the ranking of price or quantity
across ownership structures. The intuition is simple. For a given λ , there are two possible scenarios;
higher quantity leads to a lower price and lower quantity leads to a higher price. Both cases roughly
generates the same level of revenue for a given level of λ . Therefore, the main determinant of the
revenue is λ and it is lower under outsourcing. This explains why firms under outsourcing always get
a lower revenue controlling for productivity level regardless of the uncertainty about which scenario
the industry is in. Of course, this does not mean that vertical integration is always better because
looking at revenue alone ignores production costs. Costs are taken into account only when profits are
compared across ownership structures in the next section.
3.3.5 Profits
Vertical integration case;
piv = J (ψ)
α(σ−1)
κ [ζ ]
α−κ
κ
(
E
P
) α
κ
−Fv. (3.17)
Outsourcing case;
pio = J
[
φ−1
α
α−κ −1
]
φ
σα
κ (ψ)
α(σ−1)
κ [ζ ]
α−κ
κ
(
E
P
) α
κ
−Fo (3.18)
where J =
[ κ
α−κ
](σ−1
σ
) ασ
κ
(
δ−β
α
) α
κ
. The comparison between the two profit functions will be made in
the next section which describes industrial equilibrium. These equations pin down productivity cutoff
and productivity threshold which sorts firms according to their productivity into different ownership
structures.
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4 Industrial Equilibrium
This section describes all possible industrial equilibria under this model. The equilibria include perva-
sive outsourcing, pervasive vertical integration and the equilibrium where both ownership structures
coexist. This section starts by discussing the properties of profit functions derived in the previous
section as they determine the conditions required for each equilibrium. Then, the conditions for those
three equilibria will be discussed.
4.1 Properties of the Profit Functions
4.1.1 Slopes of the Profit Functions
Differentiating the profit functions in Equations (3.17) and (3.18) with respect to productivity yields
the following expressions for the gradients of those profit curves.
Vertical integration case;
dpiv
dψ
=
[
α (σ −1)
κ
ψ
α(σ−1)−κ
κ Jζ
α−κ
κ
(
E
P
) α
κ
]
. (4.1)
Outsourcing case;
dpio
dψ
=
[
φ−1
α
α−κ −1
]
φ
σα
κ
[
α (σ −1)
κ
ψ
α(σ−1)−κ
κ Jζ
α−κ
κ
(
E
P
) α
κ
]
(4.2)
where J =
[ κ
α−κ
](σ−1
σ
) ασ
κ
(
δ−β
α
) α
κ
.
Equation (4.1) shows that the gradient of piv is strictly positive. The gradient of the profit function
under outsourcing is also positive because φ−1 αα−κ > 1.
56 The equations below compare the two
gradients.
dpio
dψ
=
[
φ−1
α
α−κ −1
]
φ
σα
κ
dpiv
dψ
dpio
dψ
= M
dpiv
dψ
. (4.3)
where M =
[
φ−1 αα−κ −1
]
φ σακ . M determines which profit curve is steeper. When M is less than 1,
the profit curve under vertical integration is steeper ( dpivdψ >
dpio
dψ ). As both profit functions are strictly
56This is because 0< φ < 1 which means that φ−1 > 1. Also Assumption 1 dictates that α > κ and this leads to αα−κ > 1.
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increasing with productivity, this variable M which captures the relative gradient between the two
profit curves will play an important role in analysing each equilibrium later. Therefore, next section is
devoted to describe the properties of M.
4.1.2 Properties of M
M captures the effect of the hold-up problem on revenue (φ σακ −1 αα−κ ) and fixed costs
(
φ σακ
)
. The
former is always higher than the later but their relative values determine which profit curve has a
higher gradient. When the effect of the hold-up problem on revenue is not severe relative to the its
effect on the fixed cost ( φ σακ −1 αα−κ is much larger than φ
σα
κ ) then M > 1 and the profit curve under
outsourcing is steeper than the one under vertical integration. Some properties of M are discussed
below.
Firstly, M is positive. As explained in the previous section that φ−1 αα−κ > 1. This implies that
M =
[
φ−1 αα−κ −1
]
φ σακ is strictly positive because φ σακ is positive.
Secondly, dMdδ < 0 for any values of parameters restricted by Assumption 1. The proof of this
condition is shown in Section 8.1 in the Appendix. This means that when quality matters more,
the gradient of the profit curve under vertical integration will be steeper relative to the one under
outsourcing.
Lastly, dMdφ > 0 for any values of parameters restricted by Assumption 1. This result holds under an
additional assumption that the elasticity of substitution across varieties (σ) and the Nash bargaining
share (φ) are large enough to allow quality to matter under outsourcing case (φσ > 1). Section 8.2
in the appendix shows that when the assumption holds, M is increasing with φ . When the elasticity of
substitution is very low or close to 1, varieties are not substitutes and consumers have to consume all
varieties with equal amount regardless of their quality. In other words, quality does not matter. As this
chapter is interested in the case where quality matters, it makes sense to assume a reasonably high σ .
Also, when φ is too low, the hold-up problem is severe and the under-investment in quality is large.
Under this situation, suppliers will choose low quality even when quality matters significantly. Hence
the assumption that φσ > 1 implies that quality also matters for firms under outsourcing. If this is the
case, an increase in φ , which lowers the hold-up problem, allows firms under outsourcing to produce
higher quality products and increase their revenues. This is why M increases when φ is higher.
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4.2 Pervasive Outsourcing Equilibrium
This equilibrium occurs when outsourcing yields higher profit for all productivity levels. In other
words, this happens when pio curve lies above piv curve in profit-productivity space. This requires two
conditions; the exogenous fixed cost under vertical integration is strictly higher and pio curve is steeper
than piv curve for all level of productivity. These conditions are shown in Figure 23.
Figure 23: Pervasive Outsourcing
By assumption, the fixed cost must be higher under vertical integration. Therefore, the equilibrium
takes place when dpivdψ <
dpio
dψ for all values of ψ. Equation (4.3) suggests that this happens when M > 1.
Previous section shows that M is increasing with φ while decreasing with δ . This suggests that this
equilibrium occur when φ is high and δ is low. The intuition is that when the Nash bargaining share
(φ) is high, the hold-up problem becomes less severe which makes outsourcing more attractive. Also
when quality matters less (low δ ) , sub-optimal quality caused by the hold-up problem does not affect
the revenue much.
Firms with productivity lower than the productivity cutoff (ψ) leaves the market before matching
with a supplier. In this case, the productivity cutoff (ψ) is the productivity level where pio curve
crosses the x-axis. In other words, pio (ψ) = 0. This yields an expression for the productivity cutoff as
shown below.
ψ = M
−κ
α(σ−1) ζ
−α+κ
α(σ−1)
(
E
P
) −1
σ−1
(
Fo
J
) κ
α(σ−1)
(4.4)
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Pervasive outsourcing equilibrium suggests that all suppliers are independent from final good pro-
ducers. Hence, there is no intra-firm trade in this equilibrium. All transactions are done at arm’s
length.
4.3 Pervasive Vertical Integration Equilibrium
This equilibrium occurs when piv curve lies above pio curve and both curves are above the x-axis (both
profits are positive). This requires two conditions; piv curve is steeper than pio curve (M < 1) for all
level of productivity and both curves cross below the horizontal axis. These conditions are shown in
Figure 24.
Figure 24: Pervasive Vertical Integration
This condition is achieved when the productivity cutoff from piv (ψ) = 0 makes pio < 0. The pro-
ductivity cutoff has the following expression.
ψ = ζ
−α+κ
α(σ−1)
(
E
P
) −1
σ−1
(
Fv
J
) κ
α(σ−1)
(4.5)
Substituting this into pio, and pio (ψ) < 0 yields the condition where this equilibrium will take place.
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The inequality can be reduced to the inequality below.
FvM < Fo
This suggests that the equilibrium exists when M is low and Fo is high relative to Fv. The only
problem with vertical integration is that it has higher exogenous fixed cost. If it is lower, vertical
integration is more attractive because it does not involve with the hold-up problem. M is low when φ
is low and δ is high. When the Nash bargaining share is low, the hold-up problem under outsourcing
is severe. Also when δ is high, quality matters a lot which means that under-investment caused by
the hold-up problem will lower profit significantly. Both conditions make vertical integration more
attractive and increase the likelihood of this equilibrium.
Pervasive vertical integration equilibrium implies that all suppliers are vertically integrated. As a
result, all shipments of the inputs to the North are intra-firm.
4.4 Equilibrium with Both Ownership Structures
Some firms are under vertical integration and the rest are under outsourcing in this equilibrium. This
requires two conditions; piv curve is steeper than pio curve (M < 1) for all level of productivity and
both curves cross above the horizontal axis. These conditions are shown in Figure 25.
Figure 25: Equilibrium with Both Ownership Structures
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Apart from M < 1, this equilibrium requires that piv is above pio at the productivity threshold. In
other words, piv (ψ)> 0. This condition reduces to
FvM > Fo.
Both conditions imply that M must be lower than one but it must not be too low. Also, the
exogenous fixed cost must be higher relative to the one under outsourcing.
This industry equilibrium is captured by both productivity cutoff (ψ) and productivity thresh-
old (ψ˜). The productivity cutoff is where the least productive firm under outsourcing operates. In
other words, it can be calculated from pio (ψ) = 0. The productivity cutoff has the same closed form
expression as in Equation (4.4).
The productivity threshold (ψ˜) divides surviving firms into the two ownership structures. Firms
with productivity higher than the threshold choose vertical integration while the rest of the surviving
firms operate under outsourcing. The firm with ψ = ψ˜ is indifferent between the two ownership
structures. In other words, the threshold can be derived from piv (ψ˜) = pio (ψ˜) and its expression is
shown below.
ψ˜ = [1−M]− κα(σ−1)
(
Fv−Fo
J
) κ
α(σ−1)
ζ
−(α−κ)
α(σ−1)
(
E
P
) −1
(σ−1)
(4.6)
Sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 have described the conditions where each of the equilibria can occur.
Empirically, these conditions tend to vary across industries which is why some industries are biased
towards pervasive outsourcing while some are closer to pervasive vertical integration. Nonetheless, it
is more common to observe indusries with both types of integration. The equilibrium is also the most
interesting one as we can easily analyse firms’ decision making process between vertical integration
and outsourcing.
This equilibrium is the main focus of this chapter. When a change in the value of a parameter shifts
either or both productivity cutoff and productivity threshold, the parameter basically is a determinant
of intra-firm trade share. Such parameters are explored in the next main section.
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4.5 Free Entry and Industry Equilibrium
Free entry ensures that, in equilibrium, the expected operating profits of a potential entrant equal the
fixed cost of entry ( fe). The productivity cutoff under different equilibrium have been calculated above
and those firms with productivity higher than the cutoff operate and choose the ownership structure
z ∈ {v,o} that maximise their profits. Therefore the free entry condition becomes
∫ ∞
ψ(P)
piz (P)dG(ψ) = fe.
This condition provides a closed form solution for P. Once P is known, all other equilibrium
variables can be written as closed form expressions.
5 Determinants of Ownership Structures
This section discusses the effect of a change in some parameters on the productivity cutoff and pro-
ductivity threshold in the industry equilibrium where vertical integration and outsourcing coexist. The
movement of these thresholds explains how those parameters affect optimal ownership structure and
intra-firm trade.
5.1 Nash Bargaining Share (φ)
An increase in φ can occur when suppliers have higher bargaining power relative to final good pro-
ducers’. For example, if some aspects of the inputs become verified in the court of law in the South
due to an improvement in judicial quality, suppliers have higher outside option and they should obtain
higher surplus share from the bargaining process. Another possible scenario is that φ is likely to be
higher in the industries where suppliers’ investment is highly important. Clearly, final good producers
will be more willing to offer higher surplus share to their suppliers to mimic the hold-up problem.57
The effects of a change in φ on ψ and ψ˜ will shed light on how the degree of the hold-up problem
affect the optimal ownership structure. In other words, the signs of dψdφ and
dψ˜
dψ will tell how the
fraction of firms under vertical integration (i.e. intra-firm trade share) change after an increase in ψ.
57Endogenising the bargaining process will be an important improvement of this model
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dψ
dφ and
dψ˜
dψ have the following expressions.
dψ
dφ
=−dM
dφ
{M}− κα(σ−1)−1
(
κ
α (σ −1)
)(
Fo
J
) κ
α(σ−1)
ζ
−α+κ
α(σ−1)
(
E
P
) −1
σ−1
(5.1)
dψ˜
dφ
=
dM
dφ
κ
α (σ −1) [1−M]
− κα(σ−1)−1
(
Fv−Fo
J
) κ
α(σ−1)
ζ
−α+κ
α(σ−1)
(
E
P
) −1
σ−1
(5.2)
Equations (5.1) and (5.2) show that dψdφ has the opposite sign from
dM
dφ while
dψ˜
dφ has the same sign
as dMdφ . From Section 4.1.2, we know that
dM
dφ > 0. This implies that
dψ
dφ < 0 and
dψ˜
dφ > 0. Hence,
the productivity cutoff falls whereas the productivity threshold rises when suppliers’ Nash bargaining
share rises. In other words, there are more firms under outsourcing and fewer firms under vertical
integration, leading to a fall in intra-firm trade share. The intuition is simple. When φ increases, the
hold-up problem is less severe which improves the revenue under outsourcing. Some of the firms with
productivity lower than the previous cutoff now find that production under outsourcing is profitable
and join the market and this lowers the productivity threshold. As outsourcing provides higher return,
more existing firms switch to outsourcing which increases the productivity threshold. Hence, there are
fewer firms under vertical integration.
5.2 Intensity of Preference for Quality (δ )
This section explores the effect of an increase in δ on the fraction of firms under vertical integration.
In the model, δ belong to the consumer in the North. Empirically, it varies across countries and
industries. For instance, if we instead look at another country pair where the North is richer, this
can be interpreted as an increase in δ . Moreover, it can also vary across industries because product
markets’ scope for quality differentiation varies across industries as suggested by Khandelwal (2010).
δ enters in the expressions for ψ and ψ˜ through κ , J and M. Hence, differentiating them with δ
does not provide a useful analysis without making further assumptions on the values of some param-
eters. Hence, I opt for a more intuitive route and check the impact of δ on the relative gradient of the
two profit curves.
Equation (4.3) ( dpiodψ = M
dpiv
dψ ) implies that the gradient of pio curve relative to the gradient of piv is
M. From Section 4.1.2, we know that dMdδ < 0. This means that piv will be steeper relative to pio when
δ rises. This might be because piv tilts upwards more than pio or pio might actually tilts downwards.
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Regardless of what actually happen to each curve, it is curtain that the productivity threshold must
be lower. This implies that an increase in the intensity of preference for quality lowers the number of
firms under vertical integration. The intuition is that when quality is more important, under-investment
in quality due to the hold-up problem under outsourcing decreases firms’ profit more. Therefore firms
switch to vertical integration to avoid the hold-up problem. This increases the number of intra-firm
trade transactions.
6 Productivity Lowers Fixed Cost instead of Marginal Cost
This section explores how the aforementioned results change when productivity lowers the endoge-
nous part of fixed costs instead of marginal costs. So far, I have assumed that productive firms have the
ability to produce extra unit at a lower cost. This can happen, for example, when productive firms do
not have to hire many skilled workers to produce a unit of input because it has better technology. It is
also possible that firms with higher productivity can build sophisticated factory or machine at a lower
cost. These costs constitute the fixed costs of production. The likelihood of each situation probably
varies across industries. The analysis below shows how this change affects the results in previous
sections.
The results of this case can be obtained from defining ζ in the Table 31 to be productivity instead
of ψ. Clearly, the expressions for quality, price, quantity, revenue and profit under both ownership
structures are the same as in Section 3.3. Nonetheless, the gradients of the profit functions, productiv-
ity threshold and productivity cutoff are different.
6.1 Gradients of the Profit functions
The gradients of the profit functions
(
dpiv
dζ and
dpio
dζ
)
under the new productivity have the following
expressions.
dpiv
dζ
=
[
α−κ
κ
[ζ ]
α−2κ
κ −1 J
(
E
P
) α
κ
]
dpio
dζ
= M
[
α−κ
κ
[ζ ]
α−κ
κ −1 J
(
E
P
) α
κ
]
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where J =
[ κ
α−κ
](σ−1
σ
) ασ
κ
(
δ−β
α
) α
κ
.
It is logical to compare these expressions with the ones under the old productivity. In order to
make them comparable, I assume that ψ is one when ζ is the productivity term and vice versa. The
gradients under the previous definition of productivity are shown below.
dpiv
dψ
=
[
α (σ −1)
κ
(ψ)
α(σ−1)
κ −1 J
c
(
E
P
) α
κ
]
dpio
dψ
= M
[
α (σ −1)
κ
(ψ)
α(σ−1)
κ −1 J
c
(
E
P
) α
κ
]
When these gradients are compared controlling that ψ have the same value as ζ , their relative values
depend on whether α−κκ is higher or lower than
α(σ−1)
κ . It turns out that
α−κ
κ >
α(σ−1)
κ holds , which
is when ζ has more marginal impact on profit functions than ψ, only when δ > α+β . Nonetheless,
the value of δ under the inequality violates Assumption 1 which says that the profits functions are
concave only when ασ−1 +β > δ . Therefore, we know for certain that
α−κ
κ <
α(σ−1)
κ holds and the
marginal impact of ψ on profit functions is larger relative to ζ ’s. The intuition is that marginal costs
affect price directly and indirectly through quality while fixed costs only affect price indirectly through
quality. In the situation where quality matters but not too excessively to the point where Assumption
1 is violated, the case where productivity lowers marginal costs must therefore have larger impact on
profits.
6.2 Productivity Cutoff and Productivity Threshold
The productivity cutoff and productivity threshold under the case where productivity lowers fixed
costs are shown below.
ζ = M−
κ
α−κ
(
E
P
) −α
α−κ
(
Fo
J
) κ
α−κ
ζ˜ = [1−M]− κα−κ
(
Fv−Fo
J
) κ
α−κ
(
E
P
) −α
α−κ
.
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The productivity cutoff and productivity threshold under the case where productivity lowers marginal
cost are shown below.
ψ = M
−κ
α(σ−1)
(
E
P
) −1
σ−1
(
Fo
J
) κ
α(σ−1)
ψ˜ = [1−M]− κα(σ−1)
(
Fv−Fo
J
) κ
α(σ−1)
(
E
P
) −1
(σ−1)
From these expressions, it is clear that the signs of the effect of φ or δ on these thresholds are
the same. Nonetheless, the magnitudes are different. For example, the effect of φ and δ on these
thresholds are larger under the case where productivity lowers fixed costs instead of marginal costs.
(
dζ
dφ
)
/
(
dψ
dφ
)
= M−
κ
α−κ+
κ
α(σ−1)
[(
κ
α−κ
)
/
(
κ
α (σ −1)
)](
E
P
) −α
α−κ+
1
σ−1
(
Fo
J
) κ
α−κ− κα(σ−1)
(6.1)
Equation (6.1) shows that the right hand side tends to be larger than one because α−κκ <
α(σ−1)
κ .
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Similarly,
(
dζ˜
dφ
)
/
(
dψ˜
dφ
)
tends to be higher than one as well. This means that an increase in φ will lower
productivity cutoff and raise productivity threshold more when the productivity term lowers fixed
costs instead of marginal costs. The intuition is simple. From Section 6.1, it is clear that productivity
under the case where it affects fixed costs has smaller impact on profits because fixed costs only
affect revenue indirectly through the choice of optimal λ while it affects the revenue both directly
though price and indirectly through quality when productivity lowers marginal cost. Therefore, the
productivity threshold and productivity cutoff change more when productivity only affects the fixed
cost because profit is less sensitive to the change of productivity in this case. As a result, an increase
in φ decreases intra-firm trade share more when productivity lowers fixed costs instead of marginal
costs.
7 Conclusion
This chapter shows how product quality affects firms’ decision on their ownership structure through a
heterogeneous-firm model with product-quality differentiation where firms choose whether to produce
relevant inputs in-house or outsource input production. Firms face a trade-off between a sub-optimal
58M−
κ
α−κ+
κ
α(σ−1) > 1because M < 1in this case and the power is negative.
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quality (under outsourcing) and a higher fixed cost (under vertical integration). Their decisions depend
on the values of several important parameters and different sets of parameter values lead to different
equilibrium. The model provides closed form solutions for all variables across all equilibria.
In general, when the hold-up problem - which leads to sub-optimal product quality - becomes less
severe and quality does not matter much, outsourcing is preferred. Conversely, when quality matters
a lot, firms are willing to pay a higher fixed cost and opt for vertical integration in order to avoid the
hold-up problem. Also, more productive firms are more likely to choose vertical integration when
quality matters because they are more capable of covering the higher fixed costs. The effects of the
hold-up problem and the intensity of preference-for-quality on the productivity threshold are larger
when productivity lowers the endogenous part of fixed costs instead of marginal costs. This is because
profits are less sensitive to a change in productivity when productivity only affects fixed costs.
The area of future research includes the empirical test of the predictions. The test requires three
main elements: a good measure of product quality, firm-level productivity and the importance of
quality in each industry. There are several of good candidates for the latter element which include
the estimates of quality ladders in Khandelwal (2010). A detailed intra-firm trade data can provide a
measure for product quality. Using unit price as a measure of quality is not accurate unless product
code is disaggregated enough up to the point where different product codes really represent different
products (i.e. HS8 or HS10). Once the data is obtained, unit price will be the measure of product
quality. With firm-level productivity, empirical exercises can be set up to test the predictions.
8 APPENDIX 131
8 Appendix
8.1 Proof for dMdδ < 0
M =
[
φ−1
α
α−κ −1
]
φ
σα
κ
M =
[
φ
σα
κ −1 α
α−κ −φ
σα
κ
]
dM
dδ
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φ
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κ −1ln(φ)
d
(σα
κ −1
)
dκ
dκ
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α
α−κ +φ
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κ −1 (−1)α (α−κ)−2 (−1) dκ
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−
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κ
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]
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]
+
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]
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As ln(φ)< 0 and φ−1 αα−κ −1 > 0, it must be the case that dMdδ < 0. So when δ is high, it is likely that
M < 1 will hold. In other words, it is more likely that piv curve will be steeper than piowhen quality
matters more.
8.2 Conditions for Positive dMdφ
dM
dφ
=
d{φ−1+ σακ αα−κ −φ
σα
κ }
dφ
=
σα−κ
κ
φ
σα−2κ
κ
α
α−κ −
σα
κ
φ
σα−κ
κ
=
[
σα−κ
κ
φ−1
α
α−κ −
σα
κ
]
φ
σα−κ
κ
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dM
dφ < 0 only when
α (σα−κ)
α−κ φ
−1 < σα
σα−κ
α−κ < φσ
σα−κ < αφσ −κφσ
(1−φ)σα < (1−φσ)κ
(1−φ)σα <−(φσ −1)κ
(1−φ)
(1−φσ)σα > κ
(1−φ)
(1−φσ)σα > α− (σ −1)(δ −β )
(σ −1)(δ −β )>
[
1−φσ − (1−φ)σ
(1−φσ)
]
α
(σ −1)(δ −β )>
[
1−σ
(1−φσ)
]
α
δ >
α
(φσ −1) +β
The derivation above is based on the assumption that σ is high enough so that φσ −1 > 0. When the
elasticity of substitution is very low or close to one, varieties are not substitutes and consumers have
to consume all varieties with equal amount regardless of their quality. In other words, quality does
not matter. Hence it makes sense to assume a reasonably high σ which is greater than one with no
upper bound while φ a fraction which has a value between zero and one. Then we have dMdφ < 0 only
when δ > α(φσ−1) +β holds. Nonetheless, Assumption 1 which restricts these parameters so that the
concavity of the profit functions holds dictates that δ must not be higher than ασ−1 +β . This means
that the inequality δ > α(φσ−1) +β will never hold. This is because
α
(φσ−1) +β >
α
σ−1 +β . Hence it is
certain that dMdφ > 0 during the range of parameters that makes the profit functions concave.
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Part V
Conclusion
This thesis provides several new insights into how firms organise their production with a focus on the
skill mix of employees (the first chapter) and on ownership decisions (the second and third chapters).
The model in the first chapter derives labour demand as driven by the local distribution of wages and
available skills. Firm behaviour in general equilibrium is derived, and determines firm location as
a function of regional costs. This results in estimating equations which can be easily implemented
in two steps. The first step exploits differences in firm hiring patterns across distinct regional factor
markets to recover firm labour demand by type. The second step uses the estimates of the first stage to
introduce local labour costs into production function estimation. Both steps characterise the impact of
local market conditions on firm behaviour through recovery of model primitives. This is of particular
interest when explaining the relative productivity or location of firms, especially in settings where
local characteristics are known to be highly dissimilar.
The results from the first chapter suggest that team technologies combined with favourable factor
market conditions explain substantial differences in firm productivity. Other methods which do not
model worker substitution or factor markets yield relatively skewed productivity estimates in China.
This supports the thesis that modeling a firm’s local environment may yield substantial insights into
production patterns.
The importance of local factor markets for understanding firm behaviour suggests new dimensions
for policy analysis. For instance, regions with labour markets which generate lower unit labour costs
tend to attract higher levels of firm activity within an industry. As unit labour costs depend not only
on the level of wages, but rather the distribution of wages and worker types that represent substitution
options, this yields a more varied view of how educational policy or flows of different worker types
could impact firms.
This chapter also colours the interpretation of heterogeneous productivity at the firm level, since a
component of differences across firms is due to the influence of local supply conditions. Productivity
estimates which result from our model are more important in predicting firm performance than models
based on perfectly substitutable worker types. This suggests that if firm productivity is a measure of
‘competitiveness’ leading to dynamic advantages such as innovation or exporting, then regional factor
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markets should be controlled for. Taken as a whole, our results show that policy changes which
influence the composition of regional labour markets, such as the construction of Special Economic
Zones or liberalisation of the Hukou system, will have sizable effects on firm behaviour, productivity
and location.
Moreover, nothing precludes the application of this chapter’s approach beyond China, and it is
suitable for analysing regions which exhibit a high degree of labour market heterogeneity. As the
model affords the interpretation of trade between countries which have high barriers to immigration
but low barriers to capital and input flows, it is also suitable for analysing firm behaviour across
national borders. Further work could leverage or extend the approach of combining firm, census and
geographic data to better understand the role of local factor markets in hiring, input usage and firm
dynamics.
In the second chapter, I propose a property-rights model where the degree of integration is contin-
uous and becomes a choice variable. Due to incompleteness of contracts and investment specificity,
higher ownership share leads to a bigger incentive for parent firm to invest but decreases its supplier’s
contribution.
The model yields two main predictions for firms under vertical integration. Firstly, the degree of
integration is expected to be high when the relative importance of headquarter’s investment which is
proxied by capital intensity is high. When supplier’s contribution which is proxied by skill intensity
is large, parent firms optimally choose lower ownership share. Thai manufacturing census allows me
to divide the universe of foreign owned affiliates into three groups; horizontal, vertical and mixed
integration. Empirical results confirm the first prediction of the model. The results are highly robust
against many checks. Furthermore, they reveal that the effects of factor intensities on ownership are
heterogeneous across integration types. This emphasises that it is important to only include vertically
integrated firms in the sample when testing property-rights theories which are only applied to those
firms.
The empirical results on the first prediction also suggests that the normal rational behind the prop-
erty rights model might be sufficient to explain the degree of ownership under horizontal integration
while extra elements are needed in order to explain the opposite results under mixed integration. An
extension to my model and further empirical tests on this surprising result are possible venues for
further work.
The second prediction from the model states that the marginal effects of capital and skill intensities
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on ownership should be higher when the elasticity of substitution across varieties is high. Final good
producers increase ownership in order to be able to seize a bigger share of inputs when negotiation
breaks down resulting in a higher outside option. When the elasticity is low, which implies that the
market is not competitive, equilibrium price is steep. In this case, seizing a small amount of inputs can
still generate high outside option without increasing the ownership. Hence ownership is less sensitive
to the importance of headquarter’s investment under low elasticity. The empirical results along with
their robustness checks confirm the prediction. This strengthens the validity of the property-rights
model in this chapter which is based on continuous and endogenous degree of integration. A possible
further work is to check whether the predictions are still valid under datasets from other countries.
The third chapter shows how product quality affects firms’ decision on their ownership structure
through a heterogeneous-firm model with product-quality differentiation where firms choose whether
to produce relevant inputs in-house or outsource input production. Firms face a trade-off between
a sub-optimal quality (under outsourcing) and a higher fixed cost (under vertical integration). Their
decisions depend on the values of several important parameters and different sets of values lead to
different equilibrium. The model provides closed form solutions for all variables across all equilibria.
In general, when the hold-up problem - which leads to sub-optimal product quality - becomes
less severe and quality does not matter much, then outsourcing is preferred. Conversely, when quality
matters a lot, firms are willing to pay a higher fixed cost and opt for vertical integration in order to
avoid the hold-up problem. Also, more productive firms are more likely to choose vertical integration
when quality matters because they are more capable of covering the higher fixed costs. The effects
of the hold-up problem and the intensity of preference-for-quality on the productivity threshold are
larger when productivity lowers the endogenous part of fixed costs instead of marginal costs. This is
because profits are less sensitive to a change in productivity when productivity only affects fixed costs.
The area of future research includes the empirical test of the predictions. The test requires three
main elements: a good measure of product quality, firm-level productivity and the importance of
quality in each industry. There are several of good candidates for the latter element which include
the estimates of quality ladders in Khandelwal (2010). A detailed intra-firm trade data can provide a
measure for product quality. Using unit price as a measure of quality is not accurate unless product
code is disaggregated enough up to the point where different product codes really represent different
products (i.e. HS8 or HS10). Once the data is obtained, unit price will be the measure of product
quality. With firm-level productivity, empirical exercises can be set up to test the predictions. Another
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possible future work is to endogenise the matching process.
This thesis generates several new insights into how firms organise their production. Those new
insights include how firms hire their heterogeneous workers and choose their locations, how existing
results about firm ownership change when the degree of ownership becomes a continuous choice
variable and how product quality affects firms’ decisions on their ownership structure. Several policies
implications can be taken from these three chapters and this thesis also extends the boundaries of
related literature by providing many future research possibilities.
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